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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
While the nature of the evidence available in criminal prose-
cutions varies widely from case to case, there is one constant
among the potential sources of evidence-the defendant himself
is almost invariably aware of whether he actually committed the
offense with which he is charged. The criminal justice system's
approach to that uniquely knowledgeable individual (the de-
fendant) as a source of evidence has an important bearing on its
effectiveness in the pursuit of truth and substantive justice. Leg-
islative discretion concerning this important issue has, however,
been limited by decisions of the Supreme Court since the mid-
1960s. Under Griffin v. California' adverse comment on the de-
fendant's failure to testify is generally prohibited, and under
Carter v. Kentucky2 the jury must be affirmatively instructed
not to draw any adverse inference from the defendant's silence
at trial. Other decisions-particularly Doyle v. Ohio'-have im-
posed major restrictions on disclosure and consideration at trial
of the defendant's silence before trial.
This Report, the eighth in the Truth in Criminal Justice se-
ries, assesses the rules relating to the evidentiary consideration
of the defendant's silence. Its general conclusion is that the ex-
isting restrictive rules in this area are unjustified impediments
to the search for truth. The notion that the fifth amendment's
prohibition of compelling a person in a criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself bars drawing adverse inferences from the
defendant's silence is not well-founded. In practical effect, these
rules impede the conviction of the guilty by barring considera-
tion of an aspect of the defendant's conduct-his failure to re-
spond to the evidence and accusations against him-that is ra-
tionally relevant to the determination of guilt and innocence.
They also disserve the search for truth by artificially shielding
the defendant from the normal incentives he would feel to tes-
tify, thereby making it less likely that he will be available for
questioning. There is no reason to believe that these restrictions
have any overall value in protecting the innocent from unjust
conviction; they may well have the opposite effect.
Part I of the Report examines the historical development of
the rules in this area. Part II assesses the current rules from
both constitutional and policy standpoints. Part III examines
1. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
2. 450 U.S. 288 (1981).
3. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
Adverse Inferences 1007
Journal of Law Reform
the corresponding rules in a number of foreign jurisdictions.
Part IV contains recommendations for reform. The main find-
ings and recommendations of the Report are as follows:
I. THE HISTORY OF ADVERSE INFERENCES FROM SILENCE
Prior to the seventeenth century, the defendant in England
was subject to questioning both before trial and at trial, and ad-
verse inferences could be drawn from a failure to respond in ei-
ther context. The paths of pretrial questioning and questioning
at trial subsequently diverged as the result of basic changes in
trial practice in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The
reaction to inquisitions against religious and political dissidents
in England led to formal recognition of the principle that a de-
fendant could not be compelled to answer incriminating ques-
tions, and the idea that the defendant's interest in the case
made him an untrustworthy source of evidence led to the view
that he should not be questioned at all at trial, even if he
wanted to be questioned. The exclusion of the defendant as a
source of testimonial evidence at trial essentially mooted the
question whether adverse inferences should be permitted from
his silence in that context. However, the pretrial questioning of
defendants by magistrates at the preliminary examination
proved to be a more durable institution, and it persisted in its
traditional form into the nineteenth century. The defendant's si-
lence under questioning by the magistrate, as well as any admis-
sions on his part, were subject to disclosure at trial.
Statutory changes in the late nineteenth century authorized
the defendant to testify at trial. Prior to extensive practical ex-
perience with testimony by the accused, there was widespread
concern that taking the stand would typically pose grave risks
even to wholly truthful and innocent defendants, and statutes in
most states barred adverse inferences from the defendant's fail-
ure to testify. By the early twentieth century, however, the
weight of informed opinion in the United States had turned
against this position. Proposals were advanced in many states to
permit adverse comment on the defendant's failure to testify,
and in 1931 both the American Law Institute and the American
Bar Association adopted resolutions supporting this reform. Sev-
eral states did adopt rules authorizing adverse comment on the
defendant's silence at trial. In most instances the state courts
rejected constitutional challenges to these rules and held that
they were consistent with the right against compelled self-in-
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crimination. At the time of Griffin v. California, there were six
states-California, New Jersey, Ohio, Connecticut, Iowa, and
New Mexico-that had such rules in effect.
The nineteenth century also brought basic changes in the sys-
tem of pretrial interrogation. The interrogation function was ef-
fectively transferred from judicial officers to the newly formed
police forces. Following this change, the admissibility of pretrial
silence by the defendant was generally assessed under the tradi-
tional evidentiary principle that silence in the face of incrimi-
nating statements or accusations could be considered against a
person if response on his part would naturally be expected (the
"adoptive admissions" doctrine). The courts in some states re-
stricted the application of this doctrine to silence in non-custo-
dial situations, but the more common position was that post-ar-
rest silence would also be admitted in appropriate cases.
At the federal level, the 1878 statute authorizing testimony by
the defendant included a provision that there was to be no pre-
sumption against the defendant if he failed to take the stand.
However, the Supreme Court was required to rule on the per-
missibility of considering the defendant's silence in a number of
contexts falling outside the ambit of the statutory no-presump-
tion rule. For example, the Court held that drawing adverse in-
ferences from selective silence by a testifying defendant, and im-
peaching a defendant's testimony by disclosing his silence at an
earlier trial, were consistent with the fifth amendment's prohibi-
tion of compelled self-incrimination. The Court also held repeat-
edly-in Twining v. New Jersey4 and Adamson v. Califor-
nia-that state rules, permitting adverse comment on the
defendant's failure to testify were consistent with the Federal
Constitution.
The latitude of the states to write their own rules in this area
was eliminated by the decision in Griffin v. California,6 which
barred adverse comment on the defendant's failure to testify in
both state and federal proceedings, ostensibly on the basis of the
fifth amendment's prohibition of compelled self-incrimination.
The Griffin rule was carried further in Carter v. Kentucky,'
which held that the defendant is entitled on request to an af-
firmative instruction that no adverse inference is to be drawn
from his failure to testify. However, there have also been post-
4. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
5. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
6. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
7. 450 U.S. 288 (1981):
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Griffin decisions sanctioning adverse inferences from silence in
certain contexts that sit uneasily with the rationale underlying
the general rule of exclusion.
The decisions following Griffin relating to pretrial silence have
also not all been in the same direction. In Doyle v. Ohio8 the
Court generally barred disclosure at trial of a defendant's pre-
trial silence following the receipt of Miranda warnings. Other
decisions, however, have held that silence by a defendant who
had not been given the warnings can be admitted to impeach his
trial testimony.
II. ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS
Consideration of a defendant's conduct as part of the evidence
in a criminal case is generally permitted. For example, it is gen-
erally permissible to disclose and consider the fact that a de-
fendant refused to take a sobriety test; unexpectedly left town
after the offense or fled from the crime scene; concealed, de-
stroyed, or fabricated evidence; or attempted to prevent a wit-
ness from testifying. It is also generally permissible, in both civil
and criminal litigation, to draw adverse inferences from any
party's failure to proffer witnesses or other evidence within his
control, and to comment on the fact that there has been no re-
buttal of the evidence offered against a party. The question is
whether certain aspects of the defendant's conduct-his silence
at trial or before trial-are among the circumstances that can
properly be considered pursuant to these general principles, or
whether constitutional or policy considerations warrant an ex-
ception to their application where the conduct in question is the
defendant's withholding of his own testimony concerning the of-
fense or related circumstances.
The origin and historical understanding of the right against
compelled self-incrimination do not warrant the conclusion that
it bars taking account of the defendant's failure to testify. The
rules in a number of states that permitted adverse comment on
the defendant's silence at trial prior to Griffin were in no way
comparable to the historical abuses that gave rise to the self-
incrimination right, and the understanding of that right in the
later common law period also does not suggest that rules of this
type are invalid. The prevalence of state statutes barring ad-
verse inferences from the defendant's failure to testify resulted
8. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
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from various causes, and cannot reasonably be taken as reflect-
ing a collective judgment that a contrary rule would violate the
right against compelled self-incrimination. In pre-Griffin judicial
decisions, there was substantial support for the view that ad-
verse comment on the defendant's silence is consistent with the
self-incrimination right.
The argument that rules permitting adverse comment on a
failure to testify would jeopardize the innocent is unconvincing.
The assumptions underlying this argument are inconsistent with
other settled rules, such as the rule permitting compulsory cross-
examination of criminal defendants who do testify and the rule
permitting adverse inferences from a defendant's failure to tes-
tify in civil proceedings. Questioning at trial carries a very real
and entirely salutary risk to the guilty defendant, who must lie
on the stand and risk exposure on cross-examination, but no
comparable jeopardy results to the innocent defendant, who can
give a truthful account of the circumstances supporting his inno-
cence. If the defendant does decline to testify, the notion that no
inference should be drawn from his silence amounts to a banish-
ment of common sense from criminal trials for which no ade-
quate justification has been provided. By partially shielding the
defendant from the normal incentives he would feel to testify,
rules barring comment and inferences also increase the likeli-
hood that innocent defendants who could have cleared them-
selves by testifying will instead remain silent and run an in-
creased risk of conviction.
The argument that adverse comment is a "penalty" or imper-
missible burden on silence is also unconvincing. The prosecutor
who comments adversely on the defendant's failure to respond
to the evidence against him is not going out of his way to visit
retribution on the defendant for having the temerity to stay off
the stand, but is simply treating the defendant's silence as he
would any other aspect of his conduct that is arguably suspi-
cious or incriminating. While the prospect of adverse comment
and inferences makes the choice of silence less attractive, this
does not resolve the question whether it amounts to "compul-
sion" in the sense of the fifth amendment. The determination on
this issue in Griffin is at odds with various other decisions by the
Court that have upheld procedural and evidentiary rules that
discourage or circumscribe the choice of silence by the
defendant.
The argument that nothing should be inferred from the de-
fendant's failure to testify because he may have been motivated
to stay off the stand by concern over disclosure of his criminal
Adverse Inferences 1011.
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record is also unconvincing. This argument provides no reason
at all for barring adverse comment and inferences in any case in
which the defendant has no criminal record, or no record that
would be admitted pursuant to the jurisdiction's impeachment
rule if he testified. Various other considerations reduce the force
of this argument in the class of cases in which it does potentially
have some application.
There is no substance to the argument that permitting ad-
verse comment on silence at trial would lead to abuses or reduce
the overall effectiveness of the system in discovering the truth
by lessening recourse to other sources of evidence. A number of
other arguments are also more rhetorical than logical and do not
withstand serious analysis. These include the arguments that
permitting adverse comment is an oppressive "inquisitorial"
practice, that it violates the presumption of innocence, and that
it is inconsistent with general principles governing the waiver of
rights and privileges.
In some respects, the case for disclosure and consideration of
the defendant's silence before trial is even stronger than the case
for permitting the evidentiary consideration of his silence at
trial. There is broad historical support for admitting pretrial si-
lence. The desire to avoid disclosure of a criminal record pursu-
ant to the impeachment rule cannot be the motive for pretrial
silence. While testifying at trial carries a certain price to the de-
fendant-exposure to compulsory cross-examination-no com-
parable consequence follows from talking in informal pretrial
settings. While the exclusionary rule for silence at trial consists
of ordering the jurors not to think about a fact of which they are
necessarily aware-the defendant's failure to testify-an exclu-
sionary rule for pretrial silence produces an actual gap in the
jurors' knowledge of the course of events in the case, keeping
them ignorant of the fact that the defendant did not protest his
innocence or make explanations or denials prior to trial. The
risk of misapprehension of the defendant's motives for not talk-
ing before trial is guarded against by his subsequent opportunity
at trial to explain the reasons for his earlier silence.
III. THE LAW OF FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS
The practice of other countries does not support the view that
broad exclusionary rules in relation to the defendant's silence
are necessary to a fair or civilized system of justice. Democratic
nations generally accept the principle that a person should not
1012 [VOL. 22:3 & 4
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be compelled to answer incriminating questions, but this is not
generally understood to mean that he should be free to remain
silent at no risk to himself, thereby, in effect, obstructing the
investigation. Rather, the more common view is that the trier
should be allowed to draw adverse inferences from a defendant's
failure to tell what he knows at some stage in the process.
In England, for example, the trial judge is permitted to com-
ment adversely on the defendant's failure to testify. While ad-
verse comment is not permitted on the defendant's pretrial si-
lence after being cautioned by the police, the fact that he
refused to talk is not concealed from the jury, and that fact may
be considered against him as a practical matter. French law pro-
vides multiple opportunities for questioning of the defendant,
and freely permits adverse inferences from silence. Before trial,
a refusal to answer in questioning by a magistrate would result
in adverse inferences being drawn by the magistrate, and later
by the court at trial. The trial itself opens with the questioning
of the defendant, and a failure to respond exposes him to
whatever inferences the court chooses to draw. In India, the
judge is not only free to question the defendant at any time dur-
ing trial, but is also generally required to question the defendant
about "each material circumstance which is intended to be used
against him." A refusal to answer exposes the defendant to any
inference the court or jury considers to be warranted.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
In light of the foregoing analysis, the Office of Legal Policy
recommends that the Department of Justice seek reforms in the
rules relating to the evidentiary consideration of the defendant's
silence. Optimally, the trier should be free to consider such si-
lence on the same footing as other aspects of the defendant's
conduct. Given the dominant policy-making role that the Su-
preme Court has assumed in this area, the main implications are
for the Department's litigation program.
First, the Department should seek to persuade the Supreme
Court to limit or overrule Griffin v. California. The desirable ini-
tial position in litigation would be to argue that adverse com-
ment on the defendant's failure to testify should be allowed in
cases in which testimony by the defendant would not expose
him to impeachment by prior convictions.
Second, the Department should seek to persuade the Court to
authorize broader disclosure at trial of the defendant's pretrial
Adverse Inferences 1013
Journal of Law Reform
silence to impeach his trial testimony. The most promising ap-
proach would be to argue that the restriction of Doyle v. Ohio
does not apply if the defendant had been put on notice that his
failure to talk could be used against him.
Third, the Department should seek to persuade the Court to
authorize the use of the defendant's pretrial silence at trial for
purposes other than impeachment of his trial testimony. It could
be argued that silence should be admissible as evidence in the
government's case in chief in a clear "adoptive admissions" situ-
ation, or should be admissible in a situation in which the de-
fendant's silence has a specific bearing on the credibility of a
defense presented through other witnesses.
V. CONCLUSION
The existing rules generally bar questioning the defendant in
the most important investigative and adjudicative contexts un-
less he deems it in his interest to be questioned, and provide
that his failure to speak in these contexts cannot be considered
against him. These rules are unjustified obstacles to the search
for truth. There is no impediment in constitutional principle or
sound policy to rectifying the situation by allowing the normal
incentives to respond to charges of serious misconduct to oper-
ate, and by permitting natural inferences to be drawn if no re-
sponse is forthcoming. Effecting this reform would produce a
more rational and just criminal justice system. It would deprive
"[t]he innocent defendant. . . of no essential protection and the
guilty accused . . . only of a shelter to which he is in no way
entitled."
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"[If] an accused person . . . [is] . . . asked any question from
which evidence of his guilt may be deduced. . . he is not bound
to answer it, and his silence is not to be held to furnish any legal
presumption against him. . . . If all the criminals of every class
had assembled, and framed a system after their own wishes, is
not this rule the very first which they would have established for
their security? Innocence never takes advantage of it; innocence
claims the right of speaking, as guilt invokes the privilege of
silence."
- Bentham9
"However sound may be the . . . conclusion that an accused
should not be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, we see no reason why comment should not be
made upon his silence. . . . It seems quite natural that when a
defendant has opportunity to deny or explain facts and deter-
mines not to do so, the prosecution should bring out the
strength of the evidence by commenting upon defendant's fail-
ure to explain or deny it . . . . If. . . the facts . . . are . . . in
the knowledge of the accused . . . a failure to explain would
point to an inability to explain."
- Adamson v. California0
"The decision [Griffin v. California] that struck down the provi-
sion in California's constitution permitting comment by court
and counsel on a defendant's . . . failure to [testify] . . . war-
rants examination . . . . Comment on the exercise of the privi-
lege was surely not the 'mischief or defect' at which the self-
incrimination clause was aimed, and most informed professional
opinion approved allowing it in some fashion . . . . Mr. Justice
Douglas' opinion [for the Court in Griffin] . . . consists of a few
sentences of characterization, whose tone and failure to take ac-
count of the contrary views of experts are indeed reminiscent of
Lochner v. New York ... .
- Judge Henry Friendly 1
9. A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 240-41 (1825).
10. 332 U.S. 46, 56 (1947).
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The nature of the evidence that is potentially available in a
criminal case varies widely. There may or may not be eyewit-
nesses to the offense. There may or may not be real evidence, or
documentary evidence, or forensic evidence, or circumstantial
evidence. There is, however, one constant among the potential
sources of evidence in criminal cases: The defendant himself is
almost invariably aware of whether he actually committed the
offense with which he is charged.
The criminal justice system's approach to that uniquely
knowledgeable individual (the defendant) as a source of evi-
dence has an important bearing on its effectiveness in the pur-
suit of truth and substantive justice. The importance is twofold.
First, if a suspect or defendant refuses to disclose the truth that
he knows, or fails to respond to the evidence against him, his
silence may itself be considered a relevant factor in assessing the
probability of guilt or innocence. Second, the decision whether
to permit adverse inferences from the defendant's failure to
speak affects the incentive he feels to respond to incriminating
evidence or accusations, and accordingly has a practical bearing
on the likelihood that he will testify and be available for
questioning.
This Report, the eighth in the Truth in Criminal Justice Se-
ries, examines the issue of adverse inferences from a criminal
defendant's silence at trial or before trial. The current rules in
this area in the United States are primarily determined by deci-
sions of the Supreme Court since the mid-1960s. Under Griffin
v. California12 adverse comment on the defendant's failure to
testify is generally prohibited, and under Carter v. Kentucky's
the jury must be affirmatively instructed not to draw any ad-
verse inference from the defendant's silence at trial. These deci-
sions purportedly follow from the fifth amendment's prohibition
of compelling a person in a criminal case to be a witness against
12. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
13. 450 U.S. 288 (1981).
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himself. Decisions following Griffin-particularly Doyle v.
Ohio' 4-have also imposed major restrictions on disclosure and
consideration at trial of the defendant's silence before trial.
Part I of the Report examines the historical development of
the rules in this area from the medieval period to the present.
Part II assesses the current rules limiting disclosure or consider-
ation of the defendant's silence, both from constitutional and
policy standpoints. Part III examines the corresponding rules in
a number of foreign democracies. Part IV contains recommenda-
tions for reform.
I. THE HISTORY OF ADVERSE INFERENCES FROM SILENCE
The history of adverse inferences from silence may naturally
be divided into three periods. The first, which we will refer to as
the "common law period," extended from the sixteenth century
to the early nineteenth century. This period was characterized
by a development which resulted in the exclusion of testimony
by the defendant at trial, mooting the question of adverse infer-
ences or comment concerning his failure to testify. However, the
pretrial questioning of defendants by magistrates continued
throughout this period, and adverse inferences were drawn at
trial from the defendant's pretrial silence. The development in
this period is described in sub-part A.
The second period, extending from the nineteenth century to
the Supreme Court's decision in Griffin v. California,1
presented the question of adverse inferences from the defen-
dant's silence in novel settings as a result of the removal of the
defendant's incapacity as a trial witness and the transition from
pretrial interrogation by judicial officers to police interrogation.
The major procedural developments in this period affecting the
evidentiary consideration of the defendant's silence are reviewed
in sub-part B. The principal decisions of the state courts and the
federal Supreme Court in this period bearing on the same issue
are reviewed in sub-part C.
The third and final period, extending from Griffin v. Califor-
nia to the present, has involved the assumption by the Supreme
Court of broad policy-making powers in this area, relegating the
legislatures and state judiciaries to a relatively minor role. Spe-
cific innovations in this period have included the creation of os-
14. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
15. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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tensibly constitutional rules embodying the most extreme possi-
ble position against adverse inferences from silence at trial and
major new restrictions on disclosure and consideration of pre-
trial silence. However, there have also been discordant elements
in the Court's case law which sit uneasily with the rationales un-
derlying the general rules of exclusion. These have included de-
cisions that directly sanction adverse inferences from the de-
fendant's silence in certain contexts, and decisions in a variety
of contexts upholding other rules that discourage or circum-
scribe the choice of silence. The developments in this period are
covered in sub-part D.
A. The Common Law Period
Prior to the seventeenth century, the defendant in England
was subject to questioning both before trial and at trial, and ad-
verse inferences could be drawn from a failure to respond in ei-
ther context. As a result of developments in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, however, the paths of pretrial questioning
and questioning at trial diverged. The defendant came to be re-
garded as an untrustworthy source of evidence at trial, and ef-
forts to elicit information from him in that context ceased, effec-
tively mooting the question whether adverse inferences should
be permitted from his silence at trial. The procedure for pretrial
questioning of the defendant proved to be more durable, how-
ever, and it persisted in its traditional form into the nineteenth
century. The divergent developments relating to questioning at
trial and pretrial questioning are discussed separately in this
section.
Beyond the intrinsic interest of this early history, it is impor-
tant for its bearing on the interpretation of the fifth amend-
ment's prohibition of compelling a person in a criminal case to
be a witness against himself-the right on which the current re-
strictive rules governing inferences from a defendant's failure to
testify are ostensibly based. The materials associated directly
with the formulation of the Bill of Rights primarily reflect a con-
cern with the grossest inquisitorial abuses, and particularly with
the possibility that the federal government might resort to tor-
ture to obtain confessions in the absence of a constitutional pro-
hibition of compelled self-incrimination. 6 Nothing in these rela-
16. See III Elliot's Debates 447-52; II Elliot's Debates 111; 1 Annals of Cong. 753.
See generally OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DsP'T OF JUSTICE, 'TRUTH IN CRIMINAL Jus-
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tively sparse materials suggests that permitting adverse
inferences from a defendant's silence would constitute "compul-
sion" in a constitutionally offensive sense, but they also do not
provide a complete articulation of the common law right that
was incorporated into the fifth amendment. For a fuller elabora-
tion of the original understanding of the fifth amendment right,
one must look to its common law background.
1. The Trial Examination of the Accused and its Abatement
Under the procedure of the regular criminal courts in England
(the "common law courts") prior to the seventeenth century, de-
fendants were regularly subject to questioning at trial, whether
or not they wished to be questioned. If the defendant refused to
respond, adverse comment was permitted and adverse inferences
would be drawn. The preclusion of counsel and defense wit-
nesses in felony cases generated additional pressures on the de-
fendant to speak. Nevertheless, defendants in common law pro-
ceedings were not questioned under oath, and could not be
punished for remaining silent.
17
The development leading to the recognition of the right
against compelled self-incrimination did not begin with any dis-
satisfaction with the procedure in regular criminal proceedings,
but in the reaction to the methods of courts which followed the
ecclesiastical-as opposed to the common law-mode of proce-
dure. These included the Court of High Commission, which was
active in the persecution of religious and political dissidents in
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. A person
brought before such a tribunal could be required to take an
oath-the oath ex officio-to answer truthfully all questions
that might be put to him. A refusal to take the oath could result
in imprisonment or other punishment. Nevertheless, many vic-
tims of these inquisitions did resist the oath procedure, citing
the maxim: "nemo tenetur prodere seipsum"-"no one is bound
to accuse himself.' 'l 8
TICE' SERIES, REPORT No. 1, THE LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION, Part I.A.2 (1986)
[hereinafter REPORT No. 11, reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 437 (1989).
17. See L. Lvy, THE ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 31-32, 37-38, 215-16, 264-65,
282-84, 320-23 (1968); L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? 9-12 (1959);
1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 325-26, 440 (1883); G. WL-
LIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT 5-7, 42-43 (1963); Note, Comment upon Failure of Accused
to Testify, 25 VA. L. REV. 90, 90-91 & n.15 (1938).
18. See L. LEVY, supra note 17, at 3-4, 23-24, 44-51, 55, 66-67, 77-79, 101-05, 127, 130-
33, 141-43, 154-59, 166, 174-79, 215-16, 250, 266-71, 274-77.
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At this early stage, the right asserted was not a general right
to refuse to answer incriminating questions, but only a right not
to be the source of the initial accusation against oneself. In con-
trast to the common law courts' reliance on grand jury indict-
ment and charges of specific offenses made by identifiable wit-
nesses, these inquisitorial courts could initiate proceedings
against a person on the basis of information provided by anony-
mous accusers, or on the basis of rumor or suspicion that a per-
son may have lapsed in some manner from orthodoxy or loyalty
to the crown. Their proceedings were accordingly in many cases
open-ended fishing expeditions which could elicit from defen-
dants charges against themselves for which evidence had not
previously been provided by any identifiable witness. The
claimed right to refuse the oath was initially predicated on this
particular feature of ecclesiastical procedure-the absence of a
limitation on the scope of inquiry to specific charges supported
by the evidence of identifiable witnesses. "
The Parliament convened in 1640 acted broadly against these.
inquisitorial practices. Legislation was adopted that abolished
the Court of High Commission and its ally in the persecution of
dissidents, the Court of Star Chamber. The legislation further
provided that all trials were thereafter to be determined "in the
ordinary Courts of Justice and by the ordinary course of the
law," and prohibited use of the oath ex officio by any person
exercising ecclesiastical authority.20
These reforms did not directly affect the common law courts,
which had never questioned defendants under oath. Neverthe-
less, the general reaction to inquisitorial abuses in the seven-
teenth century created a psychological climate which was recep-
tive to self-incrimination claims, and which resulted in a
transformation of the earlier-asserted right against compelled
self-accusation into a true right against compelled self-incrimi-
nation. Cases appeared in which defendants claimed a right not
to answer incriminating questions, and judges acknowledged
that they were not required to do so."'
At the same time, the questioning of the accused at trial was
being squeezed from another direction by the growing strength
of the notion that the defendant's interest in the case made him
an untrustworthy source of evidence. The notion that the de-
19. See id. at 3-4, 64-67, 77, 126-27, 130-31, 142-43, 154-59, 177-79, 193-96, 215, 250.
20. See id. at 278-82.
21. See L. LEVY, supra note 17, at 282-85, 313-16; 8 WIGMoRE's EVIDENCE § 2250, at
289-90 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34
MINN. L. REV. 1, 9-11 (1949).
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fendant, as an interested party, should be disqualified from tes-
tifying, did not merely imply that he should have the option of
refusing to answer questions, but was thought to entail that he
should not be questioned at all, even if he wished to be
questioned.22
By the early years of the eighteenth century, these trends had
reached their culmination, and the trial examination of the ac-
cused abated in the English courts.2 s This change was eventually
emulated in American jurisdictions. 4 While the defendant
might still thereafter be able to convey some account of his ver-
sion of the relevant events in the course of presenting a defense,
the remaining opportunities to do so were informal in nature,
and the defendant's remarks had no legal status as evidence.25
The exclusion of the defendant as a source of testimonial evi-
dence at trial essentially mooted the question whether adverse
inferences should be authorized from his silence in that context
until legislative reforms in the late nineteenth century made the
defendant a competent witness."
22. See L. LEVY, supra note 17, at 323-24; L. MAYERS, supra note 17, at 16-18; J.
STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 192-94 (1863); Corwin, The
Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L. REV. 1, 10-
11 (1931).
23. See supra note 22; 8 WIGMORE'S EVIDENCE § 2250 at 291 & n.108 (McNaughton
rev. 1961).
24. The timing of the change on this side of the Atlantic is uncertain because there
are few informative records of early American trials. See generally J. GOEBEL & T.
NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 652-57 (1944) (questioning of de-
fendant at trial continued in New York in eighteenth century); L. LEVY, supra note 17, at
374-77 (questioning adequacy of Goebel and Naughton's evidence and arguing that they
confused exemption from questioning and right against compelled self-incrimination, but
agreeing that defendants required to defend without counsel in many colonies were "vul-
nerable to comments and questions from the prosecution and the bench," and agreeing
that questioning continued at preliminary examination and arraignment).
25. See generally State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200, 216-17 (1867) (defendant had been
required to be silent at trial prior to enactment of competency statute); State v. Cam-
eron, 40 Vt. 555, 565-66 (1868) (courts in state had usually not followed the "old English
practice of calling upon the prisoner to make his statement to the jury"); 5 J. BENTHAM,
RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 382 (1827) (defendant could say whatever he wanted in
making defense but it was not considered evidence); L. LEVY, supra note 17, at 323 (de-
fendant could make unsworn closing statement); I J. STEPHEN, supra note 17, at 440-41
(indicating that scope of defendant's opportunity to impart factual information varied
with development of historical practice, attitudes of individual judges, and presence or
absence of counsel).
26. But cf. J. STEPHEN, supra note 22, at 194-95 (adverse inference would be drawn as
a practical matter from pro se defendant's failure to answer the evidence against him).
1024
SPRING AND SUMMER 1989] Adverse Inferences
2. The Preliminary Examination
While the general tendency of the development in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries was to silence* the defendant at
trial, whether or not he wished to talk, he nevertheless remained
an important source of evidence because of his amenability to
pretrial interrogation. Pursuant to English statutes enacted in
the mid-sixteenth century, defendants were questioned before
trial by justices of the peace or other magistrates in a proceeding
termed the preliminary examination. The use of such examina-
tions was adopted in the American colonies.
27
The applicability of the right against compelled self-incrimi-
nation was recognized at the preliminary examination.2 8 As a re-
sult, the defendant at the examination was not put under oath,
and was not exposed to any formal punishment or penalty for
refusing to answer questions. The notion of "compulsion," how-
ever, was not given any attenuated or fictitious interpretation.
The magistrate was free to question the defendant concerning
the suspected offense, whether or not the defendant wished to
be questioned. Confessions and other admissions obtained from
defendants in the preliminary examination were admitted as evi-
27. See Morgan, supra note 21, at 14, 19; 1 J. BREvARD, AN ALPHABETICAL DIGEST OF
THE PUBLIC STATUTE LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA 460-62 (1814); H. COBB, A COMPILATION OF
THE PENAL CODE OF GEORGIA 8, 43 (1850); J. GoEBEL & T. NAUGHTON. supra note 24, at
134, 339-41, 565, 633-36, 653-56; F. MARTIN. A COLLECTION OF THE STATUTES OF THE PAR-
LIAMENT OF ENGLAND IN FORCE IN THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 282-84 (1792); REPORT
OF THE JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA (1808), in 3 Binney 599, 621; A.
SCoTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 48-49, 55-56, 59-60 (1930); L. MAYERS, supra
note 17, at 175-76; L. LEVY, supra note 17, at 29-30, 35-36, 325, 375.
28. See L. LEVY, supra note 17, at 375, 406. In reading the literature in this area, care
should be taken to distinguish two senses of the phrase "privilege against self-incrimina-
tion" which are often confused. In the narrower sense, it refers to the prohibition of
compelling a person to answer incriminating questions, a common law right of general
application that has been codified in the fifth amendment's stricture against compelling
a person in a criminal case to be a witness against himself, and in comparable provisions
of virtually all state constitutions. The applicability of this right in the preliminary ex-
amination, as in all other proceedings, was recognized in the common law period. How-
ever, the phrase "privilege against self-incrimination" is also sometimes used in an en-
tirely different sense to refer to rules against questioning a suspect or defendant, either
absolutely or without his consent. This broader stricture is not generally entailed by the
Constitution, and may or may not be found to be applicable in particular contexts. See,
e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984). While the right against actual compul-
sion to respond was traditionally recognized at the preliminary examination, the exemp-
tion from questioning at this stage was a nineteenth century development. See Wilson v.
United States, 162 U.S. 613, 615-16, 623-24 (1896); L. LEVY, supra note 17, at 325, 375; L.
MAYERS, supra note 17, at 175-76, 223-24; Morgan, supra note 21, at 14, 19; 3 WIGMORE'S
EVIDENCE § 848 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
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dence at trial.5 ' The defendant's failure to answer the magis-
trate's questions could also be disclosed at trial.3
0
In contrast to the relatively early cessation of the trial exami-
nation of the accused, the statute-based preliminary examina-
tion procedure proved to be more resistant to changes in judicial
attitudes, and persisted into the nineteenth century:
But though the questioning of the accused at his trial
thus ceased in the eighteenth century, his pretrial inter-
rogation by the committing magistrate continued for
more than a century longer. And since his answers before
the magistrate, including his failures to answer, contin-
ued to be put in evidence against him at the trial, the
effect was much the same as though he were still interro-
gated at trial. Not till the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury did the accused achieve exemption from questioning
at the preliminary examination; and in some jurisdictions
... such exemption was not recognized for decades
thereafter ...
As to the accused,.. his exemption from questioning
at the preliminary examination . . . as we have seen, is
not much more than a century old. . . . In that interro-
gation, the prisoner's silence, even when recognized as his
right, was extremely injurious to him at his subsequent
trial, where it was regularly disclosed to the jury.
[T]hose who in this country framed the constitutional
provisions against self-incrimination made no attempt to
change that procedure.31
29. See J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, supra note 24, at 339-40, 653; L. LEVY, supra note
17, at 325, 375; A. SCOTT, supra note 27, at 55-56 & n.29.
30. See E. LIVINGSTON, A SYsTEM OF PENAL LAW FOE THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 212-14
(1833) (despite modification of traditional type of examination to advise suspect that he
need not respond and theoretical preclusion of adverse inference from silence, such si-
lence was disclosed at trial and jury could infer guilt as a practical matter); Morgan,
supra note 21, at 14, 16, 18 (English practice); NEW YORK STATE, FOURTH REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Xxviii
(1849) ("inference of guilt uniformly urged against" defendant at trial from "the mere
fact of his silence" at preliminary examination).
31. L. MAYERS, supra note 17, at 16, 175-76. See generally supra notes 27-30.
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B. Post-Constitutional Developments
As the foregoing review indicates, the common law's approach
to the defendant as a source of evidence at the start of the nine-
teenth century differed fundamentally from that of contempo-
rary procedure. There was no decision whether to "take the
stand," and no "waiver" condition on pretrial custodial ques-
tioning. Rather, the defendant's preferences about being ques-
tioned were irrelevant. At trial, he could not be questioned even
if he wanted to be. Before trial, at the preliminary examination,
he could be questioned even if he did not want to be, and dis-
closure at trial of the occurrences in the examination resulted in
a continued exposure to adverse inferences from a failure to
respond.
Basic changes in both trial and pretrial procedure took place
in the nineteenth century that redefined the issue of the eviden-
tiary consideration of the defendant's silence. Through statutes
enacted in the second half of the nineteenth century, the de-
fendant was made a competent witness at trial, and the question
arose whether adverse inferences should be permitted from his
failure to take advantage of this novel opportunity to testify.
The common law type of preliminary examination generally
went out of existence earlier in the nineteenth century, but it
was replaced by the new institution of police interrogation, and
the question of disclosure of the defendant's pretrial silence
arose again in that context. The changes in trial procedure and
pretrial procedure between the ratification of the Constitution
and the decision in Griffin v. California will be discussed sepa-
rately in this part.
1. The Defendant as a Competent Witness
In 1864, Maine enacted a statute that permitted the defen-
dant to testify at trial. This was evidently an idea whose time
had come, and within a few decades virtually all of the states
had adopted similar legislation. The federal jurisdiction did so
as well, making the defendant a competent witness through an
act of 1878, which is now codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3481.2
32. See Reeder, Comment upon Failure of Accused to Testify, 31 MICH. L. REv. 40,
41-44 (1932); Note, Failure of Accused to Testify, 37 YALE L J. 955, 955-957 (1928). See
generally 8 WIGMoRE's EVIDENCE § 2272 n.2 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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The federal competency statute and a great majority of the
state competency statutes explicitly barred drawing any adverse
presumption or inference from the defendant's failure to tes-
tify." This approach becomes more comprehensible when one
considers the attitude toward testimony by the defendant that
appears in many nineteenth century sources. Prior to extensive
practical experience with testimony by defendants, it was a con-
troversial issue whether permitting the accused to testify would
be of any real value to him at all, and concerns were expressed
that taking the stand would typically pose grave risks even to
wholly truthful and innocent defendants." Given the view of
many concerning the perilous nature of testimony to the defend-
ant, arguments that no adverse inference should be permitted
from a failure to testify would have had considerable persuasive
force."
The prevailing rule, however, was frequently criticized. Earlier
in the nineteenth century, Bentham had stated the classic criti-
cism of expansive self-incrimination restrictions, directed in part
against the traditional prohibition of questioning the defendant
in proceedings other than the preliminary examination., With
respect to the issue of protection of the innocent, Bentham
observed:
The most remarkable singularity of the law of England
is the rule which ordains, that an accused person shall
not be judicially asked any question from which evidence
of his guilt may be deduced. If such a question is put, he
is not bound to answer it, and his silence is not to be held
to furnish any legal presumption against him.
Such is the rule. I do not say that it is always scrupu-
lously observed; there are deviations and inconsistencies;
33. Statutes which barred adverse inferences or presumptions were naturally inter-
preted as barring adverse comment as well. Many statutes explicitly barred both com-
ment and inferences. See supra note 32.
34. The argument was that the defendant's testimony, to the extent that it was ex-
culpatory, would have no credibility because of his obvious interest in the case, and that
taking the stand would expose him to prejudice and embarrassment. See, e.g., Ruloff v.
People, 45 N.Y. 213, 221-22 (1871); State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. 555, 565-66 (1868); see also
Bird v. State, 50 Ga. 585, 589 (1874).
35. See generally State v. Baker, 53 A.2d 53, 58-59 (Vt. 1947).
36. See J. BENTHAM, A TREATsE ON JUDICIAL EvmRsca 240-45 (1825); 5 J. BENTHAM,
supra note 25, at 207-99, 350-58, 381-415. The alternative Bentham favored to the ex-
isting regime of restrictive rules was not compelling defendants to testify, but "permis-
sion ... to put questions to the defendant; for the sake of the faculty which thence
results to the judge, of noting the answers or the silence (whichever is the result), and
drawing his inference from them." Id. at 209.
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but though the bad effects of the system be thus some-
what mitigated, enough remains to excite the regret of
every man who has reflected on criminal jurisprudence,
and sees in this indulgence, only a frequent source of im-
punity and encouragement of crime ....
Let us now consider the case of persons who are inno-
cently accused. Can it be supposed that the rule in ques-
tion has been established with the intention of protecting
them? They are the only persons to whom it can never be
useful. Take an individual of this class; by the supposi-
tion, he is innocent, but, by the same supposition, he is
suspected. What is his highest interest, and his most ar-
dent wish? To dissipate the cloud which surrounds his
conduct, and give every explanation which may set it in
its true light; to provoke questions, to answer them, and
to defy his accusers. This is his object; this is the desire
which animates him. Every detail in the examination is a
link in the chain of evidence which establishes his
innocence.
If all the criminals of every class had assembled, and
framed a system after their own wishes, is not this rule
the very first which they would have established for their
security? Innocence never takes advantage of it; inno-
cence claims the right of speaking, as guilt invokes the
privilege of silence.
3 7
While Bentham's remarks on this issue reflected his character-
istically colorful and hyperbolic style, they did strike a chord
that has resonated through the subsequent debate concerning
self-incrimination rules. Saying nothing in the face of incrimi-
nating accusations or evidence is not what one would ordinarily
expect from an innocent person who has been falsely accused.
While rules barring questioning, or adverse inferences from a
37. A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, supra note 36, at 240-41. The rule noted by
Bentham that a defendant's silence in the face of an incriminating question "is not to be
held to furnish any legal presumption against him" might appear to be analogous to
contemporary rules barring adverse inferences from a defendant's failure to testify. How-
ever, it was an aspect of a broader system in which the basic rule was that "an accused
person shall not be judicially asked any question," and in which the accused was not
considered an admissible source of evidence at trial. A rule barring a presumption from
non-response by a defendant who was not supposed to testify to questions that he was
not supposed to be asked has no implication for the treatment of a defendant's failure to
take advantage of his contemporary right to testify. The import of common law trial
practice for contemporary self-incrimination rules is generally discussed infra at notes
172-178 and accompanying text.
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failure to respond, are obviously helpful to the guilty, their util-
ity to the innocent is a more debatable proposition.
By the early twentieth century, the weight of informed opin-
ion in the United States had acquired a Benthamite cast, at
least with respect to the propriety of adverse comment and in-
ferences concerning the defendant's silence at trial. Proposals
were advanced by law reform bodies in various states to permit
such comment." At the national level, both the American Law
Institute and the American Bar Association adopted resolutions
in 1931 which called for permitting comment on the defendant's
failure to testify. 9 The same approach was followed in the
American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence and in the
Uniform Rules of Evidence.'0
This movement began to influence the practical course of
state enactments. At the close of the nineteenth century, New
Jersey was the only state that permitted adverse comment on
the defendant's silence at trial. In 1912, however, the Ohio state
constitution was amended to permit comment by counsel on the
defendant's silence. In 1927, the South Dakota legislature
amended the state's competency statute to provide that the de-
fendant's failure to testify was "a proper subject of comment by
the prosecuting attorney." In 1929, the Iowa legislature repealed
the provision of the state competency statutes barring adverse
comment and inferences. Through decisions in the late 1920s
and early 1930s, the Connecticut Supreme Court interpreted a
nineteenth century competency statute as permitting adverse in-
ferences from the defendant's silence and adverse comment by
the court. In 1934, the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted a
rule that the defendant's failure to testify "may be the subject of
comment or argument." In the same year, the California state
constitution was amended to permit comment by court and
counsel on the defendant's failure to explain or deny by his tes-
38. See Comment on the Accused's Failure to Testify-Proposed Amendment to the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 10 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 66, 66-67 (1935); Comment and Infer-
ence on Accused's Claim of Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Louisiana, 15 Tu-
LANE L. REv. 125, 133-34 (1940); Note, Comment on Defendant's Failure to Take the
Stand, 57 YALE L. J. 145, 145-46 & n.4 (1947); Failure of Accused to Testify, 37 YALE L.
J. 955, 965 (1928).
39. See 9 A.L.I. PROC. 202-18 (1931) ("The judge, the prosecuting attorney and coun-
sel for the defense may comment upon the fact that the defendant did not testify."); 56
A.BHA. REP. 137-152 (1931) ("That by law it should be permitted to the prosecution to
comment to the jury on the fact that a defendant did not take the stand as a witness;
and to the jury to draw the reasonable inferences."); see also 59 A.BA REP. 130-41
(1934) (court and defense counsel should also be allowed to comment).
40. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 201(3) (1942); UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE,
Rule 23(4) (1953).
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timony any facts or evidence in the case against him. In 1935,
the Vermont legislature amended the state competency statute
to provide that a defendant's failure to testify "may be a matter
of comment to the jury and the jury may draw reasonable infer-
ences therefrom."
4 1
The impetus for reform was blunted, however, by judicial de-
cisions in South Dakota and Massachusetts in the late 1930s
which held that this type of reform would violate the right
against compelled self-incrimination."2 While the reform contin-
ued to enjoy substantial support in judicial decisions, law reform
proposals, and scholarly writing," there was little subsequent
change in enacted state laws. At the time of the Supreme
Court's decision in Griffin v. California, six states-California,
New Jersey, Ohio, Connecticut, New Mexico, and Iowa-permit-
ted adverse comment on the defendant's failure to testify, and
the rest did not."
2. Police Interrogation and Adoptive Admissions
While the judicial questioning of the defendant at the prelimi-
nary examination proved to be a highly durable feature of com-
mon law procedure, it eventually went the way of the early trial
examination of the accused. By around the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, most states had effectively abolished the traditional type of
examination. The end of pretrial interrogation by judicial of-
ficers did not, however, mean the end of pretrial interrogation,
or the end of drawing adverse inferences at trial from the de-
fendant's pretrial silence. At around the same time that magis-
trates were being divested of their investigative functions, the
earliest professional police forces were coming into existence.
The questioning of the suspect was taken up by the police as
part of their general investigative responsibilities.'
5
Under the new regime of police investigation, the significance
of the defendant's pretrial silence was generally assessed under
the adoptive admissions doctrine. This was a traditional eviden-
tiary doctrine according to which a person's failure to respond to
41. See Note, supra note 38, at 145-146 nn.1, 4; infra notes 58, 69-78, 80-88 and
accompanying text.
42. See Note, supra note 38, at 145-46 & n.6.
43. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 53 A.2d 53 (Vt. 1947); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule
201(3) (1942); Note, supra note 38.
44. See 8 WIGmoRE'S EVIDENCE § 2272 n.2 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
45. See L. MAYERS, supra note 17, at 86-87; 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 17, at 228-29.
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damaging accusations or statements could be considered against
him, if response on his part would naturally have been expected.
In such a case, both the incriminating statement and the de-
fendant's silence in the face of it would be admissible. Occasions
for applying the principle arose in criminal cases when incrimi-
nating statements or accusations were made in a suspect's pres-
ence by victims, other witnesses, accomplices, or police officers,
and no denial or explanation was forthcoming. The applicability
of the adoptive admissions principle in such circumstances was
generally recognized."6 The courts in some states restricted the
doctrine to silence in non-custodial situations, but the more
common position was that the general principle remained appli-
cable following arrest and that post-arrest silence would also be
admitted in appropriate cases.47
In addition to the actual admission of pretrial silence by the
defendant in some circumstances pursuant to the adoptive ad-
missions doctrine, proposals were advanced to make pretrial si-
lence more consistently admissible as part of proposed reforms
in the system of pretrial interrogation. At least until the 1930s,
"third degree" abuses in police interrogation were widespread.'
A frequently proposed solution was a return to something like
the common law preliminary examination procedure. While the
details of this type of proposal varied, the basic idea would be to
replace stationhouse interrogation by the police with a proce-
dure for questioning the suspect by a judicial officer, or under
direct judicial supervision. The trade-off for this enhanced pro-
tection for the suspect, from an enforcement perspective, would
be the regular admission at trial of any refusal by the defendant
to answer questions in the examination. For example, the Na-
tional Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, in
1931, formulated the proposal as follows:
Probably the best remedy for [the third degree] would be
the enforcement of the rule that every person arrested
46. See Eisenberg, Arrest as Affecting Adoptive Admissions by Silence, 10 IrrRAMu-
RAL L. REv. 106 (1955); McCleUand, Silence as an Admission in a Criminal Trial in
Pennsylvania, 53 DICKINSON L. REV. 318 (1949); Peterson, Silence to Accusation While
under Arrest at Admission of Guilt, 47 MICH. L. REV. 715 (1949); Schleuter, Silence as
an Admission in a Criminal Trial in Illinois, 1951 U. ILL. LF. 315; Admissibility of
Accusatory Statements as Adoptive Admissions when Defendant is Under Arrest, 35
CALIF. L. REV. 128 (1947); Silence as Evidence of Guilt, 23 GEo. L. J. 331 (1935).
47. See generally the sources cited in note 46 supra; 4 WIGMoRE'S EVIDENCE § 1072
n.11 (Chadbourn rev. 1972); Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV.
935, 1038 (1966).
48. See NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESS-
NESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 153 (1931).
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[and] charged with crime should be forthwith taken
before a magistrate, advised of the charge against him,
given the right to have counsel and then interrogated by
the magistrate. His answers should be recorded and
should be admissible in evidence against him in all subse-
quent proceedings. If he choose[s] not to answer, it
should be permissible for counsel for the prosecution and
for the defense, as well as for the trial judge, to comment
on his refusal. The existing rule in many jurisdictions
which forbids counsel or court to comment on the failure
of the accused to testify in his own behalf should be
abolished."
Similar proposals have frequently been the subject of endorse-
ment or favorable comment by leading jurists from early in this
century to the present.'0 However, it has not actually been tried
in any jurisdiction. Contemporary writers have noted that the
Supreme Court's decision in Griffin v. California creates an im-
pediment to the adoption of such procedures, since it raises
doubts whether the use of the defendant's silence against him
would be upheld by the Court."1
C. Judicial Decisions
The existence in most American jurisdictions of statutory no-
inference rules limited the range of situations in which judicial
decisions were required concerning the propriety of considering
the defendant's silence in determining guilt or innocence. Never-
theless, questions of this sort did arise in litigation. As discussed
earlier, the evidentiary use of pretrial silence-an issue not ad-
dressed in the competency statutes-was an active subject of lit-
igation in the state courts. There were also a number of states in
which courts decided on the rules governing consideration of the
defendant's silence at trial in the absence of statutory guidance,
49. Id. at 5-6.
50. See M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 98-99 (1980); W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND
Socwr 77-81 (1967); Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Consti-
tutional Change, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 671, 713-15 (1968); Kauper, Judicial Examination of
the Accused - A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. Rev. 1224, 1239-55 (1932);
McCormick, Developments in Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEXAS L. REv. 239, 277-78
(1946); Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J.
CiuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1014 (1934).
51. See M. FRANKEL, supra note 50, at 99; Johnson, A Statutory Replacement for the
Miranda Doctrine, 24 AM. Cam. L. REv. 303, 309 & n.15 (1986).
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or ruled on constitutional challenges to provisions that author-
ized adverse comment. The principal state decisions relating to
consideration of silence at trial are discussed in the first part of
this sub-part.
The Supreme Court also had occasion to rule on the eviden-
tiary consideration of the defendant's silence in federal cases in-
volving pretrial silence, in federal cases involving aspects of a
defendant's silence at trial which fell outside the ambit of the
no-presumption rule of 18 U.S.C. § 3481, and in state cases in-
volving constitutional challenges to state rules permitting ad-
verse comment. The principal Supreme Court decisions prior to
Griffin v. California are reviewed in the second part of this
section.
1. State Decisions
The holdings of state decisions concerning the permissibility
of adverse comment on a defendant's failure to testify, where
comment or inferences were not expressly barred by statute,
may be summarized as follows: Decisions in Maine, New Jersey,
Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, and New Mexico upheld such com-
ment. Decisions in Georgia, Virginia, South Carolina, and South
Dakota were to the contrary, as was an advisory opinion in Mas-
sachusetts. California initially ruled against permitting comment
on state statutory and constitutional grounds, but later upheld it
following various changes in the surrounding legal context.
Where states adopted rules authorizing adverse comment, the
state courts in most instances rejected constitutional challenges
to these rules and held that they were consistent with the right
against compelled self-incrimination. 5 The principal state deci-
sions were as follows:
a. Maine- The earliest state decision was State v. Bart-
lett,53 a bank larceny case in which the trial judge's instructions
stated that the jury could properly take into consideration the
fact that the defendants had not testified. Maine had enacted
52. The self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment did not apply to the states
prior to Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). However, all of the states have historically
recognized the right against compelled self-incrimination. All but two of the
states-Iowa and New Jersey-had express self-incrimination provisions in their consti-
tutions. In Iowa, the due process clause of the state constitution was interpreted as en-
compassing a right against compelled self-incrimination. In New Jersey, the same right
was recognized as part of the common law of the state, and was protected by statute. See
8 WIGMoRE's EVIDENcE § 2252 nn.1, 3 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
53. 55 Me. 200 (1867).
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the first statute making the defendant a competent witness in
1864. The statute said nothing about comment or inferences.
The Supreme Court of Maine rejected the argument that the
jury charge in the case violated the state constitution's provision
against compelled self-incrimination. The court reasoned that a
defendant's conduct could generally be considered as part of the
evidence in a criminal case. Treating his silence at trial as one
relevant aspect of his conduct was not unconstitutional compul-
sion, but only an application of traditional evidentiary
principles:
We are not aware that such a construction [barring ad-
verse inferences from silence] has ever been given this
provision in the bill of rights; on the contrary, the con-
struction now contended for is in conflict with certain
well known rules of evidence of long and frequent prac-
tice in our courts.
If a person accused remains silent when he may speak,
he does so from choice, and the choice he makes upon
such occasions has always been regarded competent evi-
dence. It is the act of the party. From time immemorial
the reply or the silence of the accused person, when
charged, has been regarded as legitimate evidence on his
trial for the consideration of the jury. Any act of his,
when charged, tending to sustain the charge, may be
proved. Fleeing from arrest, giving contradictory, untrue
or improbable accounts of the matters in issue, and refus-
als to account for the possession of stolen property, are
evidence of guilt admitted upon the trial of the persons
accused. These are proofs derived from the prisoner's
acts, sayings and silence. He never has been, and is not
now compelled to furnish the Court the evidence of the
existence of these facts. If it be said, these are the volun-
tary acts of the prisoner, the manifest answer is, they are
not more so than the refusal or neglect to testify.
When found in the possession of stolen property and
inquired of concerning it, he must speak or be silent
..... When found with the implements used in a recent
burglary and interrogated in reference to them, he must
answer or be silent . . . . When found with the bloody
instruments of a foul murder, and he is called upon to
explain his possession, he must answer or be silent. . ..
Yet, in all these cases, it has been the uniform practice of
the Court to admit in evidence the conduct of prisoners
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upon such occasions, and it never has been held an in-
fringement of the [self-incrimination right] . ... The
Act in question imposes no obligation upon the prisoner
to testify; it only affords him an opportunity so to do, if
he choose. It changes his condition only in adding one
more opportunity to speak or be silent, and the same rule
applies to the result which has been applied to such cases
for a long time."
The decision in Bartlett was followed while the pertinent stat-
ute remained unchanged.55 In 1879, however, it was overturned
by legislation which provided that a defendant's failure to testify
should not be taken as evidence of guilt."
b. California- Following the Bartlett decision in Maine, the
next state decision was People v. Tyler,57 a rape prosecution, in
which the court reached a diametrically opposite result. The
California competency statute, enacted in 1866, allowed the de-
fendant to testify at his own request, but stipulated that it was
not to be construed as compelling a defendant to testify. The
Court in Tyler held that adverse comment or inferences con-
cerning the defendant's failure to testify would violate the statu-
tory prohibition of compulsion and the corresponding provision
of the state constitution that prohibited compelling a person in a
criminal case to be a witness against himself. The court reasoned
that even if the defendant declined to testify, he would effec-
tively be forced to incriminate himself if adverse comment or
inferences were allowed, since his silence would be taken as evi-
dence of guilt.
The rule of Tyler was followed in California until 1934, when
the state constitution was amended to permit comment by court
and counsel on the defendant's failure to explain or deny any
facts or evidence in the case against him." While this conclu-
sively resolved the issue in favor of permitting comment as far
as state law was concerned, the question of consistency with the
federal Constitution arose after the Supreme Court made the
Self-Incrimination Clause of the fifth amendment applicable to
the states in Malloy v. Hogan." In People v. Modesto," the
54. Id. at 217-18
55. See State v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298 (1871).
56. See Reeder, supra note 32, at 47.
57. 36 Cal. 522 (1869).
58. See 8 WIGMoRE's EVDENCE § 2272 n.2 at 428 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Note,
Comment on Defendant's Failure to Take the Stand, 57 YALE L. J. 145 n. 1 (1947).
59. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
60. 62 Cal. 2d 436, 447-54, 398 P.2d 753, 759-64, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 423-28 (1965).
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court reviewed Supreme Court precedent bearing on this issue,
and held that the California comment rule was consistent with
the fifth amendment.
c. Georgia- In Georgia the defendant was not allowed to
testify under oath, but a statute authorized his making an un-
sworn statement. In Bird v. State"1 the court disapproved an in-
struction that the jury could take into consideration the defend-
ant's failure to make such a statement along with the other
evidence in the case. The court believed that the statutory pro-
cedure authorizing an unsworn statement was of little or no
value to defendants, and that it would be unfair and contrary to
the intent of the statute if the defendant's unsworn statements
"could not practically count much for him, certainly not as other
evidence," but his failure to make a statement could be consid-
ered against him on the same basis as other evidence. The rule
barring adverse comment continued to be followed in later
cases.
62
d. Virginia- In Price v. Commonwealth's the court stated
that adverse comment was improper under a facially uninforma-
tive competency statute on the ground that a contrary rule
would be in conflict with the purpose of the statute and the pre-
sumption of innocence. Later Virginia statutes contained express
no-comment and no-presumption language."
e. South Carolina- In State v. Howard" the prosecutor had
commented adversely on the fact that the defendant had not
taken the stand to repudiate an earlier confession. The court in
Howard held that such comment was inconsistent with the per-
missive nature of the competency statute and the state constitu-
tion's prohibition of compelled self-incrimination. The decision
was conclusory. The same rule was followed in later cases."
f. New Jersey- In Parker v. State the trial judge had com-
mented as follows on the defendant's failure to respond to testi-
mony by prosecution witnesses that he had engaged in illegal
liquor sales: "The defendant has heard this evidence, but has
remained in his seat without attempting to deny or contradict
the testimony given by the state's witnesses. Neither has any
61. 50 Ga. 585 (1874).
62. See 8 WIGMORz'S EVIDENCE § 2272 n.2 at 429 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
63. 77 Va. 393 (1883).
64. See Miller v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 890, 899-900, 149 S.E. 459, 461 (1929).
65. 35 S.C. 197, 202-03, 14 S.E. 481, 482-83 (1892).
66. See 8 WIGMORE'S EVIDENCE § 2272 n.2 at 432-33 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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other witness been called to refute it. Under the circumstances,
the court submits the case for your determination."67
The reviewing court held that comment of this type was
proper under the state competency statute, which was silent on
the subject of comment and inferences. The rationale was simi-
lar to that of the Supreme Court of Maine in the Bartlett case:
Under traditional evidentiary principles, a defendant's silence in
the face of declarations or charges of his guilt could be consid-
ered against him, if response on his part could properly be ex-
pected. Once the defendant had been made a competent witness,
this principle would apply to his failure at trial to respond to
evidence by the government that he would be in a position to
answer or rebut.
The rule permitting adverse comment on the defendant's fail-
ure to testify continued to be applied in New Jersey, giving that
state the longest historical experience with such a rule. It was
eventually codified in the New Jersey rules of evidence.68
g. Connecticut- The original competency statute in Con-
necticut had explicitly barred comment by the court or prosecu-
tor on the defendant's failure to testify. In 1879, however, that
statute was repealed and replaced by a new provision reading:
"The neglect or refusal of an accused party to testify shall not
be commented upon to the court or jury."
In the late 1920s, the Connecticut Supreme Court began a line
of decisions construing the 1879 statute in a manner favorable to
inferences and comment on silence. in State v. Colonese,69 State
v. Guilfoyle,70 and State v. Ford,1 the court held that it was
permissible for the court and jury to draw adverse inferences
from the defendant's failure to testify in response to the evi-
dence against him, despite the statutory rule limiting comment.
In State v. Heno7' the court held that the 1879 statute was only
meant to bar unfair comment by counsel to the court or jury,
and that it was permissible for the trial court to comment ad-
versely on the defendant's failure to testify.
In reaching these results, the court expressly rejected the ar-
gument that permitting adverse inferences would violate the
right against compelled self-incrimination. "There is no actual
67. 61 N.J.L. 308, 312-14, 39 A. 651, 653-654 (1898), afl'd, 62 N.J.L. 801, 45 A. 1092
(1899).
68. See 8 WIGMORE'S EVIDENCE § 2272 n.2 at 431 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
69. 108 Conn. 454, 463-464, 143 A. 561, 565 (1928).
70. 109 Conn. 124, 144, 145 A. 761, 768 (1929).
71. 109 Conn. 490, 496-500, 146 A. 828, 829-31 (1929).
72. 119 Conn. 29, 34-35, 174 A. 181, 183 (1934).
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compulsion upon the accused to testify, and, when he elects not
to do so, he is obviously not being compelled to give evidence
against himself." An inference from the defendant's failure to
testify would be no different in principle from the inference
which always arises from the nonproduction of a competent wit-
ness. The court also believed that barring such inferences would
make the conviction of the guilty more difficult without contrib-
uting to the protection of the innocent.
8
Following these decisions, the rule in Connecticut continued
to be that the court, but not the prosecutor, could comment on
the defendant's failure to testify.
7'
h. South Dakota- Prior to 1927, South Dakota had the
usual sort of competency statute, which barred any presumption
against a defendant based on his failure to testify. In 1927, the
state legislature changed the statute to provide that a defend-
ant's failure to testify is "a proper subject of comment by the
prosecuting attorney."
In State v. Wolfe78 the state supreme court held that the 1927
statute was inconsistent with the right against compelled self-
incrimination in the state constitution. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court relied on an earlier decision, State v. Vroman,7 s
which had stated that the pre-1927 statutory no-presumption
rule was entailed by the constitutional self-incrimination provi-
sion. The court also drew support from its belief that judicial
decisions in many other states had "adopted the same rule," and
that there was no authority to the contrary aside from the early
decisions in Maine. This view, however, was incorrect.7 7 Finally,
the court believed that South Dakota was the only state that
had adopted legislation authorizing adverse comment in the
73. State v. Ford, 109 Conn. at 498-99, 146 A. at 830.
74. 8 WIGMORE'S EVIDENCE § 2272 at 428-29 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
75. 64 S.D. 178, 266 N.W. 116 (1936).
76. 45 S.D. 465, 188 N.W. 746 (1922).
77. In support of the assertion that other judicial decisions had generally "adopted
the same rule," the court in Wolfe cited cases from ten other states. See 64 S.D. at 186,
266 N.W. at 120. However, many of these were actually cases decided under statutory
no-inference rules which merely contained dictum that was critical for one reason or
another of the idea of permitting adverse comment or inferences concerning the defen-
dant's failure to testify. See generally the textual discussion of state decisions and infra
notes 89-93.
In addition to the early Maine decisions, which involved a favorable determination of
the constitutional issue, the Supreme Court of Connecticut had held in decisions running
from 1928 to 1934 that adverse comment and inferences concerning a defendant's failure
to testify were consistent with the right against compelled self-incrimination. See the
textual discussion relating to Connecticut. The rejection of the compelled self-incrimina-
tion argument was also implicit in the New Jersey decisions, although the right was not
constitutionally protected in that state. See infra note 89.
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presence of a constitutional prohibition of compelled self-incrim-
ination. However, this belief was also incorrect.
78
i. Massachusetts- In 1938, the Senate of Massachusetts
asked the state supreme court for an advisory opinion concern-
ing the constitutionality of a bill that would have authorized a
trial court to instruct the jury that it could take into considera-
tion the defendant's failure to testify in response to material
prosecution evidence that he would be in a position to contra-
dict. The court answered in In re Opinion of the Justices79 that
this would be inconsistent with the state constitution's prohibi-
tion of compelled self-incrimination. The decision relied primar-
ily on dicta to the same effect in earlier Massachusetts decisions.
j. Iowa- In 1929, the Iowa legislature repealed a statutory
provision barring adverse comment and inferences concerning a
defendant's failure to testify. In State v. Ferguson,80 a cattle
rustling prosecution, the defense argued that the prosecutor's
comment on the defendant's failure to testify was inconsistent
with the due process clause of the state constitution. The court
held that the statutory change was intended to authorize such
comment, and rejected the constitutional challenge. The court
noted in the course of the decision that the federal Supreme
Court had held that such comment was consistent with the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Con-
78. In 1935, the Vermont legislature had amended the state competency statute to
permit comment and inferences, in the presence of an express constitutional prohibition
of compelled self-incrimination. See the textual discussion of Vermont. In 1929, the Iowa
legislature had repealed a statutory prohibition of comment and inferences for the same
purpose. The right against compelled self-incrimination had been held to be encom-
passed in the due process clause of the state constitution of Iowa. See the textual discus-
sion relating to Iowa; State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902).
In State v. Heno, 119 Conn. 29, 34-35, 174 A. 181, 183 (1934), the court stated that a
nineteenth century amendment of the state competency statute was intended to permit
comment by the court on the defendant's failure to testify, and held that this was consis-
tent with the state constitution's prohibition of compelled self-incrimination. The New
Mexico Supreme Court also adopted a rule permitting comment on the defendant's fail-
ure to testify in 1934, in the presence of a constitutional prohibition of compelled self-
incrimination. See the textual discussion relating to Connecticut and New Mexico.
While the authorization of comment in Ohio and California had been effected by con-
stitutional amendment, in 1912 and 1934 respectively, this cannot reasonably be taken as
reflecting an endorsement of the judgment that the same result could not validly be
achieved through ordinary legislation. Rather, given the appearance of holdings or dicta
in some state judicial decisions that comment or inferences would violate the self-incrim-
ination right, see, e.g., People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522 (1869); Tate v. State, 76 Ohio St. 537,
81 N.E. 973 (1907), the constitutional amendment route would have appeared prudent or
practically necessary to avoid a risk of judicial invalidation.
79. 300 Mass. 620, 15 N.E.2d 662 (1938).
80. 226 Iowa 361, 283 N.W. 917 (1939).
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stitution in Twining v. New Jersey;8' that New Jersey practice
and the early Maine decisions supported this approach; and that
all state decisions to the contrary were decided under statutory
or constitutional provisions differing from those of Iowa. The
court also stated that due process under the Iowa state constitu-
tion included the defendant's right not to be compelled to testify
against himself, but that permitting adverse inferences from a
failure to testify did not violate due process. Following the Fer-
guson decision, adverse comment on the defendant's failure to
testify continued to be allowed in Iowa.
82
k. Vermont- In 1935, the Vermont legislature changed the
state competency statute to provide that a defendant's failure to
testify "may be a matter of comment to the jury and the jury
may draw reasonable inferences therefrom." The change had
been proposed by the Vermont Bar Association, whose proposal
was inspired by the American Bar Association resolutions sup-
porting this reform. The question of the consistency of this pro-
vision with the state constitution's prohibition of compelled self-
incrimination came before the state supreme court in State v.
Baker.8 The result was the most exhaustive state decision on
this issue.
The court in Baker reviewed the historical origin and under-
standing of the self-incrimination right, and concluded that it
was directed against "torture, force, and the inquisitorial prac-
tices of past centuries," and not against the circumstantial pres-
sures which a defendant would normally feel to respond to the
evidence against him." The court reasoned that comment by the
prosecutor on the defendant's failure to testify did not make the
jury aware of anything it did not already know, or create a possi-
bility of adverse inferences that would not have existed in any
event. While the defendant had been barred from testifying in
the common law period, that reflected the disqualification-for-
interest rationale. The long persistence of this disqualification
and the prevalence of no-presumption rules in the nineteenth
century competency statutes reflected apprehensions that sub-
jecting innocent defendants to cross-examination would seri-
ously prejudice them. Subsequent experience, however, had
shown that cross-examination did not jeopardize the innocent.
The court also suggested that permitting adverse inferences
81. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
82. See 8 WIGMoRE's EVIDENCE § 2272 n.2 at 429 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
83. 115 Vt. 94, 53 A.2d 53 (1947).
84. 115 Vt. at 105, 53 A.2d at 59-60 (quoting from dissent to Massachusetts advisory
opinion, 300 Mass. 620, 15 N.E.2d 662 (1938)).
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from the defendant's silence at trial would only be an applica-
tion of the general evidentiary principles that silence in the face
of incriminating facts may be considered against a defendant,
and that adverse inferences may be drawn from the defense's
failure to produce a witness within its control who could eluci-
date the matters in issue. 5'
While the court in Baker upheld the statutory comment rule,
this did not prove to have a lasting practical effect. In 1955, the
state legislature amended the statute to bar adverse comment
and inferences concerning the defendant's failure to testify."
1. New Mexico- The final important decision under a state
constitution was State v. Sandoval.87 It was a prosecution for
assault with intent to rape. The prosecutor commented on the
defendant's failure to testify. This was authorized by a rule the
New Mexico Supreme Court had adopted in 1934, which pro-
vided that the defendant's failure to testify "may be the subject
of comment or argument." This rule had also apparently been
inspired by the ABA and ALI resolutions.
The court in Sandoval held that the rule was consistent with
the state constitution's prohibition of compelling a person to tes-
tify against himself in a criminal proceeding. The court relied
primarily on the earlier decisions to the same effect in Maine
and Vermont, and the dissenting opinions in the South Dakota
decision. The rule permitting comment in New Mexico contin-
ued until Griffin v. California."
m. Concluding Observations- As the foregoing review of
state decisions indicates, there was no consensus or near-consen-
sus among the state courts about the advisability of permitting
adverse comment and inferences concerning a defendant's fail-
ure to testify. Authority was also divided on the constitutional
issue, but the courts in several states held that permitting com-
ment was consistent with the self-incrimination right.89
85. See 115 Vt. at 98-111, 53 A.2d at 56-63.
86. See 8 WIGMORE's EVIDENCE § 2272 n.2 at 433 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
87. 59 N.M. 85, 279 P.2d 850 (1955).
88. See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 611-12 n.3.
89. As the textual discussion shows, the states in which the courts held that comment
was consistent with the right against compelled self-incrimination included Maine, Con-
necticut, Iowa, Vermont, and New Mexico. In all of these states but Iowa, the state con-
stitutions included express self-incrimination provisions, and in Iowa the right against
compelled self-incrimination had been held to be encompassed in the state constitution's
due process clause. See State v. Ferguson, 226 Iowa 361, 372-73, 283 N.W. 917, 922-23
(1939); State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902). The rejection of the compelled
self-incrimination objection was also implicit in the New Jersey decisions, though the
right was not incorporated in the state constitution. See, e.g., State v. Gimbel, 107 N.J.L.
235, 239-40, 151 A. 756, 758-59 (1930) (upholding charge to jury that defendant could not
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Beyond the cases discussed above, in which state courts were
actually required to rule on the constitutional issue, or to make
decisions concerning the rule to be followed in the absence of
legislative guidance,"' remarks appeared in decisions in some
states with no-presumption statutes concerning the wisdom or
constitutionality of permitting comment. Some decisions sug-
gested that permitting adverse comment would undermine the
value of the self-incrimination right,"' or would actually violate
be compelled to testify under the law of the state, but that adverse inferences could be
drawn from his failure to do so); State v. Miller, 71 N.J.L. 527, 531-32, 60 A. 202, 203-04
(1905) (right against compelled self-incrimination part of common law of state). See gen-
erally Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908); 8 WIGMORE's EVIDENCE § 2252 n.1
(McNaughton rev. 1961). In California, the state supreme court held that the state rule
permitting comment was consistent with the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amend-
ment to the federal Constitution in People v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 447-54, 398 P.2d
753, 759-64, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 423-28 (1965).
On the other side of the constitutional issue, the decision in South Dakota and the
advisory opinion in Massachusetts held that statutory rules authorizing comment would
violate the right against compelled self-incrimination. Also, the early decisions in Califor-
nia and South Carolina, which decided on the rule to be applied under facially uninform-
ative statutes, invoked both constitutional and statutory grounds for barring comment.
90. A few other cases may be noted in which state courts filled out statutory rules
that were incompletely specified, or resolved ambiguities. In State v. Clarke, 48 Nev. 134,
148-50, 228 P. 582, 586-87 (1924), a statutory rule which expressly barred adverse com-
ment by the court was held to imply a like restriction on comment by the prosecutor. In
Washington, the state supreme court adopted a rule deleting a provision of the state
competency statute which had uniformly required the trial judge to charge the jury that
no inference of guilt arises from the defendant's failure to testify. In a subsequent line of
decisions, the court held that it had validly abrogated the requirement of giving such an
instruction in the + absence of a request by the defendant, but held that it lacked the
authority to abrogate the defendant's substantive right to such an instruction on request
and to protection against adverse comment by the prosecutor. The first decision in the
line placed this result on constitutional (compelled self-incrimination) as well as statu-
tory grounds, citing California decisions to the same effect. See State v. Pavelich, 150
Wash. 411, 273 P. 182 (1928); State v. Pavelich, 153 Wash. 379, 279 P. 1102 (1929); State
v. Mayer, 154 Wash. 667, 670-71, 283 P. 195, 197 (1929). In Anderson v. State, 27 Wyo.
345, 362-71, 196 P. 1047, 1051-55 (1921), the court was required to decide whether a
statute containing a no-presumption and no-comment rule barred adverse comment on
the defendant's decision to make an unsworn statement instead of testifying as a wit-
ness. The court held that such comment was improper. In the course of the decision, the
court noted and quoted from a number of decisions which indicated that a contrary rule
would violate the right against compelled self-incrimination, but the result seemed to be
based primarily on statutory construction and presumption of innocence grounds.
91. In Ruloff v. People, 45 N.Y. 213, 221-22 (1871), the court stated that the self-
incrimination right would be "practically abrogated" if the defendant's failure to testify
could be used against him, but acknowledged that the defendant would "not actually
[be] compelled to be a witness against himself' if that were allowed. In Petite v. People,
8 Colo. 518, 519-20, 9 P. 622, 623 (1886), the court stated similarly that a failure to
enforce carefully the statutory no-inference rule would result in a "practical abrogation"
of the right against compelled self-incrimination, and that if silence were taken as evi-
dence of guilt, the defendant would be "practically forced" to testify. See generally State
v. Wolfe, 64 S.D. 178, 194-96, 266 N.W. 116, 124-25 (1936) (Bakewell, J., dissenting)
(discussion of Ruloff and Petite). In State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. 555, 565-66 (1868), the
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it.9" At the level of dictum, there were also contrary decisions
which suggested that adverse comment and inferences would be
consistent with that right.'8 On either side of the issue, these
remarks generally did not involve serious analysis of the consti-
tutional question and amounted to observations concerning an
court stated in passing that adverse comment was prohibited by "the express terms of
the statute as well as the fair interpretation of the constitution," but the discussion in
the decision appeared to focus on policy issues and did not mention the right against
compelled self-incrimination. Cf. State v. Baker, 115 Vt. 94, 102-04, 53 A. 2d 53, 58-59
(1947) (dismissing remark in Cameron as dictum).
92. Remarks which stated or suggested that permitting adverse inferences or com-
ment would violate the right against compelled self-incrimination appeared in such deci-
sions as Tate v. State, 76 Ohio St. 537, 81 N.E. 973 (1907); Jarman v. State, 47 P.2d 220,
222 (Okla. 1935); Staples v. State, 89 Tenn. 231, 14 S.W. 603 (1890); and State v. Taylor,
57 W. Va. 228, 234-35, 50 S.E. 247, 249 (1905). The remarks on the constitutional issue in
the decisions from Tennessee, Ohio, and Oklahoma were essentially conclusory.
The case from West Virginia was unique in this group in claiming a historical justifica-
tion for its interpretation of the self-incrimination right, but its view of history rested on
a misreading of a treatise. The court believed that "[b]efore the assistance of counsel was
allowed, prisoners were at liberty to make statements to the jury, and, upon their volun-
tarily doing so, they were sometimes questioned by the attorney general, but were at
liberty to stop at any time and remain silent, and, in that event, their silence was not
permitted to raise any inference or presumption against them." 57 W. Va. at 235, 50 S.E.
at 249. CooLz'S CoNsTrruTONAJ LIMrTATioNs was cited as the source on this point.
However, what Coojzv's actually said was that the accused was free to make statements
at trial in the early common law period, and that he was sometimes asked questions by
the prosecutor or judge, which he "might answer or not at his option." In a separate
passage, CooLz''s offered the opinion that unfavorable inferences should not be permit-
ted from the defendant's failure to testify under contemporary competency statutes, and
that if the defendant did decide to testify, he should be free to stop at any time, leaving
it to the jury to determine what evidentiary weight should be given to such incomplete
testimony. See CooLEY's CONSTTUMTONAL LIMrrATIONs 447-49 (7th ed. 1903). The West
Virginia court evidently hybridized these passages to produce its revisionist account of
historical practice..
93. The earliest New York decision, Ruloff v. People, 45 N.Y. 213, 221-22 (1871), was
strongly critical of the decision to permit the defendant to testify, but acknowledged that
permitting his failure to testify to be used against him would not actually compel him to
be a witness against himself. People v. Courtney, 94 N.Y. 490, 493-94 (1884), contained
dicta reflecting the same view on the compelled self-incrimination issue. In People v.
Reese, 258 N.Y. 89, 101-03, 179 N.E. 305, 309 (1932), the court seemed to be signalling
the state legislature that it would be amenable to legislation authorizing comment on the
defendant's failure to testify.
Massachusetts produced dicta on both sides of the issue. Early cases contained lan-
guage indicating that the no-presumption rule was of constitutional dimensions, see
Commonwealth v. Scott, 123 Mass. 239, 241 (1877); Commonwealth v. Harlow, 110 Mass.
411 (1872), but there was also dictum which indicated that adverse comment and infer-
ences concerning a defendant's failure totestify would be permitted in the absence of a
statutory rule to the contrary, see Phillips v. Chase, 201 Mass. 444, 450, 87 N.E. 755, 758
(1909). In the 1938 advisory opinion in Massachusetts, the court sided with the anti-
comment dicta.
In State v. Pearce, 56 Minn. 226, 234-38, 57 N.W. 652, 654-55 (1894), the court evi-
dently saw no conflict with the right against compelled self-incrimination in permitting
the jury to draw adverse inferences from the defendant's failure to testify.
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issue that was not actually presented in the presence of a statu-
tory no-presumption rule.
2. Supreme Court Decisions
Prior to Griffin v. California" the Supreme Court did not
hold in any case that adverse comment or inferences concerning
a defendant's silence would violate the right against compelled
self-incrimination. The Court upheld the constitutionality of
such comments or inferences in a number of specific contexts. In
ruling on the permissibility of inferences from silence as an evi-
dentiary matter, the Court reached divergent results in different
contexts. Cases relating to silence at trial and cases relating to
pretrial silence will be discussed separately.
a. Silence at trial- Prior to the late nineteenth century, de-
fendants in federal proceedings could not testify in light of the
common law doctrine of testimonial incapacity. The federal stat-
ute enacted in 1878 that made the defendant a competent wit-
ness-now 18 U.S.C. § 3481-followed the common approach of
state statutes in providing that a defendant's failure to testify
"shall not create any presumption against him." The Supreme
Court naturally interpreted the statute as barring adverse
prosecutorial comment on the defendant's failure to take the
stand,' and later held that the defendant was entitled under the
statute to have the jury charged concerning the no-presumption
rule."" Despite the statutory rule in this area, however, some is-
sues arose requiring creative resolutions by the Court.
The question of greatest general importance concerned the
permissibility of adverse inferences when the defendant did take
the stand, but then failed to address some of the evidence
against him or refused to answer particular questions on cross-
examination. Dictum in Fitzpatrick v. United States" suggested
that the trial court would "probably" have no power to compel
response by the defendant in such circumstances, but that his
refusal to answer questions on cross-examination would be a
proper subject of comment to the jury.9 Later, in Caminetti v.
94. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
95. See Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893).
96. See Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
97. 178 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1900).
98. The most interesting aspect of the dictum in Fitzpatrick was the Court's appar-
ent assumption that adverse comment on the defendant's refusal to answer would be
permissible because such comment would not constitute compulsion. Later cases made it
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United States," the Court held squarely that such comment was
proper. In that case, a defendant charged with interstate trans-
portation of women or girls for immoral purposes failed to -ex-
plain in his testimony the nature or purpose of an interstate trip
he had taken with the girls identified in the indictment. The
trial court charged the jury that if a testifying defendant "has
failed to deny or explain acts of an incriminating nature" estab-
lished by the prosecution's evidence, then both comment and
consideration by the jury would be proper, "since it is a legiti-
mate inference that, could he have truthfully denied or ex-
plained the incriminating evidence against him, he would have
done so." The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's objection
that this instruction "virtually made him a witness against him-
self in derogation of rights secured by the Fifth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution." The Court held that a defendant who
"voluntarily relinquished his privilege of silence" should not be
free to address only matters that would help his case without
facing the inference that would naturally arise from his failure
to "speak upon matters within his knowledge which might in-
criminate him."100
While Caminetti settled the general rule that adverse com-
ment and inferences are permitted in relation to a testifying de-
fendant's selective silence, the Court reached a contrary result in
an unusual factual setting in Johnson v. United States.10 1 In
that case the trial court erroneously ruled that a testifying de-
fendant could invoke the fifth amendment right on cross-exami-
nation with respect to matters that could expose him to other
criminal charges. The Supreme Court concluded that adverse
comment by the prosecutor on this invocation was improper.
However, the rationale of the decision, which reflected an exer-
cise of the Court's supervisory power, was that the defendant
could have been "entrapped" or "misled" into claiming the priv-
ilege by the trial court's approving of his doing so, and then un-
predictably permitting the prosecutor to argue that the claim
was probative of guilt.102 The case did not present the question
whether comment or inferences would be permissible in situa-
tions in which the defendant could have anticipated that ad-
clear, however, that a testifying defendant could actually be compelled to respond on
cross-examination. See Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, 310-11, 314-15 (1912);
Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
99. 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
100. Id. at 492-95.
101. 318 U.S. 189 (1943).
102. Id. at 197-99.
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verse comment would be permitted concerning his invocation of
the privilege.103
Beyond the few issues in federal trials that fell outside the
ambit of the statutory no-presumption rule, the Court was called
on to consider the constitutionality of state rules that permitted
adverse comment on the defendant's failure to testify. The issue
initially arose in Twining v. New Jersey,'G4 which involved a
charge that certain bank officials had deceived a state bank ex-
aminer through the use of a forged document. The defendants
did not testify themselves or call any other witnesses to rebut
the government's evidence supporting the charge. Consistent
with New Jersey law, the trial judge discussed the fact that the
defendants had not testified and advised the jury that they
could take that fact into consideration.105 The Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction on the ground that the Self-Incrimina-
tion Clause of the fifth amendment did not apply of its own
force to the states;'" that it had not been made applicable to the
states by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the fourteenth
amendment;107 and that exemption from compulsory self-incrim-
ination was not part of due process of law.108 At the close of the
decision, the Court emphasized that it had only assumed for
purposes of the discussion that the type of comment at issue in-
fringed the privilege against self-incrimination, and that it did
"not intend . . . to lend any countenance to the truth of that
assumption." The Court noted that authority was divided on
this question, but that it was unnecessary to address it because
of the inapplicability of the self-incrimination right under the
federal Constitution to the states. 10 9
The issue came before the Court a second time in Adamson v.
California,1 in which a murder defendant challenged the Cali-
fornia rule permitting court and counsel to comment on the de-
fendant's failure to explain or deny by his testimony any evi-
dence against him. The grounds of the challenge included
compelled self-incrimination and alleged violation of the pre-
103. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 58 n.17 (1947) (upholding comment on
defendant's silence and distinguishing Johnson on ground that it involved possible mis-
leading of defendant).
104. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
105. Id. at 79-83.
106. Id. at 93.
107. Id. at 93-99.
108. Id. at 99-114.
109. Id. at 114.
110. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
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sumption of innocence."' The Court rejected the arguments, re-
affirming the inapplicability of the self-incrimination right under
the federal Constitution to the states and holding that the com-
ment at issue involved no denial of due process. The opinion of
the Court, subscribed to by four justices, also clearly reflected a
belief that such comment did not involve compelled self-
incrimination:
California follows Anglo-American legal tradition in ex-
cusing defendants in criminal prosecutions from compul-
sory testimony. . . . That is a matter of legal policy and
not because of the requirements of due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment. So our inquiry is directed, not
at the broad question of compulsory testimony from the
accused. . . but to the constitutionality of the. . . Cali-
fornia law that permits comment upon his, failure to
testify ...
Generally, comment on the failure of an accused to tes-
tify is forbidden in American jurisdictions . . . . Califor-
nia, however, is one of a few states that permit limited
comment upon a defendant's failure to testify ....
[T]he court can direct the jury's attention to whatever
evidence there may be that a defendant could deny and
the prosecution can argue as to inferences that may be
drawn from the accused's failure to testify. Compare
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 492-95; Raffel
v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 497. . . . California has
prescribed a method for advising the jury in the search
for truth. However sound may be the legislative conclu-
sion that an accused should not be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, we see no
reason why comment should not be made upon his si-
lence. It seems quite natural that when a defendant has
opportunity to deny or explain facts and determines not
to do so, the prosecution should bring out the strength of
the evidence by commenting upon defendant's failure to
explain or deny it. The prosecution evidence may be of
facts that may be beyond the knowledge of the accused.
If so, his failure to testify would have little if any weight.
But the facts may be such as are necessarily in the
111. The court also considered and rejected the argument that the California proce-
dure should be invalidated because of the possibility that a defendant would stay off the
stand to avoid disclosure of his criminal record. See id. at 57-58.
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knowledge of the accused. In that case a failure to ex-
plain would point to an inability to explain.11'
b. Silence before trial- Prior to Griffin v. California the Su-
preme Court also considered in a number of cases the propriety
of disclosing at trial the defendant's silence before the trial, ei-
ther in earlier proceedings or in less formal settings.
The earliest case that might be thought to have some bearing
on this issue was Boyd v. United States,1 3 in which the Court
held that requiring the claimants in a forfeiture action to pro-
duce an invoice bearing on an alleged customs law violation
transgressed both the fourth and fifth amendments. However,
the impermissible "compulsion" perceived by the Court was a
statutory rule which essentially provided that if the claimants
disobeyed a production order, any allegation by the government
would be conclusively taken as true, if the government stated
that the requisitioned evidence would tend to prove the allega-
tion.1 The decision did not address the propriety of considering
a defendant's failure to proffer exculpatory evidence for its natu-
ral evidentiary value under the facts of a case.
Nine years later, in Sparf and Hansen v. United States,"8 the
Court considered the significance of a defendant's pretrial si-
lence in an ordinary evidentiary context. The defendants were
tried for murder on the high seas, and questions arose concern-
ing the admissibility of confessions made by one of the defen-
dants. The Court held that "[t]he declarations of Hansen after
the killing . ..were also admissible in evidence against Sparf,
because they appear to have been made in his presence and
under such circumstances as would warrant the inference that
he would naturally have contradicted them if he did not assent
to their truth.""' 6 This was a straightforward application of the
adoptive admissions doctrine. As discussed earlier,1 7 that doc-
trine admits incriminating statements made in a person's pres-
ence and his failure to respond to them in circumstances in
which response would naturally be expected.
The third important case in this area was Raffel v. United
States,"8 which involved a retrial for a prohibition violation.
112. Id. at 54-56 (citations and footnotes omitted).
113. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
114. See id. at 618-19, 621-22, 639.
115. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
116. Id. at 56.
117. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
118. 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
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The defendant Raffel had not testified at the initial trial, which
resulted in a hung jury. When Raffel took the stand at the sec-
ond trial and denied that he had made an incriminating admis-
sion ascribed to him by a prohibition agent testifying for the
government, questioning by the trial court brought out the fact
that Raffel had not testified in response to the same prosecution
testimony at the earlier trial. The trial court also required Raffel
to explain the reasons for his earlier silence. The Supreme Court
held that this was consistent with the fifth amendment on the
ground that the government may validly make the defendant's
waiver of his immunity from giving testimony an all-or-nothing
proposition, including exposure to impeachment by disclosure of
silence at an earlier trial.
Following the constitutional decision upholding the impeach-
ment use of silence in Raffel, the Court reached contrary results
concerning impeachment by silence at earlier judicial proceed-
ings in two cases, albeit on non-constitutional evidentiary
grounds. The first of these was Grunewald v. United States,1' 9
in which the Court held that it was error to impeach the defen-
dant's trial testimony by disclosing the fact that he had
"pleaded the fifth" when asked the same questions before a
grand jury. The rationale was that, under the facts of the case,
there was not sufficient inconsistency between claiming the priv-
ilege before a grand jury and later giving truthful exculpatory
testimony at trial. The facts the Court identified as relevant to
this determination included the defendant's protestations before
the grand jury that he was innocent and that he was refusing to
answer questions only on the advice of counsel; the fact that the
defendant was already under suspicion at the time of his grand
jury appearance, and could have expected that his statements to
the grand jury might be used in putting together a case against
him; and the features of grand jury proceedings which make
them unfavorable for the presentation of a defense, including
their secretive nature and the absence of a right to counsel and
opportunity for cross-examination.
The second case of this type was Stewart v. United States,1 20
in which a murder defendant claiming an insanity defense was
put on the stand in his second retrial, and the prosecutor asked
the defendant questions indicating that the defendant had failed
to testify at the two earlier trials. The purpose of the defend-
ant's testifying was not to give information about the offense,
119. 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
120. 366 U.S. 1 (1961).
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but to exhibit his alleged insanity directly to the jury. The Court
concluded that there was no inconsistency between such "de-
meanor" evidence and earlier silence comparable to that in-
volved in the Raffel case, and held that its disclosure was preju-
dicial error.""
D. Developments Following Griffin v. California
The state of the federal law regarding adverse inferences from
silence, as it stood at the start of the 1960s, may be summarized
as follows: The states generally had a free hand to write their
own rules in this area, because the Supreme Court had repeat-
edly held that the self-incrimination right under the fifth
amendment did not apply to the states, and that the state rules
permitting comment and inferences did not offend any other
provision of the federal Constitution. There was also no Su-
preme Court decision which had found a constitutional infirmity
in the evidentiary use of a defendant's silence in federal pro-
ceedings. All decisions limiting comment on or disclosure of si-
lence were based on statutory grounds, or involved evidentiary
rulings under the Court's supervisory power.
The decision in Griffin v. California1 22 fundamentally altered
this state of affairs, shifting the primary policy-making role in
this area from the states and the legislatures to the Supreme
Court. In the year preceding Griffin, the Court in Malloy v. Ho-
gan12 3 "incorporated" the self-incrimination clause of the fifth
amendment against the states, overturning various earlier prece-
dents to the contrary.124 While all the states had previously pro-
tected the right against compelled self-incrimination through
their own laws, 126 the change wrought by Malloy v. Hogan was
nevertheless of basic importance. It meant that the specific con-
ception and elaboration of that right in the Supreme Court's de-
cisions would henceforth be binding on the states, and would
override any contrary state rules or interpretations. The poten-
tial of this enlargement of federal judicial power was promptly
realized when the Court adopted a new "constitutional" rule
121. The more detailed account of the facts of the case in the dissenting opinions in
Stewart suggest that the decision was contrived to prevent the execution of a capital
sentence. See 366 U.S. at 11-27.
122. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
123. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
124. See Malloy, 378 U.S. at 17 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
125. See supra note 52.
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barring adverse comment on the defendant's failure to testify in
Griffin. That rule has remained in effect to the present.
The situation relating to the use of pretrial silence by the de-
fendant following Griffin has been more complicated. Other de-
cisions of the Court have imposed new restrictions on disclosure
of a defendant's silence following arrest, but the Court has also
sanctioned the use of pretrial silence in some contexts. The prin-
cipal current decisions relating to silence at trial and pretrial si-
lence will be discussed separately in this part.
1. Silence at Trial
Griffin v. California'2 arose from the defendant Griffin's fatal
battery of a woman in the course of a sexual assault. The state's
evidence indicated that Griffin had been with the victim and her
common law husband in their apartment. Griffin had assaulted
the victim in the apartment and attacked her husband after he
made repeated attempts to expel Griffin. The husband fled and
went to get help. On the following morning, Griffin was seen
walking away from a large trash box in an alley by the apart-
ment building, buttoning his trousers. The victim was found in
the box in a severely battered condition. She died shortly there-
after from the injuries.""'
Following his arrest, Griffin told the police that he had en-
gaged in consensual sex with the victim and denied any crimi-
nality.12 8 However, he failed to take the stand at his trial for
murder. Consistent with California law, the trial court charged
the jury that Griffin's failure to testify in response to evidence
relating to matters within his knowledge which he could reason-
ably be expected to deny or explain could be considered as
strengthening the probative force of that evidence. The prosecu-
tor commented more forcefully on the defendant's failure to
testify. 29
In an opinion by Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court over-
turned the conviction,130 holding that comment on a failure to
126. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
127. See People v. Griffin, 60 Cal. 2d 182, 383 P.2d 432, 32 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1963); 66
Cal. 2d 459, 426 P.2d 507, 58 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1967).
128. See 60 Cal. 2d at 187-88, 383 P.2d at 435, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
129. See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 610-11.
130. Griffin was retried three times after the Supreme Court overturned his convic-
tion. His conviction for murder was finally upheld in People v. Griffin, 93 Cal. Rptr. 319
(1971).
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testify violates the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amend-
ment. The argumentative portion of the decision, which over-
turned the laws of half a dozen states and closed off a century of
historic debate, occupied less than three pages. 13' Its essential
elements were as follows:' s3
First, the opinion quoted some language from Wilson v.
United States,' an early case applying the no-presumption rule
of 18 U.S.C. § 3481 for federal proceedings. The language indi-
cated that the statutory rule reflected "tenderness to the weak-
ness" of defendants who might be innocent, but nevertheless
would refuse to testify out of concern that they might make a
poor showing on the stand because of nervousness or timidity.
Following the quotation, the opinion in Griffin declared that the
policy identified in Wilson as underlying the statutory rule also
reflected "the spirit of the Self-Incrimination Clause," and that
"comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the 'inquisito-
rial system of criminal justice,' .. which the Fifth Amendment
outlaws.' '
Following this divination of the spirit of the self-incrimination
clause, the Court reached the nub of the decision, which con-
sisted of the following two sentences: "[Clomment on the refusal
to testify . . . is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a
constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making
its assertion costly."
Finally, the Court noted the argument that adverse inferences
from the defendant's failure to explain facts peculiarly within
his knowledge are in any event "natural and irresistible," and
that judicial comment on the failure to testify does not magnify
the inference into a "penalty." The Court responded that a pos-
131. 380 U.S. at 613-15.
132. Beyond the arguments noted in the text, a footnote in the opinion stated that
the "legislatures or courts of 44 States have recognized that . . . comment [on the de-
fendant's failure to testify] is, in light of the privilege against self-incrimination, 'an un-
warrantable line of argument.'" Id. at 611 n.3. The number given for states with no-
comment rules was correct, but the opinion did not seriously attempt to substantiate its
assertion that the rules in all 44 of these states were predicated on the view that a con-
trary rule would violate the right against compelled self-incrimination. The issue is gen-
erally discussed infra at notes 179-88 and accompanying text.
133. 149 U.S. 60 (1893).
134. A footnote to this portion of the argument (380 U.S. at 614 n.5), citing Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), stated that "[ojur decision today that the Fifth Amend-
ment prohibits comment on the defendant's silence is no innovation, for on a previous
occasion a majority of this Court indicated their acceptance of this proposition." This
assertion was incorrect. See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 619 n.3 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Adam-
son v. California, 332 U.S. at 54-56, 61, 68-69, 92, 124-25; Friendly, supra note 11, at 939
n.56.
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sible inference by the jury is different from a court's "solem-
nizing" the defendant's silence into evidence against him, and
that this type of inference is not always so natural or irresistible
in light of the possibility that a defendant will stay off the stand
because of concern over impeachment by prior convictions.
The basic rule announced in Griffin has continued to be fol-
lowed, and has since been carried further in Carter v. Ken-
tucky,135 in which the Court held that the trial court must af-
firmatively instruct the jury that no adverse inference is to be
drawn from the defendant's failure to testify, if the defendant so
requests. The Court purported to derive this rule as a corollary
of Griffin: Griffin held that a defendant may not be required to
bear any "court-imposed price" or "penalty" for failing to tes-
tify. However, the "penalty" for silence may be just as severe if
nothing is said about it and the jury is "left to roam at large
with only its untutored instincts to guide it, to draw from the
defendant's silence broad inferences of guilt." Therefore, affirm-
ative action by the trial court is required to head off possible
adverse inferences.1
3 6
Notwithstanding the Court's willingness in Carter to constitu-
tionalize the most extreme type of no-inference approach,13 7 the
Court has rejected expansive applications of Griffin in some
other contexts. Lakeside v. Oregon as presented the question
whether it was error to charge the jury that it should not draw
any adverse inference from the defendant's failure to testify,
where the defense had objected to the giving of such an instruc-
tion. The Court held that this was not in conflict with Griffin,
which only barred adverse comment. Another example is United
States v. Robinson,'39 in which the defendant's attorney asserted
that the government had denied the defendant an opportunity
to explain the evidence against him, and the prosecutor re-
sponded by pointing out that the defendant could have taken
the stand and provided such an explanation. The Court held
that this was proper, distinguishing Griffin on the ground that it
135. 450 U.S. 288 (1981).
136. Id. at 301, 305.
137. Cf. 8 W[GMoRE's EvIDENCE § 2272 at 436 (McNaughton rev. 1961) ("Nor is it
proper, when no comment has been made, to go so far as to instruct the jury to disre-
gard the inference. It is well enough to contrive artificial fictions for use by lawyers, but
to attempt to enlist the layman in the process of nullifying his own reasoning powers is
merely futile, and tends toward confusion and a disrespect for the law's
reasonableness.").
138. 435 U.S. 333 (1978).
139. 485 U.S. 25 (1988).
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only barred use of the defendant's silence as "substantive evi-
dence of guilt."
A more noteworthy development has been the Court's contin-
ued acceptance of statutory presumptions and judicial instruc-
tions that effectively authorize an ultimate determination of
guilt on the basis of a single unrebutted incriminating circum-
stance. For example, the trial court may tell the jury that guilty
knowledge can be inferred from the defendant's unexplained
possession of stolen property. While an instruction or presump-
tion of this sort may give the defendant a heightened incentive
to testify, the Court has had no difficulty in upholding such
charges against fifth amendment challenges. "1 0 The underlying
rationale is apparently that such an instruction only highlights a
possible inference which the jury could draw even if nothing
were said about it, and that the pressure on the defendant to
make a response is the result of the force of the adverse evidence
rather than of unconstitutional compulsion. " While this point
would also seem to apply to the type of comment on the defen-
dant's failure to respond to the evidence that Griffin con-
demned, the Court has not attempted to reconcile these lines of
precedent.
A final example of a post-Griffin decision that sits uneasily
with the Griffin rule is Baxter v. Palmigiano." The case in-
volved a prisoner who was advised in a prison disciplinary pro-
ceeding that "he had a right to remain silent during the hearing
but that if he remained silent his silence would be held against
him.' 4  He was also informed that he might be prosecuted
under state law, but was not offered immunity with respect to
the use in a criminal prosecution of any testimony he might give
in the disciplinary proceeding.
The Court held that this was consistent with the fifth amend-
ment, apparently on the ground that advising the defendant
that an adverse inference will be drawn from silence in this type
of proceeding is not compulsion. 4 The Court distinguished ear-
140. See, e.g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846-47 (1973); Turner v. United
States, 396 U.S. 398, 417-18 & n.35 (1970); see also County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140
(1979).
141. See generally Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and the Inference of Guilt from Si-
lence: Griffin v. California after Fifteen Years, 78 MICH. L. REv. 841, 859-64 (1980).
142. 425 U.S. 308, 312-14, 316-20 (1976). See generally Ayer, supra note 141, at 864-
66.
143. 425 U.S. at 312.
144. While the fifth amendment right is limited to a prohibition of compelling a per-
son "in any criminal case" to be a witness against himself, the Court has held that the
right is implicated by compulsion of testimony from the defendant in a civil proceeding
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lier cases involving the imposition of administrative sanctions
for refusing to talk on the ground that they effectively involved
pro confesso rules, which conclusively presumed guilt from
silence:
[T]his case is very different from . . . decisions . . .
where refusal to submit to interrogation and to waive the
Fifth Amendment privilege, standing alone and without
regard to the other evidence, resulted in loss of employ-
ment or opportunity to contract with the State. There,
failure to respond to interrogation was treated as a final
admission of guilt. Here, Palmigiano remained silent at
the hearing in the face of the evidence which incrimi-
nated him; and, as far as this record reveals, the silence
was given no more evidentiary value than was warranted
by the facts surrounding his case. This does not smack Of
an invalid attempt by the State to compel testimony
without granting immunity or to penalize the exercise of
the privilege. The advice given inmates by the deci-
sionmakers is merely a realistic reflection of the eviden-
tiary significance of the choice to remain silent. 1 5
One might argue similarly, however, that the sort of comment in
a criminal trial that Griffin condemned is just "a realistic reflec-
tion of the evidentiary significance of the choice to remain si-
lent" in such a proceeding.
Additional perplexities arise from dictum in Baxter,"6 which
indicated that disclosure of Palmigiano's silence at the discipli-
nary proceeding in a later criminal trial would be in conflict with
the Griffin rule. In Griffin itself, the defendant was not literally
compelled to be a witness against himself; rather, he resisted any
pressure generated by the prospect of adverse comment on his
silence, and declined to take the stand. Nevertheless, if one ac-
cepts the notion that this pressure constitutes "compulsion" in
the sense of the fifth amendment, the Griffin rule has an obvious
relationship to the constitutional prohibition: It bars the govern-
ment from presenting the defendant with an incentive to talk
that would compel him to be a witness against himself if he ac-
ceded to it. On this view, permitting adverse comment on silence
would be comparable to threatening to hold a defendant in con-
where he is not given assurance against the use of the testimony in a subsequent criminal
prosecution. See id. at 316-17.
145. Id. at 318-19.
146. Id. at 317.
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tempt for refusing to answer incriminating questions. Even if
the defendant resisted the coercion in a particular case and did
not talk, this action by the government would be improper
under the fifth amendment, since it involves an effort by the
government to achieve an objective-compelling the defendant
to be a witness against himself-which the fifth amendment
prohibits.
In Baxter, however, the Court was evidently of the view that
the state's action in notifying Palmigiano that his silence would
be held against him, and in actually considering it as evidence in
the proceeding, did not constitute compulsion in the sense of the
fifth amendment. This makes it altogether unclear how there
could have been any problem in using it in a subsequent crimi-
nal proceeding. If there was no fifth amendment "compulsion,"
how could Griffin-a decision ostensibly based on the Self-In-
crimination Clause-impose any constraint? And if the Griffin
rule would bar such use of silence, despite the fact that the state
did nothing "compelling," what does that rule have to do with
the fifth amendment?
2. Silence before Trial
In the year following Griffin, the following statement appeared
in a footnote in the decision of Miranda v. Arizona:
147
In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to
penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege when he is under police custodial interro-
gation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial
the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the
face of accusation.
This statement was dictum in Miranda; none of the cases under
review involved any question of disclosure of a defendant's pre-
trial silence.
Several years later, in Harris v. New York,1 48 the Court held
that a defendant's pretrial statements that were inadmissible as
affirmative evidence of guilt because obtained in violation of Mi-
randa could nevertheless be used to impeach his trial testimony.
In reaching this result, the Court in Harris1 49 discounted con-
147. 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966).
148. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
149. Id. at 224.
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trary dictum in the Miranda decision.1 50 This naturally raised
the question whether a defendant's pretrial silence could be used
to impeach his trial testimony, despite the Miranda footnote ap-
plying the Griffin "penalty" rationale to pretrial silence under
custodial interrogation. The Court has answered this question in
a line of decisions under which a defendant's silence before he
receives Miranda warnings generally may be admitted for im-
peachment, but such use of silence after the defendant has re-
ceived Miranda warnings is generally barred.
The initial case in the line was United States v. Hale.'5' Hale
was a robbery prosecution in which the victim identified the de-
fendant Hale to the police as one of the robbers, and Hale fled
when the police approached him. When apprehended, Hale was
found to have a large amount of cash on his person. At trial,
Hale gave an exculpatory story, claiming that he had fled from
the police because a person with him was carrying narcotics, and
that he had received the money for his estranged wife to
purchase some money orders from her. On cross-examination,
the prosecutor brought out the fact that Hale had not offered
this explanation of the source of the money to the police follow-
ing his arrest. When asked why, Hale replied only that he did
not feel it was necessary at that time. The trial court instructed
the jury to disregard this colloquy, but the court of appeals re-
versed the conviction on the view that cross-examining the de-
fendant about his prior silence was prejudicial error.
The Supreme Court agreed that the questioning was im-
proper, basing this result on non-constitutional evidentiary
grounds. Comparing the situation to earlier cases, the Court be-
lieved that it was more like Grunewald v. United States,152
which barred disclosing that a defendant "pleaded the fifth"
before a grand jury, than Raffel v. United States,15 3 which had
permitted impeachment by a defendant's failure to testify at an
earlier trial. In the course of the opinion in Hale, the Court sug-
gested that post-arrest silence would generally have little proba-
tive force in light of the many alternative explanations for not
talking in that situation, including the fact that an arrestee will
ordinarily have been advised through the delivery of the Mi-
randa warnings "that he has a right to remain silent, and that
anything he does say can and will be used against him in
150. 384 U.S. at 476-77.
151. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
152. 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
153. 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
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court. ' 15 The Court also stated that disclosure of such silence
carries a large potential for prejudice to the defendant that is
unlikely to be overcome by permitting the defendant to explain
the reasons for it.
15 5
In the year following Hale, the import of the Miranda warn-
ings was given center stage, and was made the basis for an os-
tensibly constitutional rule limiting disclosure of pretrial silence
for impeachment in Doyle v. Ohio.156 The case involved defen-
dants in a drug trafficking prosecution who testified that they
had been framed, and who were impeached by cross-examina-
tion showing that they had not told this story to the police at
the time of arrest. Before the Supreme Court, the state argued
that "an exculpatory story at trial and silence at time of arrest
gives rise to an inference that the story was fabricated some-
where along the way, perhaps to fit within the seams of the
State's case as it was developed at pretrial hearings."157
The Court did not question the force of this point, but held
that suppression of the defendants' silence at the time of arrest
was nevertheless required by the fact that they had been given
Miranda warnings:
The warnings mandated by [Miranda], as prophylactic
means of safeguarding Fifth Amendment rights ... re-
quire that a person taken into custody be advised imme-
diately that he has the right to remain silent, that any-
thing he says may be used against him, and that he has a
right to retained or appointed counsel before submitting
to interrogation. Silence in the wake of these warnings
may be nothing more than the arrestee's exercise of these
Miranda rights. Thus, every post-arrest silence is in-
solubly ambiguous because of what the State is required
to advise the person arrested. . . .Moreover, while it is
true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assur-
ance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is
implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such
circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a
deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's
silence to be used to impeach an explanation subse-
quently offered at trial.'5"
154. 422 U.S. at 176-77.
155. Id. at 180.
156. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
157. Id. at 616-17.
158. Id. at 617-18 (citations omitted).
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True to the due process rationale articulated in Doyle, which
turned on implicit assurances the Court discerned in the Mi-
randa warnings, the Court has held in later cases that pretrial
silence can constitutionally be disclosed for impeachment where
the defendant had not received such warnings. The issue arose
in Jenkins v. Anderson,'59 in which the testimony of a murder
defendant was impeached by showing that he had not come for-
ward to the police with his self-defense story until about two
weeks after the offense. The Court distinguished Doyle on the
basis of the absence of Miranda warnings in Jenkins.6 0 The
Court also rejected the objection that "a person facing arrest will
not remain silent if his failure to speak later can be used to im-
peach him."' 1 Rather, Raffel v. United States'6 2 had held that
the possibility of impeachment by prior silence is not an imper-
missible burden on the exercise of fifth amendment rights. More
generally, the Court indicated that permitting the defendant to
testify and exposing him to "the traditional truth-testing devices
of the adversary process" can validly be made a package deal,
and that permitting impeachment on cross-examination ad-
vances a valid truth-seeking function." 3
The final important case in this line was Fletcher v. Weir,'6
in which the Court applied the rule of Jenkins v. Anderson to
silence in police custody. In that case, the defendant's self-de-
fense claim in a homicide prosecution was impeached by show-
ing that the defendant had not advanced his exculpatory expla-
nation or disclosed the location of the weapon used in the killing
to the police at the time of arrest. The Court held that this im-
peachment was constitutionally permissible so long as the de-
fendant had not been given Miranda warnings prior to his
silence.
II. ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS
A criminal case may be put together from many pieces of evi-
dence and possible inferences. For example, in a murder case it
may appear that the defendant had previously fought with the
victim, that he left fingerprints near the victim's body, that he
159. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
160. Id. at 238-40.
161. Id. at 236.
162. 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
163. 447 U.S. at 235-38.
164. 455 U.S. 603 (1982).
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washed or destroyed his presumably bloodstained clothes imme-
diately after the offense, then he withdrew all his money from
the bank and left town on the following day, and so on. Consid-
ered in isolation, no particular fact may be strongly probative,
but taken together, they may constitute proof of guilt. When a
case has been brought to trial, it is the prosecutor's responsibil-
ity to disclose these facts to the trier, to point out the incrimi-
nating tendency of each, and to argue that in the aggregate they
warrant conviction.
The essential question addressed in this Report is whether
certain aspects of the defendant's conduct-his silence at trial or
before trial-are also among the circumstances that can properly
be considered in assessing the probability of guilt or innocence
in light of all the facts disclosed in the case, or whether special
rules are justified that bar disclosure or consideration of the de-
fendant's silence. In assessing this question, two general points
should be kept in mind.
First, consideration of a defendant's conduct as part of the ev-
idence in a criminal case is generally permitted. For example, it
is generally permissible to disclose and consider the fact that a
defendant refused to take a sobriety test; unexpectedly left town
after the offense or fled from -the crime scene; concealed, de-
stroyed, or fabricated evidence; or attempted to prevent a wit-
ness from testifying."'s It is also generally permissible, in both
civil and criminal litigation, to draw adverse inferences from any
party's failure to proffer a witness or other evidence within his
control that could elucidate the facts of the case,"" and to com-
ment on the fact that there has been no rebuttal of the evidence
offered against a party."6 7 The question is whether constitutional
constraints or valid policy considerations warrant a departure
165. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983); Allen v. United States,
164 U.S. 492, 498-99 (1896); WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§ 154-158 (14th ed. 1985);
Williams, Problems of the Fifth Amendment, 24 FORDHAM L. REV. 19, 38-40 (1955).
166. See 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§ 88-89 (14th ed. 1985); 2 WIGMORE'S
EVIDENCE §§ 285-90 (Chadbourn rev. 1979). As the cited sources indicate, courts are less
disposed to permit such an inference if the withheld witness is equally available to both
parties, or if the witness is antagonistic toward the party against whom the inference is
urged. However, these qualifications would not apply to the defendant's withholding of
his own testimony. The prosecution has no power to summon the defendant to the stand,
and defendants are generally favorable toward their own interests. See J. BENTHAM, A
TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, supra note 36, at 240-41.
167. The qualifications of this principle in criminal cases are based on the special
rules barring adverse comment on the defendant's failure to testify. See generally 8 WIG-
MORE'S EVIDENCE § 2273 at 446-50 (McNaughton rev. 1961); AVER, supra note 141, at 843
& nn.11-12; Gaims, The Meaning of Defendant's Silence, 39 So. CAL. L. REv. 120, 122-23
(1966); Failure of Accused to Testify, 37 YALE L.J. 955, 958-59 (1928).
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from these general rules where the relevant conduct is the de-
fendant's withholding of his own testimony concerning the of-
fense or related circumstances.
Second, it basically misconceives the issue to suppose that it is
resolved by simply pointing out that a defendant who is inno-
cent may nevertheless remain silent. The general standard for
admitting and considering evidence is not infallibility, but rele-
vance. In other words, it is sufficient if it has some bearing, di-
rect or indirect, on the probability of guilt or innocence.' 68
These elementary principles are the starting point of inquiry
rather than the end of it, since they may be outweighed by coun-
tervailing considerations, such as the risks of prejudice that are
thought to inhere in some types of evidence. They nevertheless
bear emphasizing, because they have often been lost sight of in
the debate over the evidentiary consideration of the defendant's
silence. Opponents of permitting such consideration may tacitly
assume that it should not be allowed unless silence is in itself
virtually conclusive proof of guilt. Proponents of comment and
inference may similarly fall into the fallac y" of arguing' as, if con-
clusiveness must be established to justify the practice. This basi-
cally misapprehends the issue and applies a standard to the de-
fendant's silence that would not be applied in assessing the
propriety of disclosing or considering any other type of evidence.
With these cautionary remarks in mind, we turn to specific
arguments and issues. Sub-part A addresses comment on silence
at trial and sub-part B addresses disclosure of pretrial silence.
A. Silence At Trial
The arguments relating to adverse comment on the defend-
ant's failure to testify may be grouped into five categories. Part
one below analyzes the implications of the historical understand-
ing of the self-incrimination right for contemporary practices in
this area. Parts two, three, and four analyze the main issues that
168. See FED. R. EVID. 401, 402 and Notes. The question whether inferences may
properly be drawn from the defendant's silence is, in substance, the same as the question
whether the defendant's silence may properly be considered as evidence. See Bilokumsky
v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1923) ("Conduct which forms a basis for inference is evi-
dence. Silence is often evidence of the most persuasive character."); infra note 203. In
general, "evidence" refers to a factual matter offered as the basis for an inference con-
cerning a factual issue in a case. See generally 1 WIGMORE'S EVIDENCE § 1 at 7-11 (Til-
lers rev. 1983). These two modes of expression-the permissibility of considering the
defendant's silence as evidence against him, and the permissibility of considering it as
the basis for adverse inferences-are used interchangeably in this Report.
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were considered or touched on in the decision of Griffin v. Cali-
fornia-the import of comment on the defendant's silence for
protecting the innocent and convicting the guilty; the idea that
such comment is a "penalty" for remaining silent or an imper-
missible "burden" on silence; and the special problems raised by
the defendant's exposure to impeachment by prior convictions if
he testifies. Part five addresses some other arguments whose
force seems more rhetorical than rational-for example, the con-
tention that comment on silence is an oppressive "inquisitorial"
practice-but which nevertheless merit discussion because of
their appearance in the historical debate over inferences from
silence.
1. Historical Considerations
The fifth amendment to the federal Constitution, and compa-
rable provisions in state constitutions, protect a person against
being compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal
case. It is accordingly necessary to consider whether the right
against compelled self-incrimination bars comment or inferences
concerning a defendant's failure to testify.
As discussed in Part I of this Report, the materials associated
directly with the formulation of the Bill of Rights provide no
support for an interpretation of the right against compelled self-
incrimination as barring such inferences, and it would also be
difficult to discern any support for such an interpretation in the
historical origin of that right. The right initially arose in reaction
to persecutions of religious and political dissidents in the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The practices which
made these inquisitions odious to their contemporaries were of
an entirely different order from simply considering a defendant's
silence as one factor in assessing the case against him. As Justice
Stewart observed in his dissent in Griffin v. California:
We must determine whether the petitioner has been
"compelled . . . to be a witness against himself." Com-
pulsion is the focus of the inquiry. Certainly, if any com-
pulsion be detected in the California procedure, it is of a
dramatically different and less palpable nature than that
involved in the procedures which historically gave rise to
the Fifth Amendment guarantee. When a suspect was
brought before the Court of High Commission or the Star
Chamber, he was commanded to answer whatever was
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asked of him, and subjected to a far-reaching and deeply
probing inquiry in an effort to ferret out some unknown
and frequently unsuspected crime. He declined to answer
on pain of incarceration, banishment, or mutilation. And
if he spoke falsely, he was subject to further punishment.
Faced with this formidable array of alternatives, his deci-
sion to speak was unquestionably coerced.
Those were the lurid realities which lay behind enact-
ment of the Fifth Amendment, a far cry from the subject
matter of the case before us.16'
A contrary argument might be based on the fact that one of
the abuses of the English inquisitorial courts was the pro con-
fesso use of the oath procedure.17 0 Under the pro confesso rule, a
defendant who refused to take the oath ex officio, or to answer
any question after taking the oath, could be deemed guilty of
the offenses of which he was suspected. However, this produced
convictions that were premised solely on the defendant's refusal
to bind himself to answer any questions he might be asked, or to
answer questions following such a commitment, without the
need for any other evidence against him, and without any other
opportunity to present a defense. Rejecting such a procedure as
"compelling" and oppressive does not entail a like conclusion
concerning comment rules that would only permit the eviden-
tiary consideration of the defendant's silence on the same basis
as other aspects of his conduct.1 '
The understanding of the self-incrimination right in the later
common law period also does not entail a rejection of comment
and inferences relating to a defendant's silence under contempo-
rary procedures. The question of adverse inferences from a de-
fendant's failure to testify could not arise in any form compara-
ble to the contemporary issue, since the defendant was not
considered a proper source of evidence at trial and was deemed
incompetent as a witness."7 2
It might be objected, however, that the historical elimination
of the trial examination of the accused in itself implies that
comment on silence should be barred. If merely asking the de-
169. 380 U.S. at 620.
170. See generally L. LEVY, supra note 17, at 55, 75, 77, 132, 203, 250, 262, 270-71,
472-73, 484.
171. Similar considerations distinguish cases in which the Supreme Court has invali-
dated rules that it perceived as involving a pro confesso use of silence, as opposed to
consideration of silence for its natural evidentiary value. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425
U.S. 308, 317-18 (1976); see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 621-22, 639 (1886).
172. See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
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fendant a question was thought to be unduly compelling, then a
fortiori the pressure exerted by the prospect of adverse comment
and inferences for failing to talk should also be so considered.
Even if one assumes, however, that the trial examination had
been wholly eliminated in American jurisdictions by the time of
the framing of the fifth amendment,17 there are two problems
with this argument.
The first is that it overlooks the fact that there were two fac-
tors at work in the cessation of the trial questioning of the de-
fendant-not only the recognition of the self-incrimination
right, but also the growing strength of the notion that the de-
fendant should not be questioned at trial because his interest in
the case made him an untrustworthy source of evidence. An ac-
curate statement would be that the notion of defendant incom-
petency, taking hold in a context of heightened sensitivity to
self-incrimination concerns, resulted in the abatement of the
trial examination.17' It is open to question whether the same re-
sult would have followed from self-incrimination considerations
alone. 75 A contrary conclusion is suggested by the fact that
questioning of the defendant at trial, even in the English courts,
did continue for several decades after the recognition of the self-
incrimination right in the mid-seventeenth century.1 76 It is also
suggested by the fact that the self-incrimination right was not
regarded as precluding questioning in non-trial contexts-even
questioning where the defendant might misapprehend that he
was required to respond. The common law's general position on
interrogation of the defendant and self-incrimination was as
follows:
The fact must be emphasized that the right in question
was a right against compulsory self-incrimination, and,
excepting rare occasions when judges intervened to pro-
tect a witness against incriminating interrogatories, the
right had to be claimed by the defendant. Historically it
173. As a result of the paucity of early records of American trials, the timing of the
American reception of the English reform in trial practice is unclear. See supra note 24.
174. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
175. See J. STEPHEN, supra note 22, at 191-92 (maxims against compelled self-incrim-
ination and torture protected people from being forced to answer incriminating ques-
tions, but "it has never been doubted that such questions may be asked, or that a refusal
to answer them may be used as an argument that the person so refusing was guilty of the
criminal conduct suggested by them. Hence it is quite consistent with those maxims that
a prisoner should be questioned though there may be no way of compelling him to an-
swer."). See generally id. at 190-96.
176. See 8 WIGMORE'S EVIDENCE § 2250 at 289-91 & n.108 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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has been a fighting right: unless invoked, it offered no
protection. It vested an option to refuse answer but did
not bar interrogation nor taint a voluntary confession as
improper evidence. Incriminating statements made by a
suspect at the preliminary examination or even at ar-
raignment could always be used with devastating effect
at his trial. That a man might unwittingly incriminate
himself when questioned in no way impaired his legal
right to refuse answer. He lacked the right to be warned
that he need not answer, for the authorities were under
no legal obligation to apprise him of his right. . . .Yet if
the authorities in eighteenth-century Britain and in her
colonies were not obliged to caution the prisoner, he in
turn was not legally obliged to reply. His answers, al-
though given in ignorance of his right, might secure his
conviction.
1 77
A second problem with implying restrictions on contemporary
comment and inference rules from common law trial practice is
that it overlooks basic differences in the surrounding procedural
context. Giving the defendant a choice whether to take the stand
was not considered in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Rather, the practical choice presented was between (1) directly
attempting to question the defendant, thereby requiring an
overt refusal on his part to respond in order to exercise the op-
tion of silence, and (2) simply not trying to question the defen-
dant. The latter approach was eventually adopted, showing only
that it was preferred to the stated alternative. Even if the his-
tory were taken as indicating that direct questioning of unwill-
ing defendants in the presence of the trier came to be regarded
as unduly "compelling, 1 78 the same conclusion would not be re-
quired concerning comment on the defendant's failure to take
advantage of his contemporary right to testify.
Moving to the post-constitutional period, it might be argued
that the prevalence of no-presumption rules in the statutes that
abrogated the defendant's testimonial incapacity support an in-
177. L. LEVY, supra note 17, at 375.
178. Cf. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-98 (1896) (suggesting origin of rule
against questioning defendant, absent waiver on his part, in reaction to bullying of de-
fendants in English state trials). But cf. L. MAYERS, supra note 17, at 223-24 (arguments
that defendant could regularly be questioned before trial and at trial if he were not put
under oath or were otherwise protected from punishment for refusing to respond); supra
notes 21-24, 27-31, 175-77 and accompanying text (continued questioning of defendants
before trial and at trial following recognition of right against compelled self-
incrimination).
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terpretation of the right against compelled self-incrimination as
barring comment and inferences from the defendant's silence.
An argument of this sort appeared in a footnote in Griffin v.
California.'79
However, there is no adequate basis for concluding that these
legislative choices reflected a general view that a contrary rule
would involve unconstitutional compulsion. The earliest state
court decision passing on this issue had no difficulty in recon-
ciling comment on the defendant's failure to testify with the
self-incrimination right. 8' Later state decisions were divided.
Prior to Griffin, the Supreme Court had rejected fifth amend-
ment challenges to the evidentiary consideration of the defen-
dant's silence in a number of cases, and had not sustained such a
challenge in any case.' 8
Moreover, it is not difficult to discern other reasons why stat-
utes making the defendant a competent witness, but barring any
presumption from his failure to testify, would have had broad
appeal. From the defense perspective, such a statute afforded
the defendant a hitherto unavailable opportunity to testify in
response to the charges.182 There was, however, concern when
the reform was being considered that the option of testifying
would prove to be of little or no value, and would jeopardize
innocent defendants. This concern would have given substantial
persuasive force to the policy argument against permitting ad-
verse inferences if the defendant did not avail himself of this
option.' From an enforcement perspective, the defendant's
competency offered hitherto unavailable opportunities for cross-
examination and impeachment.18 While the no-presumption
rule did limit the reform's value to some extent from a prosecu-
tion standpoint, it did not leave the government worse off than
the preexisting common law procedure, under which no adverse
inference could be drawn from the defendant's failure to testify
because he was not allowed to testify. For these reasons and
179. 380 U.S. at 611-12 n.3.
180. See State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200, 215-21 (1867).
181. See supra notes 95-112 and accompanying text.
182. See Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 65-66 (1893).
183. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
184. The competency statutes also would have foreclosed arguments at trial by de-
fense counsel that the defendant would be able to clear himself if he were free to testify,
but that he was unfairly barred from doing so. See 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 17, at 440-41
(noting such argument by English defense attorneys); J. STEPHEN. supra note 22, at 194
(same).
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others,188 the prevalence of rules barring comment and inference
in the nineteenth century competency statutes is quite compre-
hensible without assuming a general belief that this approach
was required by the right against compelled self-incrimination.
The continuation of the no-presumption rule as the predomi-
nant approach in the twentieth century also cannot reasonably
be taken as reflecting a collective judgment that this approach
was constitutionally required. The general pattern of state legis-
lation, once established, had institutional inertia working in its
favor, and the proponents of reform carried the burden of going
against settled practice. The policy arguments that continued to
be offered against permitting comment-including the fre-
quently stated argument that it would operate unfairly against
defendants who declined to testify to conceal their criminal
records-would have increased this burden.180 The judicial deci-
sions in some states which did bar comment and inferences on
self-incrimination grounds also impeded reform efforts, and
would have tended to create a perception by legislators that at-
tempting this reform would be futile or hazardous.1 8 Notwith-
standing these obstacles, rules permitting adverse comment on
the defendant's failure to testify were adopted in several
states.18
8
2. Acquitting the Innocent and Convicting the Guilty
In relation to the general subject of this series of reports, the
most important question concerning rules against adverse com-
ment and inferences from silence is whether they create an un-
justified impediment to the search for truth. Proponents of such
185. Other considerations that apparently influenced the formulation of the compe-
tency statutes were concern for the situation of innocent defendants who might make a
poor showing on the stand for such reasons as nervousness or timidity, and concern for
the presumption of innocence. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 65-66
(1893); Price v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 393, 395 (1883).
186. See generally infra Part II.A.4.
187. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
188. New Jersey had permitted comment since the nineteenth century. In the twenti-
eth century, rules permitting comment were adopted at one point or another in Ohio,
South Dakota, Iowa, Connecticut, New Mexico, California, and Vermont. See supra note
41 and accompanying text. In two instances-Ohio and California-the change was ef-
fected by constitutional amendment. However, for reasons noted earlier, reliance on con-
stitutional amendment in these states could not reasonably be taken as indicating legis-
lative endorsement of the view that comment would otherwise be barred by the right
against compelled self-incrimination on an accurate interpretation of that right. See
supra note 78.
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restrictions have regularly denied that this is the case. The prin-
cipal argument is that adverse comment and inferences would
create an unacceptable risk of convicting defendants who are not
guilty, but who would nevertheless choose or prefer to stay off
the stand for some innocent reason. A frequently cited version of
this rationale-popularly known as the "nervous defendant" ar-
gument-appeared in an early Supreme Court decision, Wilson
v. United States, explaining the statutory no-presumption rule
of 18 U.S.C. § 3481:
But the act was framed with a due regard also to those
who might prefer to rely upon the presumption of inno-
cence which the law gives to every one, and not wish to
be witnesses. It is not every one who can safely venture
on the witness stand though entirely innocent of the
charge against him. Excessive timidity, nervousness when
facing others and attempting to explain transactions of a
suspicious character, and offenses charged against him,
will often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as
to increase rather than remove prejudices against him. It
is not every one, however honest, who would, therefore,
willingly be placed on the witness stand. The statute, in
tenderness to the weakness of those who from the causes
mentioned might refuse to ask to be a witness, particu-
larly when they may have been in some degree compro-
mised by their association with others, declares that the
failure of the defendant in a criminal action to request to
be a witness shall not create any presumption against
him.1
8 9
As noted earlier, the Court in Griffin v. California " stated that
this consideration also reflected "the spirit of the Self-Incrimi-
nation Clause."
How well does this type of argument stand up as the justifica-
tion for a uniform rule against considering or commenting on a
defendant's silence? When the Griffin rule is compared to com-
parable rules in other areas, one would have to say, not well. The
same concerns for the "nervous defendant" would seem to apply
in civil proceedings, but adverse comment and inferences con-
cerning a party's silence are permitted in that context."1 The
189. 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893).
190. 380 U.S. 609, 613-14 (1965).
191. See 2 WIGMORE's EVIDENCE § 289 (Chadbourn rev. 1979); 8 WIGMORE'S EVIDENCE
§ 2272 at 439 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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Supreme Court has so held in relation to proceedings concerned
with such weighty civil sanctions as deportation and disciplinary
action by prison authorities. 192 Even in the context of criminal
proceedings, other decisions by the Court barring comment or
inferences have not been based on a generalized concern that
innocent defendants might make a poor showing on the stand.
Rather, such decisions have generally reflected the view that a
defendant had been ambushed by the adverse use of his silence
after the government had tacitly assured him that that would
not occur,1 or concern for the situation of the defendant who
remains silent in secretive proceedings lacking significant proce-
dural safeguards.'
By the year following Griffin, the Supreme Court in Tehan v.
Shott'9a had apparently taken another reading of the spirit of
the Self-Incrimination Clause through a different medium,'"
and had concluded that the purposes of the Griffin rule-and of
the privilege against self-incrimination generally-did not in-
clude protecting the innocent from unjust conviction. The Court
held in Tehan that Griffin would not be applied retroactively to
invalidate pre-Griffin convictions. The decision was predicated
in part on this distinction between the Griffin rule and other
newly recognized rights whose importance in protecting the in-
nocent had resulted in retroactive application.
To the extent that empirical data is available, it supports the
Court's later view on this question. In 1938, an ABA committee
surveyed judges in five states that permitted adverse comment
on the defendant's failure to testify, and found a virtual consen-
sus that the practice was an important and proper aid to the
administration of justice. 9 " In contrast, the argument that such
comment would jeopardize the innocent has generally been
based on speculation by lawyers who have had no actual experi-
ence with the operation of such a rule.
192. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316-20 (1976); Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263
U.S. 149, 153-54 (1923).
193. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189
(1943).
194. See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975); Grunewald v. United States, 353
U.S. 391 (1957).
195. 382 U.S. 406, 413-16 (1966).
196. The Court's opinion in Tehan was written by Justice Stewart. Justice Douglas,
the author of Griffin, dissented.
197. 63 A.BA. REP. 592-93 (1938) ("The replies of the judges show that 93.65 per cent
regard comment as an important and proper aid in the administration of justice, while
only 2.65 per cent consider it definitely unfair to the accused (the others listing it as
relatively unimportant.)").
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The jeopardy-to-the-innocent argument also fails the test of
intrinsic plausibility. In approaching this subject, it is useful to
consider first how much force this type of argument would have
in other contexts. A defendant who does decide to testify is not
free to limit disclosure to matters that help his case, but must
also submit to cross-examination by the prosecutor. With a little
fixing, the quote from Wilson v. United States set out above can
be adapted as an argument against the cross-examination rule
for testifying defendants:
But the law should be framed with a due regard also to
those who might prefer to rely on the presumption of in-
nocence which the law gives to everyone, and not wish to
serve as witnesses against themselves. It is not everyone
who can safely be cross-examined on the witness stand,
though entirely innocent of the charge against him. Ex-
cessive timidity, nervousness when facing hostile ques-
tioning and attempting to explain transactions of a suspi-
cious character, and offenses charged against him, will
often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as to
increase prejudices against him. It is not every one, how-
ever honest, who would, therefore, willingly be subjected
to cross-examination. The law, in tenderness to the weak-
ness of those who from the causes mentioned might pre-
fer not to be cross-examined, particularly when they may
have been in some degree compromised by their associa-
tion with others, should declare that the failure of a testi-
fying defendant in a criminal action to submit himself to
cross-examination shall not create any presumption
against him.
This parody is about as convincing as the original. The weak-
nesses of the argument in this setting are not difficult to spot:
First, the guilty defendant, who must lie on the stand to avoid
conviction, has good reason to fear exposure on cross-examina-
tion, but no comparable jeopardy results to the innocent defen-
dant, who can give a truthful account of the circumstances sup-
porting his innocence. Moreover, there is no reason to believe
that the specific sources of prejudice identified in the argument
will generally have the claimed effect. If the defendant is ner-
vous, why should it be assumed that the trier would be unable to
understand that an innocent person who has been falsely ac-
cused might be nervous when subjected to hostile questioning at
his trial? If the defendant is timid, why should it be assumed
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that that will excite antagonism rather than sympathy?' 98 Such
remote or speculative risks of prejudice are insufficient to justify
the wholesale waiver of a normal truth-seeking device (cross-ex-
amination) in relation to testifying defendants."99
Second, while avoiding conviction of the innocent is one of the
fundamental objectives of the system, the other fundamental ob-
jective-securing the conviction of the guilty-must also be fig-
ured into the balance. Any slight potential risk to the innocent
from cross-examination must be evaluated in the context of the
large cost to the conviction of the guilty-and hence, to the pub-
lic's security from crime-that would result from its preclusion.
Very similar considerations apply to the "nervous defendant"
argument against permitting comment on the defendant's si-
lence. To begin with, suppose that adverse comment on the de-
fendant's failure to testify is permitted, and that the prospect of
such comment induces a defendant to testify who otherwise
would not have done so. The claim that an unacceptable risk to
the innocent would result in such cases is very close to the par-
ody argument against permitting cross-examination. Indeed,
presumably the main concern underlying the "nervous defend-
ant" argument-as it applies to a defendant who testifies to
avoid adverse comment on his silence-is not that he will make
a poor showing under friendly questioning by his lawyer, but
that he will not do well under cross-examination.
The same sort of response is appropriate here: There is a very
real and entirely salutary risk in such cases to the guilty defen-
dant who must lie on the stand and risk exposure, but any jeop-
ardy to the innocent defendant from being exposed to question-
ing at trial is slight, since he can give a truthful account of the
circumstances showing his innocence.2 00 Even if the innocent de-
fendant does lack composure on the stand in some cases of this
sort, one may question how frequently any resulting disadvan-
tage outweighs the risk of conviction that would arise from re-
maining silent.21 Suc'L. remote or speculative risks of prejudice
198. See Price, On the Right of the Prosecutor to Comment on Defendant's Refusal
to Take the Stand, 13 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 292, 293-94 (1922).
199. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-56 (1958).
200. Exceptions to this point would be limited to rare cases in which the defendant
has amnesia or has no recollection of the pertinent events for some other extraordinary
reason. Even in such a case, however, the defendant is free to testify that he is unable to
recall what happened, and to explain the reasons why.
201. "Prejudice" would result to an innocent defendant in an overall sense only if his
performance on the stand was more damaging to his case than the alternative of saying
nothing would have been. The latter course, however, entails a risk of conviction result-
ing from the trier's natural suspicions about a supposedly innocent defendant's failure to
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do not outweigh the truth-disclosing value of the normal trial
processes of eliciting testimony from knowledgeable witnesses
(including defendants) and testing its veracity. In general, en-
larging the opportunities for withholding the defendant's testi-
mony does not advance the search for truth.202
Conversely, suppose that adverse comment on silence is al-
lowed, but the defendant nevertheless decides not to testify. The
argument must be that this will occur in some significant num-
ber of cases involving an innocent defendant, even though his
silence deprives him of the opportunity to share the truth that
he knows with the trier, even though it deprives him of the op-
portunity to respond to any specific evidence against him that
relates to matters within his knowledge, and even though his
failure to talk will predictably be pointed to by the prosecutor
(and perhaps also the judge) as suspicious conduct that en-
hances the probability of guilt. The argument must assume fur-
ther that in some significant sub-class of these cases, comment
of this type will result in the conviction of an innocent defen-
dant who would otherwise have been acquitted, and that this
will occur with sufficient frequency to outweigh the value of such
comment in securing the conviction of the guilty.
In addressing these contentions, one may note to begin with
that the bare possibility of an innocent defendant's not testify-
ing would not justify barring the consideration of silence under
normal evidentiary standards. The basic standard for admitting
and considering evidence is not conclusiveness, but rele-
vance-that is, some bearing, direct or indirect, on the
probability of guilt or innocence. e3 Both innocent and guilty de-
fendants may be apprehensive about testifying for the sorts of
testify and from the relinquishment of the opportunity to give truthful exculpatory testi-
mony. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
202. See State v. Baker, 53 A.2d 53, 58-59 (Vt. 1947); L. MAVEMs, supra note 17, at 26
& n.27; 8 WIGMORE'S EVIDENCE § 2251 at 310-11 & n.3 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Price,
supra note 198, at 293-94.
203. See FED. R. EviD. 401, 402. While the defendant's failure to testify is not for-
mally offered in evidence, it is a directly observable aspect of the defendant's conduct
which could properly be considered as evidence by the trier in the absence of special
rules to the contrary. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965) ("[The
California comment rule] is in substance a rule of evidence that allows the State the
privilege of tendering to the jury for its consideration the failure of the accused to tes-
tify. No formal offer of proof is made as in other situations; but the prosecutor's com-
ment and the court's acquiescence are the equivalent of an offer of evidence and its
acceptance."); Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1923) ("Conduct which forms a
basis for inference is evidence. Silence is often evidence of the most persuasive charac-
ter."); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316-19 (1976) (upholding consideration of
prisoner's silence as evidence against him in disciplinary proceeding).
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reasons suggested in the "nervous defendant" argument, but the
guilty defendant has an additional reason that does not apply to
the innocent-his inability to give a truthful response to the evi-
dence against him. Thus, other things being equal, guilty de-
fendants are more likely to be unwilling to testify than the inno-
cent, which establishes that a failure to testify is relevant to the
assessment of the probability of guilt or innocence.
However, focusing on relevance in this minimal sense consid-
erably understates the case. As a matter of common sense, a per-
son's failure to respond to charges of serious misconduct would
normally be regarded as a suspicious circumstance. The suspi-
cion would be heightened if he remained silent when confronted
with substantial evidence supporting the charges. It would be
heightened still further if he made no response despite being
aware that his failure to do so would be held against him in de-
termining whether he had engaged in the misconduct, and that
he would face serious adverse practical consequences if he failed
to clear himself. All these conditions are present when a defen-
dant facing possible criminal conviction declines to testify in re-
sponse to the government's evidence despite the prospect of ad-
verse comment and inferences concerning his silence.
Nevertheless, the inferences that would normally be drawn in
such circumstances are currently barred by law. If this wholesale
banishment of common sense from criminal trials is to be ac-
cepted, a convincing showing should be required that allowing it
in would create an unacceptable risk to the innocent.2°4
An argument to this effect has been based on the fact that a
lawyer may advise his client not to testify for strategic reasons
unrelated to guilt or innocence. 205 For example, there may not be
much value (from the defense's standpoint) in putting the de-
fendant on the stand if the government's evidence is weak, if
there is other good rebuttal evidence, or if all the defendant
could say is that he was at home in bed asleep at the time of the
alleged offense. In such a case, any slight value of testimony by
the defendant could be outweighed if there were some risk of
204. See generally S. Hoov, COMMON SENSE AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 14-19, 30-40,
47-55, 62-63, 73-76, 81-82 (1957); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 60 (1947) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) ("Sensible and just-minded men, in important affairs of life, deem
it significant that a man remains silent when confronted with serious and responsible
evidence against himself which it is within his power to contradict. The notion that to
allow jurors to do that which sensible and right-minded men do every day violates the
'immutable principles of justice' as conceived by a civilized society is to trivialize the
importance of 'due process.' ").
205. See Bradley, Griffin v. California Still Viable After All These Years, 79 MICH.
L. REv. 1290, 1292-94 & n.25 (1981).
1074 [VOL. 22:3 & 4
SPRING AND SUMMER 1989]
resulting prejudice because, for example, the defendant is intim-
idated, personally obnoxious, or inarticulate, and accordingly
might make a poor impression on the stand. While the reasons
for failing to testify in such a case would reflect strategic consid-
erations of this type rather than the defendant's guilt, the trier
might nevertheless believe that guilt was the reason. In order to
protect defendants in such cases from this type of misapprehen-
sion, it is urged, consideration of silence as evidence of guilt
should be barred. There are, however, three basic problems with
this argument.
First, so narrow a premise cannot sustain so broad a conclu-
sion. The current rules barring comment on the defendant's si-
lence are not limited to cases in which, for example, the govern-
ment's evidence is weak or the defendant could be expected to
have little to say in response. Rather, they apply in all cases,
including those in which the government's evidence is strong
and relates directly to matters that are within the defendant's
knowledge. If the force of the defendant's silence as evidence of
guilt is affected by other circumstances in the case-for exam-
ple, how strongly the government's evidence seems to call for a
specific response on his part-this point does not distinguish si-
lence from other types of evidence, whose probative force will
also vary depending on surrounding circumstances. Under the
operation of a comment rule, the import of the defendant's si-
lence under the facts of the case, like that of other evidence,
would be an appropriate subject of comment and argument by
the defense attorney as well as the prosecutor, and the judge's
instructions would provide guidance to the jury on this issue.206
Second, this argument fallaciously extrapolates the contempo-
rary practice of lawyers to the very different situation that
would exist if adverse comment on silence were allowed. The
current system attempts to make the decision not to testify as
cost-free as possible. Under the rule of Griffin v. California,07
adverse comment is barred; and under the rule of Carter v. Ken-
tucky,0s5 the jury must be affirmatively instructed that no ad-
verse inference is to be drawn. While these rules may make the
206. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 80-83 (1908) (trial judge's charge
concerning defendants' failure to testify). While a defendant who fails to take the stand
cannot personally explain to the trier his reasons for remaining silent, this point does not
distinguish the defendant's silence from other evidence. A defendant who does not tes-
tify relinquishes the opportunity to explain in his own words any of the evidence against
him, including any aspect of his conduct that is arguably suspicious or incriminating. See
generally supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
207. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
208. 450 U.S. 288 (1981).
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option of silence attractive unless a substantial advantage to the
defense can be expected from testimony by the defendant, the
decision not to put the defendant on the stand would be more
hazardous if common sense inferences could be drawn from his
failure to testify. Any risk that a factually innocent defendant
would stay off the stand for strategic reasons would be dimin-
ished accordingly. Rather than supporting a rule against com-
ment, the argument's assumptions about current defense prac-
tices highlight the toll on the search for truth that the existing
anti-comment rules exact by facilitating strategic withholding of
the defendant's testimony. Repealing these rules would help en-
sure a decision by the trier based on all the relevant information
by restoring the normal incentives for responding to incriminat-
ing accusations and evidence.'"
Third, in arguing for a sweeping exclusionary rule with respect
to the defendant's silence, the argument from contemporary law-
yers' practice applies a standard that is not applied in relation
to the withholding of other types of evidence. In deciding
whether to offer a witness's testimony or any other evidence, an
advocate's decision does not turn on the overall question of guilt
or innocence, but on the narrower question of whether that evi-
dence is likely to help or hurt his case. That is a fact-bound de-
termination which takes into account considerations other than
ultimate guilt or innocence. Nevertheless, the defense's failure to
offer evidence is generally relevant in assessing the probability
of guilt or innocence' 10 because it can normally be expected that
evidence will be offered if its overall tendency is exculpatory,
and it is more likely that the available evidence will have that
character if the defendant is in fact innocent. This point applies
to the defendant's own testimony as well as other evidence."'
The argument up to this point indicates that any value of
anti-comment rules in protecting the innocent does not outweigh
the impediment they create to securing the conviction of the
guilty. We can go further, however, and suggest that these rules
may be counterproductive even if one puts aside the objective of
convicting the guilty and focuses solely on acquittal of the
innocent.
The jeopardy-to-the-innocent argument assumes that inno-
cent defendants would fail to testify with some frequency-out
209. See Price, supra note 198, at 293-95.
210. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
211. See Bradley, supra note 205, at 1294 (acknowledging that factual guilt or inno-
cence will affect probability of factors entering into judgment whether defendant should
testify, such as credibility of defendant's story and likelihood of impeachment).
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of concern over nervousness, timidity, etc.-even if adverse com-
ment were permitted, and that they would then be unfairly
taxed with such comment. However, whether or not comment is
permitted, it would not be implausible to suggest that an inno-
cent defendant who fails to testify is typically engaging in a dan-
gerous and foolish act, and substantially increasing the likeli-
hood that he will be unjustly convicted. The potential jeopardy
arises both from the fact that in not taking the stand he relin-
quishes the opportunity to present truthful exculpatory testi-
mony, and from the fact that the trier may draw adverse infer-
ences from his silence, regardless of what legal theory has to say
on that point. By removing the incentive to testify that arises
from the prospect of adverse comment, anti-comment rules in-
crease the risk that some innocent defendants will not testify
and that miscarriages of justice will accordingly result. If it is
objected that the underlying assumption concerning the hazard-
ousness of silence to the innocent defendant who would prefer
not to testify is speculative, it is no more so than the assumption
that the innocent defendant will fail to testify in some signifi-
cant class of cases and be harmed by a rule permitting comment.
Thus, in assessing the net impact of comment rules on protec-
tion of the innocent, any unjust convictions that result from ad-
verse comment on the failure of defendants to testify must be
offset by unjust convictions avoided through the incentive that
such rules provide for innocent defendants to testify and clear
themselves:
The nervous-innocent-person argument can have ap-
plication only to criminal defendants; the privilege does
not protect civil parties and third-party witnesses, ner-
vous or otherwise, from being called to the witness stand.
There is of course always a chance that an innocent crim-
inal defendant, by his poor witness-stand performance,
will convict himself. To take the stand with such a possi-
bility, however slight, in mind must be a frightening ex-
perience. But does the risk of a miscarriage of justice for
this reason exceed the risk of a miscarriage of justice be-
cause of the inference which will surely be drawn from
the defendant's failure to testify? Probably not.
Strangely enough, then the privilege in the mass of cases
of frightened innocent defendants (if it influences them
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at all) probably has a net tendency to seduce them into
convicting, not saving, themselves by their silence.2
3. Penalties and Burdens on Silence
The essential rationale of Griffin v. California was as follows:
"[C]omment on the refusal to testify. . . is a penalty imposed
by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down
on the privilege by making its assertion costly.
2 13
If "penalty" is understood in its most common sense as refer-
ring to a punishment or sanction, then Griffin's characterization
on this point has no substance. The prosecutor who comments
adversely on the defendant's failure to testify is not going out of
his way to visit retribution on the defendant for having the te-
merity to stay off the stand. Rather, he is simply treating the
defendant's silence as he would any other aspect of the defend-
ant's conduct that is arguably suspicious or incriminating. If, for
example, the prosecutor comments on the fact that the defen-
dant concealed or disposed of a firearm that he allegedly used in
a homicide, that is not a punishment imposed on the defendant
by the state for failing to keep his gun. If the prosecutor com-
ments on the fact that the defendant apparently fled after the
offense, that is not a sanction imposed on the defendant by the
state for failing to stay in town. Characterizing comment on the
defendant's failure to testify as a punitive measure is equally
groundless.2 '
Thus, if there is any substance at all in Griffin, it is not in the
penalty metaphor, but in the statement indicating that comment
is an impermissible burden on the choice of silence: "It cuts
down on the privilege by making its assertion costly." However,
unless the Constitution itself is to be ignored in resolving a ques-
tion of constitutional interpretation, it is not enough to point
out that a procedural or evidentiary rule makes silence a less
attractive option for the defendant than would otherwise have
been the case. Rather, it must be shown that the type of pres-
212. 8 WIGuoRE's EVIDENCE § 2251 at 311 n.3 (McNaughton rev. 1961). The textual
quote is addressed to the defendant's immunity from being compelled to testify; essen-
tially the same point applies to the exemption from adverse comment on a failure to
testify. See Price, supra note 198, at 293-94; see also Swope, Constitutionality of a Com-
ment upon Defendant's Failure to Testify, 37 MICH. L. REv. 777, 779-80 (1939).
213. 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
214. See generally Ayer, supra note 141, at 855-57.
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sure the rule exerts constitutes compulsion in the sense of the
fifth amendment. Neither the origin nor the historical under-
standing of the self-incrimination right sustains this conclusion
in relation to comment on the defendant's silence. 1
Griffin's pronouncement on this issue is also at odds with
other decisions by the Court which have countenanced proce-
dures that "cut down" on the privilege by "making its assertion
costly," or even by more direct constraints on the choice of si-
lence."1 ' These include, for example, the numerous cases uphold-
ing statutory presumptions and judicial instructions that effec-
tively authorize a finding of guilt on the basis of a single
unrebutted incriminating circumstance,1 7 and the decision in
Baxter v. Palmigiano,"58 in which the Court upheld telling a
prisoner that his failure to give non-immunized testimony would
be held against him in a disciplinary proceeding."' Other exam-
ples include the following:
First, a defendant who takes the stand is not free to limit his
testimony. The Court held in Caminetti v. United States220 that
adverse inferences could be drawn from the defendant's selective
silence on the stand, and other decisions have made it clear that
a defendant could be held in contempt for refusing to answer
questions on cross-examination. As the Court explained in
Brown v. United States, a contrary rule "would make . ..the
Fifth Amendment. . .a positive invitation to mutilate the truth
a party offers to tell." In this context, "[t]he interests of the
other party and regard for the function of courts of justice to
ascertain the truth become relevant and prevail in the balance of
215. See supra notes 169-88 and accompanying text.
216. Cases involving informal pressures to testify arising from general procedural ar-
rangements or evidentiary rules present the closest analogies to the situation addressed
by Griffin. Cases involving efforts to impose unconditional obligations on a person to
testify through the threat of formal sanctions or penalties raise different issues and have
been assessed under different standards, see generally Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S.
308, 316-18 (1976); Grano, Miranda's Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor
Schulhofer, 55 U. CH. L. REv. 174, 183-86 (1988), as have cases involving efforts to in-
duce suspects to talk through physical or psychological abuse, see generally Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304-09 (1985) (occurrence of fifth amendment violation in question-
ing of suspects generally depends on traditional voluntariness test).
217. E.g., instructions that guilty knowledge may be inferred from the unexplained
possession of stolen goods, or a rebuttable presumption that occupants of a vehicle were
in possession of an illegal firearm found in the vehicle. See generally Ayer, supra note
141, at 859-64.
218. 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
219. See generally Ayer, supra note 141, at 864-66; supra notes 142-45 and accompa-
nying text.
220. 242 U.S. 470, 492-95 (1917).
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considerations determining the scope and limits of the privilege
against self-incrimination.""'
Second, in Crampton v. Ohio'2 ' the defendant objected to a
unitary guilt-determination and sentencing trial in a capital case
on the ground that this procedure "unduly encourages waiver of
the defendant's privilege to remain silent on the issue of guilt, or
. . . unlawfully compels the defendant to become a witness
against himself on the issue of guilt by the threat of sentencing
him to death without having heard from him." The Court re-
jected this argument on the ground that the state may validly
provide that the defendant's testimony will be considered on all
matters to which it is relevant, including guilt or innocence, even
if he would prefer to have it considered only on the question of
punishment.
Third, in Williams v. Florida the Court upheld a discovery
rule requiring pretrial disclosure of an alibi defense and alibi
witnesses as a condition on the assertion of such a defense at
trial. The Court noted that discovery in criminal cases serves a
valid truth-promoting function. While the discovery rule re-
quired the defendant to make an earlier disclosure of his in-
tended alibi defense than he might have liked, the choice it
posed was similar in character to the normal choice at trial
whether to put on a defense witness from whom the prosecutor
might elicit incriminating testimony on cross-examination.
"Nothing in the Fifth Amendment privilege," said the Court,
"entitles a defendant ... to await the end of the State's case
before announcing the nature of his defense, any more than it
entitles him to await the jury's verdict on the State's case in
chief before deciding whether or not to take the stand
himself.
'2 2 3
Fourth, in Jenkins v. Anderson22" the Court upheld impeach-
ment of a defendant's trial testimony by his pretrial silence, re-
jecting the argument that the fifth amendment barred this prac-
tice because "a person facing arrest will not remain silent if his
failure to speak later can be used to impeach him." The Court
recognized that the Constitution does not forbid "every govern-
ment-imposed choice in the criminal process that has the effect
of discouraging the exercise of Constitutional rights," and that
221. 356 U.S. 148, 155-56 (1958).
222. Reported with McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213-17, 220 (1971).
223. 399 U.S. 78, 80-86 (1970).
224. 447 U.S. 231, 235-38 (1980).
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permitting impeachment of the defendant's testimony "advances
the truth-finding function of the criminal trial."
All of these decisions have upheld procedural arrangements or
evidentiary rules that limited or discouraged the defendant's ex-
ercise of the option of remaining silent. While their specific ra-
tionales vary, they are obviously irreconcilable with any general
assumption that nothing can validlr be done which makes the
choice of silence "costly." Like the rules addressed in these deci-
sions, the comment rule overturned in Griffin was not a capri-
cious imposition on the defendant for remaining silent, and re-
flected no purpose of punishing the defendant for refusing to
testify. Rather, permitting such comment is a legitimate effort
by the state to facilitate the achievement of accurate verdicts
and substantive justice.2" As such, it is comparable to truth-pro-
moting rules that discourage or circumscribe the choice of si-
lence which have been upheld in many other decisions. "
225. Griffin's arguments to the contrary, based on concern for the situation of the
"nervous defendant," and the possibility that an innocent defendant might fail to testify
to avoid disclosure of his criminal record, have been answered elsewhere in this report.
See supra notes 189-212 and accompanying text; infra notes 227-41 and accompanying
text. Griffin's virtually conclusory overriding of a state judgment on this issue is also not
consistent with the Court's recognition in other cases of the deference owed to state
decisions concerning the formulation of just evidentiary and procedural rules. See Jen-
kins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238-41 (1980) (states are free to decide whether prejudi-
cial effect of disclosing defendant's pretrial silence for impeachment outweighs its proba-
tive value); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 220-22 (1971) (deference to state
decision to use unitary trial in capital cases).
226. See generally Ayer, supra note 141, at 858-66; supra notes 216-225 and accom-
panying text. Aside from cases like Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981), that depend
directly on Griffin, it is difficult to find significant parallels to Griffin elsewhere. The
closest approach would seem to be Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), in which
the Court invalidated a state rule requiring a defendant who desired to testify to take
the stand before other defense witnesses. However, the validity of the fifth amendment
rationale of Brooks is certainly open to question, see generally id. at 613-15 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting); Westen, Order of Proof: An Accused's Right to Control the Timing and
Sequence of Evidence in His Defense, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 935, 939-40, 947-59 (1978), and
the Court in Brooks relied in part on Griffin for its fifth amendment standard, see 406
U.S. at 610-11. The specific "burden" on silence identified as impermissible in
Brooks-precluding the defendant from subsequently testifying if he chooses not to
speak at a certain point in the proceedings-may also be distinguishable from the "bur-
den" at issue in Griffin. In contrast to the restriction invalidated in Brooks-in effect, an
evidence exclusion sanction for remaining silent at a certain time-a rule permitting ad-
verse comment if the defendant fails to testify in no way impedes a defendant in
presenting evidence in his defense, and leaves him free to testify, if he is so inclined, at
the time of his choosing.
1081
Journal of Law Reform
4. Impeachment by Prior Convictions
The common law once held that a person convicted of a felony
or of an offense involving dishonesty ("crimen falsi") was per-
manently disqualified thereafter from testifying as a witness in
any proceeding. The rule was subsequently moderated so as to
provide that such persons could testify, but that their convic-
tions would be admitted to impeach their credibility. Once de-
fendants were made competent to testify, it became possible to
admit their prior convictions for impeachment, as with other
witnesses. The rule has persisted to the present in most states,
albeit with variations among the states in the class of offenses
admissible for impeachment."
7
The fact that a defendant's criminal record may be disclosed
when he takes the stand, but generally not otherwise, has vexed
the debate over comment on silence throughout its history. The
usual argument is that defendants and their lawyers will be ap-
prehensive that the jury will consider the defendant's record as
affirmative evidence of guilt, despite its theoretical restriction to
impeachment, and hence will keep the defendant off the stand
so that his record does not come out. However, the jury may not
be aware of this possible motive for not testifying, and may ac-
cordingly misapprehend in such a case that the reason for the
defendant's silence is an inability to respond to the evidence
against him. To avoid this type of prejudice to an innocent de-
fendant whose real reason for not testifying is concern about ex-
posure of his criminal history, it is argued, the jury should not
be allowed to draw adverse inferences from the defendant's
silence.
One response to this argument has been to propose repealing
the rule permitting impeachment of testifying defendants by
prior convictions."8 Others have responded by arguing that re-
quiring a choice between disclosure of a criminal record and ad-
verse comment on silence is not more objectionable in principle
than the choice that would be required in any event between
disclosure of the record and bearing the adverse consequences of
not testifying, or that the practical likelihood that an innocent
defendant would forego the opportunity to testify in order to
conceal his record is not great enough to justify a general rule
227. See MCCORMICK'S EVIDENCE § 43 (2d ed. 1972); 2 WIGMoRE's EVIDENCE §§ 519-
20 (Chadbourn rev. 1979).
228. See, e.g., MODEL CODS O EVIDENCE, Rules 106(3) and Comment, 201(3)(1942);
Note, supra note 38, at 152; Swope, supra note 212, at 779-80.
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against comment.22 9 In the jurisdictions that historically did per-
mit adverse comment on silence, judges were evidently not of
the view that this possibility made the procedure unfair to de-
fendants. 30 In Adamson v. California" I the Supreme Court re-
jected the argument that the possibility of impeachment by
prior convictions made the California comment rule
unconstitutional.
The issue merits a finer analysis than it has received in the
historical debate. To begin with, it should be noted that the ar-
gument depends entirely on unrelated evidentiary rules-the
rules that admit prior convictions if the defendant testifies but
otherwise generally exclude them-which are not uniform
among the states. In a state that does not admit prior convic-
tions to impeach a defendant's testimony, the argument does not
apply at all.25 2
Moreover, even in the presence of the usual sort of impeach-
ment rule, the argument only applies to a certain class of cases.
It presupposes that the defendant does in fact have a conviction
record. It also presupposes that the defendant's convictions fall
within the class of offenses that are admissible under the im-
peachment rule. This class has traditionally been limited to felo-
nies and crimina falsi, and contemporary rules of evidence may
impose additional restrictions. For example, Fed. R. Evid. 609
imposes a general ten-year time limit on disclosable convictions.
Moreover, with respect to convictions for felonies other than
crimina falsi, Rule 609 conditions admission on a determination
by the trial judge that the value of admission outweighs its prej-
udicial effect to the defendant. Finally, even where the defen-
dant does have prior convictions that would be subject to admis-
sion under the impeachment rule, the prosecutor is not required
to bring them out, and could stipulate that he would not seek
their disclosure if the defendant testified. Thus, the impeach-
ment argument is germane at most to cases in which (1) the de-
229. See, e.g., Ayer, supra note 141, at 868-69 n.121; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 57-58 (1947); People v. Modesto, 398 P.2d 753, 763-74 (Cal. 1965); see also Adamson,
supra, 332 U.S. at 60-61 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Nor does it make any difference
* * .that by taking the witness stand [the defendant] may expose himself to having his
credibility impugned by reason of his criminal record. Silence under such circumstances
is still significant. A person in that situation may express to the jury, through appropri-
ate requests to charge, why he prefers to keep silent.").
230. See 63 A.B.A. REP. 592-93 (1938).
231. 332 U.S. 46, 57-58 (1947).
232. See MoNT. R. EvID. 609 (conviction of crime not admissible to impeach any wit-
ness); HAw. R. EVID. 609 (defendant's convictions generally not admissible for
impeachment).
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fendant has one or more prior convictions that fall within the
general class of convictions admissible under the jurisdiction's
impeachment rule, (2) the trial judge has ruled that any judg-
mental condition on disclosure of the defendant's convictions
under the impeachment rule-such as balancing of probative
value against prejudicial effect-is satisfied with respect to one
or more of the convictions, and (3) the prosecutor has not stipu-
lated that he would refrain from disclosing the convictions.""
The argument from the possibility of impeachment by prior con-
victions provides no basis at all for barring adverse comment
and inferences concerning a defendant's silence in any case in
which these conditions are not satisfied.
Moreover, the argument would not apply to cases in which the
trier knows about the defendant's record independently of its
disclosure for impeachment. This can occur under some state
sentencing procedures which involve disclosing the defendant's
record to the jury before it makes a determination of guilt or
innocence. 34 It can also occur in a bench trial where the judge
knows independently about the defendant's record because, for
example, it was disclosed at a pretrial bail hearing which the
judge handled. In such cases, the defendant's motive for staying
off the stand cannot be concealment of his criminal record, since
the trier will know about it even if he does not testify.
More broadly, the fourth Report in this series has argued that
the defendant's record of prior convictions should be uniformly
admissible at trial, including cases in which the defendant does
not testify.' The argument from impeachment by prior convic-
tions would not apply at all in any jurisdiction that adopted this
approach. The motive for staying off the stand under such a rule
could not be concealment of a conviction record, since it would
be disclosed anyway.
This leaves the question of what force the impeachment argu-
ment has in the class of cases in which the defendant does have
a record which would be disclosed under the impeachment rule
if he testified, but which he would otherwise be able to conceal.
233. If the impeachment argument were met by permitting adverse comment only
where there is not a risk of disclosure of prior convictions, the prosecutor might deem it
advantageous in some cases to stipulate to the non-admission of such convictions so as to
be able to comment on the defendant's failure to testify, or to increase the likelihood
that the defendant will testify and be available for cross-examination.
234. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554
(1967).
235. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 'TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE'
SERIES, REPORT No. 4, THE ADMIssIoN OF CRIMINAL HISTORIES AT TRIAL (1986), (hereinaf-
ter REPORT No. 4], reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. RE. 707 (1989).
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A number of considerations limit the force of the argument in
this context.
First, staying off the stand to conceal a criminal record may be
a relatively attractive strategic option for the defendant under
the current rules, since they bar adverse comment and attempt
to prevent any adverse inference from a failure to testify. A very
different strategic equation would be presented, however, if fail-
ing to testify exposed the defendant to adverse comment. Thus,
any risk that an innocent defendant would stay off the stand to
avoid disclosure of past convictions is at least in part a result of
the current rules that shield the defendant from the normal in-
centives he would feel to testify. Changing the rules to permit
comment would reduce any such risk.2"6
Second, if an innocent defendant does stay off the stand to
conceal his record, it is open to question whether he typically
does himself more good than harm in doing So. 23 7 By encourag-
ing the defendant's choice of silence, the existing rules barring
comment and inferences create a risk that innocent defendants
with criminal records who could have cleared themselves by tes-
tifying will instead remain silent and run an increased likelihood
of conviction. Any value of anti-comment rules in preventing
prejudice to innocent defendants with criminal histories must be
offset by this resulting jeopardy to the same class of defendants.
Third, Fed. R. Evid. 609 and many comparable state rules
2
8
condition admission of a defendant's past convictions (other
than crimina falsi) on a finding by the trial judge that their evi-
dentiary value with respect to credibility outweighs their preju-
dicial effect. As a practical matter, this generally creates the
strongest presumption in favor of excluding convictions that are
actually of the greatest probative value in establishing guilt of
the currently charged offense. 3 9 The fact that the conviction
record admissible under this type of rule is an edited version
designed to avoid a possibility of undue prejudice also reduces
the likelihood that the prospect of disclosure will deter an inno-
cent defendant from testifying. The likelihood is even more re-
236. See Price, supra note 198, at 295.
237. See generally id. at 293-95; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 60-61 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); State v. Baker, 115 Vt. 94, 102-03, 53 A.2d 53, 58-59 (1947);
REPoRT No. 4. supra note 235, Part II.C.3.
238. State rules are compiled and analyzed in G. JOSEPH & S. SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN
AMERICA-THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES ch. 43 (1987).
239. See D. LOUisELL & C. MUELLER, 3 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 316 at 329-30 (1979);
REPORT No. 4, supra note 235, Part II.C.3.
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mote under state rules that are more restrictive than the federal
rule.2
40
Taking account of all the foregoing considerations, the im-
peachment argument would not seem adequate to justify a rule
against comment and inferences from a defendant's failure to
testify, even in the class of cases in which it arguably has some
application. The argument does, however, emphasize the desir-
ability of securing the adoption of the reform proposed in the
fourth Report in this series: a uniform rule of admission for the
conviction records of defendants at trial, including defendants
who do not testify. 41 To the extent that the alleged ambiguities
generated by the non-testifying defendant's ability to conceal his
record continue to be offered as the justification for an anti-com-
ment rule, it is an example of one bad law being used to justify
another.
5. The Overall Effectiveness of the Truth-Seeking Process
It has been argued that permitting comment and inferences
concerning a defendant's silence would result in a lesser overall
effectiveness of the criminal justice system in discovering the
truth and reaching just results. The alleged risk is that the sys-
tem will generally come to rely on unreliable admissions ex-
torted from defendants in place of better sorts of evidence or,
more narrowly, that prosecutors will become less diligent in
seeking other sorts of evidence (the "lazy prosecutor" argu-
ment). The source most frequently cited for this type of argu-
ment is a rationale offered by Wigmore for the defendant's ex-
emption at trial from being required to testify:
The real objection is that any system of administra-
tion which permits the prosecution to trust habitually to
compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof must it-
self suffer morally thereby. The inclination develops to
rely mainly upon such evidence, and to be satisfied with
an incomplete investigation of the other sources. The ex-
ercise of the power to extract answers begets a forgetful-
ness of the just limitations of that power. The simple and
240. For example, Rules 609 of Alaska and Iowa only admit crimina falsi for im-
peachment, and require a balancing of prejudicial effect and probative value even with
respect to such offenses. Rule 609 of West Virginia limits impeachment of defendants to
crimes involving perjury or false swearing.
241. See REPORT No. 4, supra note 235, Part V.
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peaceful process of questioning breeds a readiness to re-
sort to bullying and to physical force and torture. If there
is a right to an answer, there soon seems to be a right to
the expected answer-that is, to a confession of guilt.
Thus the legitimate use grows into the unjust abuse; ulti-
mately, the innocent are jeopardized by the encroach-
ments of a bad system. Such seems to have been the
course of experience in those legal systems where the
privilege was not recognized .... Il
Practical experience would suggest some countervailing con-
siderations that are not noted in this argument's generalities
concerning the risk of abuse. The practical choice in many ac-
tual cases is not between getting evidence from the defendant
and getting better evidence from some other source, but between
getting evidence from the defendant and turning a criminal
loose on society. "It is always easy to hint at mysterious means
available just around the corner to catch outlaws."24 Moreover,
there are intermediate possibilities between making a defen-
dant's testimony compellable and barring questioning at trial
without his consent. Various contemporary foreign democracies
authorize the routine questioning of the defendant at trial, sub-
ject to his option of refusing to answer particular questions. "
Even assuming, however, that this argument provides a valid
reason for some types of self-incrimination restrictions, it does
not provide any substantial objection to permitting adverse com-
ment on the defendant's failure to testify. Comment of this type
in public judicial proceedings would not create any novel risk of
"bullying," much less of "physical force and torture. '2 4 5 If the
defendant did not testify, the only consequence would be com-
ment on his silence as an incriminating circumstance. If concern
over exposure to such comment resulted in a defendant's taking
the stand, his examination and cross-examination would be no
different in character from that of other witnesses, including de-
fendants who decide to testify under the current rules.
242. 8 WIGMORE'S EVIDENCE § 2251 n.1 at 295-96 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (quotation
of Wigmore's discussion from 1940 edition). But cf. infra note 248 (sources indicating
belief by Wigmore that considerations noted in argument did not apply against permit-
ting comment on failure to testify).
243. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 73 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). See generally
Friendly, supra note 50, at 691; MAYERS, supra note 17, at 67-71.
244. Information about practices in foreign jurisdictions appears in Part III of this
Report, and in REPORT No. 1, supra note 16, at Part III.
245. See generally Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarran Act, and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. CH. L. REV. 687, 691-92 (1951).
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The "lazy prosecutor" aspect of the argument is also not per-
suasive in relation to comment on the defendant's silence. The
1938 ABA survey which found that judges in the states permit-
ting comment believed overwhelmingly that the practice was im-
portant and beneficial also found that they believed overwhelm-
ingly that it did not result in lesser diligence by prosecutors in
investigation," 6
Considering the issue at a practical level, permitting such
comment does not relieve the prosecutor of the need to seek
other evidence, since he must obtain evidence sufficient to estab-
lish probable cause in order to bring the case to trial, and must
produce sufficient evidence at trial to establish a prima facie
case before any issue of the defendant's testifying or not testify-
ing arises. The prosecutor also cannot go to trial with little in
hand, hoping to remedy the defects in his case with the help of
the defendant's testimony or silence, since he cannot anticipate
with any certainty whether the defendant will testify, even if
comment is permitted; cannot anticipate how helpful the de-
fendant's testimony will be, if the defendant does testify; and
cannot anticipate how probative of guilt the defendant's silence
will appear to be in the context of the completed case, if the
defendant does not testify. Moreover, while permitting adverse
comment on silence could be expected to result in a more fre-
quent availability of defendants for questioning at trial, this
would not obviate the need for independent investigation, since
"effective interrogation presupposes careful investigation."'s47 An
article concerning the Ohio procedure permitting adverse com-
ment on the defendant's failure to testify had the following to
say:
Under the practice of permitting an inference in Ohio,
the prosecution is forced to obtain evidence sufficient to
make out a case to go to the jury before it can possibly be
in a position to profit by the inference. The prosecution
is not tempted to go to trial without sufficient evidence
with a view to the establishment of the case from defen-
dant's own testimony. The innocent defendant is there-
246. See 63 A.BA REP. 570, 592-93 (1938). The survey found that 93.65% of judges
regarded comment as "an important and proper aid in the administration of justice,"
2.65% considered it "definitely unfair to the accused," and the rest considered it rela-
tively unimportant. Over 85% of the judges said that it "seldom if ever causes the prose-
cuting attorney to be less diligent in his search for evidence of guilt." The views of the
remaining judges on the diligence issue were not detailed in the report.
247. Meltzer, supra note 245, at 691-92.
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fore not prejudiced by reason of the fact that the prose-
cutor has relied upon his expected testimony and has
therefore made a careless examination of other sources of
proof. Without any testimony from the accused, the state
must introduce sufficient evidence to cause the grand
jury to return an indictment. Without the testimony of
accused the state is then required to introduce sufficient
admissible evidence so that a jury may find that all the
essential elements of the crime charged have been
proved. The prosecutor, therefore, is forced to examine
others than the accused, and to make such an examina-
tion that the innocent accused has reasonable protection
against being made the object of a charge in the absence
of independent evidence ...
As far as the writer has been able to learn, the provi-
sion permitting comment upon failure of accused to tes-
tify has not led to abuse in Ohio. The prosecutor's pre-
liminary investigation seems no less thorough and the
trial no less dignified. The innocent defendant is de-
prived of no essential protection, and the guilty accused
is deprived only of a shelter to which he is in no way
entitled.2 4
A final point that should be noted is that permitting adverse
comment would in itself increase the quantum of evidence avail-
able in criminal cases, both by increasing the proportion of de-
fendants who testify and by permitting the defendant's silence
to be considered for its natural probative value when the de-
fendant does not testify. Even if some reduced investigation of
other sources of evidence did result, the practice would be justi-
fied unless the loss of other potential evidence were so great as
to outweigh the value of the evidence generated by the comment
procedure in furthering the search for truth. Since there is no
reason to believe that permitting adverse comment would have
any significant adverse effect on the overall diligence of investi-
gation-much less such an overriding negative effect-the "lazy
prosecutor" argument simply has no force in this context.
248. Dunmore, Comment on Failure of Accused to Testify, 26 YALE L.J. 464, 469-70
(1917); see also Wigmore, Ex-Secretary Hughes on the Privilege Against Self-Incrimi-
nation, 16 J. CaM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 165, 166 (1925) (lazy prosecutor argument would
"probably not" apply against rule permitting adverse inference from defendant's failure
to testify); Heintz, Criminal Justice in Ohio, 26 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 180, 180-81
(1935) (reported favorable assessment by Wigmore of Ohio rule permitting comment).
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6. Other Arguments
Several other arguments have had some currency in the de-
bate over inferences from silence. These include the contention
that comment on a defendant's silence is an "inquisitorial" prac-
tice that is out of place in an "accusatorial" or "adversarial" sys-
tem; that such comment violates the "presumption of inno-
cence"; that permitting adverse inferences from the defendant's
failure to testify is inconsistent with general principles governing
the waiver of rights and privileges; and that considering the de-
fendant's silence in itself compels him to be a witness against
himself.
a. The "inquisitorial-accusatorial" dichotomy- Griffin v.
California249 stated that "comment on the refusal to testify is a
remnant of the 'inquisitorial system of criminal justice,'" which
the fifth amendment outlaws. The Court cited Murphy v. Wa-
terfront Commission'5" as the source of this language. Murphy,
however, involved compulsion in a straightforward and indispu-
table sense-contempt sanctions for refusing to answer incrimi-
nating questions-and had nothing to do with the issue in
Griffin.
It has been aptly observed that this type of argument amounts
to defending a restriction "by plastering a disagreeable adjective
on its critics. 2 51 The purpose is presumably to bring into play
emotional reactions that go with the label. If the point of the
argument is to conjure up images of the Spanish Inquisition,
then it is merely inflammatory and irrational. As noted earlier,
permitting adverse comment on a failure to testify is not compa-
rable to the practices of the English inquisitions that gave rise to
the self-incrimination right."5 '
When the "inquisitorial-accusatorial" argument moves beyond
the level of pure rhetoric, it is likely to be elaborated as the no-
tion that the government should have to "shoulder the whole
load" in a criminal case, establishing guilt without any help or
cooperation from the defendant. The Constitution, however,
does not say this; it only says that a person cannot be compelled
to be a witness against himself. If the Constitution is taken seri-
ously, there is a need for inquiry whether any particular incen-
tive for cooperation by the defendant constitutes compulsion in
249. 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
250. 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
251. Friendly, supra note 50, at 686.
252. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
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the relevant sense. Conversely, if the "compulsion" requirement
is ignored, much more than comment on the defendant's silence
might have to go. For example, voluntary confessions and guilty
pleas also relieve the government of the need to prove guilt
through evidence obtained by means independent of the defend-
ant's cooperation.
Moreover, it is apparent that there is a broad range of con-
temporary practices that place pressure on the defendant to co-
operate in the search for truth, or even force him to do so, in
circumstances where the sought-after truth may be adverse to
his personal interests. A motorist stopped by the police has a
strong incentive to cooperate in a sobriety test whose results
could be used against him in a criminal prosecution when the
police advise him that his refusal to take the test may result in
revocation of his license. A defendant or potential defendant can
also be required to appear before a grand jury, to stand for an
identification line-up or photograph, to give fingerprints or
blood samples, to provide handwriting or voice exemplars, and
to disclose before trial defenses and witnesses he intends to use
at trial.253 While these particular practices may be distin-
guishable at a finer level of analysis from comment rules on con-
stitutional or policy grounds, they are sufficient to show that
contemporary practice rejects any general rule against encourag-
ing or requiring the defendant to cooperate, and that adopting
such a principle would invalidate many legitimate procedures
and seriously impede the search for truth. If valid objections ex-
ist to comment on the defendant's silence, they must derive
from some source other than slogans concerning the "accusato-
rial" nature of the system or the government's supposed obliga-
tion to "shoulder the whole load."
b. The presumption of innocence- It has been argued that
comment on the defendant's failure to testify violates the pre-
sumption of innocence. The presumption of innocence, however,
is just the principle that the defendant's guilt must be proved
through evidence presented at trial.2  Nothing in the statement
of the principle excludes any particular aspect of the defendant's
conduct from comment and consideration at trial,2 " including
253. See generally United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 573-75 (1976); Wil-
liams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983); Doe v.
United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
254. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483-86 (1978).
255. There is no intrinsic problem in considering silence as evidence. The contrary
rule for the defendant's silence at a criminal trial reflects the special restriction imposed
by Griffin. See generally supra notes 172, 207; Ayer, supra note 141, at 846 n.20, 867-69.
Adverse Inferences 1091
Journal of Law Reform
the directly observable fact that the defendant sat in the court-
room and said nothing in response to the evidence against him.
To the extent that the contrary view has gained credence among
some judges and writers, it may reflect a sense that, if comment
were permitted, the defendant's failure to testify would in itself
create a presumption of guilt, effectively shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant and obviating the need for the govern-
ment to obtain or offer other proof of guilt.
This image, however, has no relationship to the realities of
criminal prosecution. To initiate a prosecution and bring a case
to trial, the government must establish probable cause to believe
that the defendant committed the offense. At trial, the govern-
ment must produce sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case of guilt. The defense is then free to offer any competent
evidence it may have in rebuttal. If the prosecutor thereafter
comments on the defendant's failure to testify, that is no more
in conflict with the presumption of innocence than pointing out
other omissions or weaknesses in the defense's case, or pointing
to other aspects of the defendant's conduct that are arguably
suspicious or incriminating.2 5" This suggests that the presump-
tion of innocence argument in this context actually masks some
other type of concern, such as the rule against compelled self-
incrimination or the "shoulder the whole load" notion. For rea-
sons discussed elsewhere in this Report, these other arguments
are not convincing.
Finally, it may be noted that the Supreme Court has directly
addressed this issue, and has held that state rules authorizing
comment on the defendant's failure to testify do not violate the
presumption of innocence. The Constitution does not speak ex-
plicitly of the "presumption of innocence"; its textual berth is
presumably the Constitution's general prohibition of depriving a
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. In
Twining v. New Jersey,8 7 however, the Court held that the New
Jersey comment rule was consistent with due process. In Adam-
son v. California' 8 the Court similarly held that the California
comment rule was consistent with due process, and explicitly re-
jected the argument that it violated the presumption of inno-
cence. While the practical effect of Twining and Adamson has
been limited by later innovations of the Court relating to the
256. See generally supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text; S. HooK, supra note
204, at 40-45.
257. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
258. 332 U.S. 46, 50, 58 (1947).
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self-incrimination right, these aspects of their holdings have
never been overruled.s
9
c. Waiver of rights and privileges- Another objection to ad-
verse comment and inferences concerning a defendant's failure
to "waive the right to remain silent" is that permitting such ad-
verse consequences involves a departure from normal principles
governing the waiver of rights or privileges. Two analogies have
been suggested in this context:
First, a comparison is drawn to judicial decisions which have
barred adverse inferences from a litigant's failure to waive other
testimonial privileges, such as the spousal privilege or the attor-
ney-client privilege.26 0 However, privileges of these sorts aim at
safeguarding socially favored relationships which require trust
and confidentiality for their proper operation. That protection
may include avoiding the inhibition or disruption of such rela-
tionships that might result if a person could come under pres-
sure to permit disclosure of damaging matters by the other party
to the relationship, and face adverse inferences for failing to do
so. In contrast, while compelled self-incrimination is prohibited,
this "privilege" is not designed to safeguard any desirable social
relationship, and does not otherwise set up silence by a suspect
or defendant concerning the charged offense as an affirmative
good. Short of compulsion, it does not bar measures that give
defendants an incentive to talk, or require the state to suspend
ordinary evidentiary rules to facilitate the choice of silence.
Second, a comparison is drawn to the fact that no adverse in-
ference arises from a defendant's failure to waive other proce-
dural rights under the Constitution, such as the right to counsel,
or to a jury, or to compulsory process to obtain evidence.""
There is, however, a basic difference between most of these
other procedural rights and the self-incrimination right in terms
of the rationality of such an inference. For example, a defen-
dant's decision to waive counsel and represent himself is gener-
ally good evidence of imprudence, but there is no reason to be-
lieve that exercising the right to representation by counsel
indicates an enhanced probability of guilt. In contrast, the de-
fendant's failure to explain incriminating circumstances or evi-
259. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976) (citing Adamson and Twin-
ing as authority for the proposition that, aside from compelled self-incrimination con-
straints, "in proper circumstances silence in the face of accusation is a relevant fact not
barred from evidence by the Due Process Clause.").
260. See Dilis, The Permissibility of Comment on the Defendant's Failure to Testify
in His Own Behalf in Criminal Proceedings, 3 WASH. L. REv. 161, 168-69 (1928).
261. See Bradley, supra note 205, at 1296-97.
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dence naturally raises the question of why he did not, if he was
capable of doing so. Moreover, the exercise of most of the other
procedural rights in the Constitution-such as the counsel right,
the compulsory process right, and the right to notice of
charges-plays an important role in protecting the innocent
from unjust conviction, and there is accordingly a valid interest
in not having comment or inference rules that would discourage
their exercise. In contrast, there is no reason to believe that the
option of not testifying has any net value in protecting the
innocent.2 62
A more basic distinction lies in the textual formulation and
historical understanding of these rights. The Constitution
speaks of a right to the assistance of counsel and a right to a
jury, for example, but does not speak of a "right to remain si-
lent." The latter expression is only a loose and imprecise way of
referring to the fifth amendment's prohibition of compelling a
person to be a witness against himself. There is no need to as-
sess the permissibility of "burdening" the choice of silence
under judicially fashioned waiver standards, because the Consti-
tution itself specifies the relevant standard-whether the de-
fendant was compelled to be a witness against himself. The rele-
vant inquiry accordingly turns on the interpretation of the
meaning of "compulsion" under the fifth amendment, and re-
strictions derived from waiver standards for other constitutional
rights are inapposite. The Supreme Court has recognized this
point, holding that the requirement of a "knowing and intelli-
gent" waiver is inapplicable to the fifth amendment right, and
that it cannot be violated in the absence of actual coercion or
compulsion by the government.26
d. Consideration of silence as compelled self-incrimina-
tion- A final argument is that considering a defendant's silence
as evidence against him compels him to be a witness against
himself. This is distinct from the argument, answered elsewhere
in this Report, that the psychological pressure generated by the
prospect of adverse comment on silence may "compel" the de-
fendant to take the stand. Rather, the argument here is that
taking account of the defendant's failure to take the stand in
itself amounts to compelling him to be a witness against himself:
262. See supra notes 189-212 and accompanying text.
263. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467, U.S. 649, 654 (1984); Minnesota v. Murphy,
465 U.S. 420, 427-29 (1984); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 562 (1983).
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If [the defendant] does not take the stand, his silence is
used as the basis for drawing unfavorable inferences
against him as to matters which he might reasonably be
expected to explain. Thus he is compelled, through his
silence, to testify against himself. And silence can be as
effective in this situation as oral statements. 2 '
But who has compelled whom to do what? The government
does not compel the defendant to remain silent. That reflects
the defendant's own choice, and permitting adverse comment on
silence, far from "compelling" a choice not to testify, actually
makes the option of remaining silent less attractive. The govern-
ment also does not compel the defendant to inform the trier that
he has failed to testify in response to the evidence against
him.26" The trier is aware of that fact through direct observation.
In the absence of compulsion, the necessary predicate for finding
a fifth amendment violation is absent.266 In essence, the argu-
ment rests on a confusion between compelling a person to be a
witness and considering certain aspects of his non-verbal con-
duct as evidence. 67
The argument is not salvaged by pointing out that, under the
operation of a rule permitting comment, both courses of action
open to the defendant-testifying and remaining silent-may
have an incriminating effect.2 18  Comparable choices are
presented under many other evidentiary rules. For example,
suppose there is evidence which puts the defendant in a bad
light. If he conceals or destroys it, that fact may be considered
against him, but it does not conceal or destroy it, then the evi-
dence itself may be admitted and used against him.269 Similarly,
if the defendant fails to testify or put on defense witnesses, then
conviction may result, but if he does testify or present other wit-
nesses, the government may elicit incriminating evidence on
cross-examination.7 0 In general, necessary choices for the de-
fendant between potentially incriminating alternatives are a nor-
mal incident of criminal proceedings and the general rules of ev-
264. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 124 (1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting); see Peo-
ple v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522, 530 (1869).
265. See State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200, 217-18 (1867).
266. See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 561-64 (1983) (using defendant's re-
fusal of sobriety test against him in criminal prosecution consistent with fifth amend-
ment because government did not compel defendant to refuse the test).
267. See generally Ayer, supra note 141, at 866-69.
268. See State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200, 217-18 (1867).
269. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
270. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83-84 (1970).
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idence, and do not entail any inconsistency with the fifth
amendment.
B. Silence Before Trial
The case for permitting disclosure and consideration of a de-
fendant's silence before trial is, in several respects, even stronger
than the case for permitting the evidentiary consideration of the
defendant's silence at trial. In historical terms, there was limited
endorsement in enacted state rules of adverse comment on the
defendant's failure to testify, but disclosure of pretrial silence
was widely allowed.2 71 Depending on the case, the pretrial period
may present various situations in which response or denial by
the defendant could naturally be expected. While taking the
stand at trial may expose the defendant to impeachment by
prior convictions, talking before trial has no such effect. The de-
sire to avoid disclosure of a criminal record through the opera-
tion of the impeachment rule accordingly cannot be the motive
for pretrial silence. While the exclusionary rule for silence at
trial consists of ordering the jurors not to think about a fact of
which they are necessarily aware-the defendant's failure to tes-
tify-an exclusionary rule for pretrial silence produces a gap in
the jurors' knowledge of the course of events in the case, actually
keeping them ignorant of the fact that the defendant did not
protest his innocence or make explanations or denials prior to
trial. The risk of misapprehension of the defendant's motives for
not talking before trial is guarded against by his subsequent op-
portunity at trial to explain the reasons for his earlier silence
and to offer any other evidence he may have in support of that
explanation. The first Report in this series argued as follows:
The case for restricting the use of . . . evidence [of
pretrial silence] has been based in part on the contention
that jurors are likely to overestimate the value of a de-
fendant's silence in police custody as evidence of guilt.
See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. at 180. In assessing
this contention, any resulting jeopardy to defendants who
are in fact guilty may be discounted, since the guilty
should be convicted. The argument accordingly must be
that the admission of pretrial silence would create a sub-
stantial risk of conviction for innocent defendants, and
271. See supra notes 27-31, 45-47 and accompanying text.
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that this risk is great enough to outweigh the value it
would have in securing the conviction of the guilty.
No evidence has ever been offered in support of this
proposition, and it would not appear to have any intrin-
sic plausibility to persons who are not already disposed
to believe that a defendant's silence under questioning
should be concealed from the trier of fact. To the extent
that it relates to a supposed propensity of jurors to error,
it apparently reflects the common conceit of lawyers and
judges that jurors, lacking the sagacity of lawyers and
judges, are likely to go wrong if allowed to known what
has actually happened in a case, and that the way to im-
prove their thinking is to let them know less.
In concrete terms, the following occurrences would
generally be required for the conviction of an innocent
person to result from the admission of pretrial silence
under questioning: (1) The defendant, though innocent,
fails to deny the false charges or accusations against him
when confronted with them by the police, or otherwise
refuses to respond to the evidence against him; (2) the
defendant, though innocent, does not subsequently pre-
sent an exculpatory story to the prosecutor before trial,
or if he does, the jury finds his. later willingness to talk
inadequate to mitigate the inference arising from his si-
lence in police custody; (3) the defendant, though inno-
cent, fails to take the stand at trial and offer some alter-
native explanation for his earlier silence, or offers an
explanation that is sufficiently implausible that the jury
discounts it, and (4) the jury finds the defendant's silence
sufficiently probative in the context of all the evidence in
the case that it convicts the defendant, though he is in-
nocent, where it would have acquitted him had his si-
lence been concealed. Proponents of the view that this
confluence of improbabilities amounts to an undue risk
to the innocent would at least appear to have the burden
of proof on this point."'
The general arguments that have been offered for excluding
pretrial silence have usually focused on the possibility of inno-
cent reasons for remaining silent and, as the foregoing quote in-
dicates, alleged risks of prejudice resulting from the disclosure of
silence. Arguments have also been based on special risks of un-
272. REPORT No. 1, supra note 16, Part IV.D.4.
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fairness or misapprehension that are said to arise from the Mi-
randa warnings or comparable assurances to the suspect. The
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Hale2 73 typifies
the former approach; the decision in Doyle v. Ohio' 74 typifies the
latter.
1. The Argument in United States v. Hale
United States v. Hale raised the question of whether a rob-
bery suspect's exculpatory testimony concerning the source of a
large amount of cash found on his person at the time of arrest
could be impeached by showing that he did not offer the same
explanation to the police following his arrest. The Court, in an
opinion by Justice Marshall, found the evidence inadmissible
under the facts of the case. The opinion contained dicta sup-
porting a broader presumptive inadmissibility of post-arrest si-
lence based on the possibility of innocent explanations for si-
lence in that context, and an alleged risk of resulting prejudice.
One of these alternative reasons was reliance on the representa-
tions of the Miranda warnings-a special issue that will be dis-
cussed separately in the next part. Putting aside that issue for
the moment, the main points made in the general discussion in
Hale were as follows:
In most circumstances silence is so ambiguous that it is
of little probative force. . . . [Ain arrestee is . . . under
no duty to speak. ...
At the time of arrest and during custodial interroga-
tion, innocent and guilty alike-perhaps particularly the
innocent-may find the situation so intimidating that
they may choose to stand mute. A variety of reasons may
influence that decision. In these often emotional and con-
fusing circumstances, a suspect may not have heard or
fully understood the question, or may have felt there was
no need to reply. . . . He may have maintained silence
out of fear or unwillingness to incriminate another. Or
the arrestee may simply react with silence in response to
the hostile and perhaps unfamiliar atmosphere surround-
ing his detention. In sum, the inherent pressures of in-
273. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
274. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
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custody interrogation . . . compound the difficulty of
identifying the reason for silence ...
In light of the many alternative explanations for [the
defendant's] pre-trial silence, we do not think it suffi-
ciently probative of an inconsistency with his in-court
testimony to warrant admission of evidence thereof.
Not only is evidence of silence at the time of arrest
generally not very probative of a defendant's credibility,
but it also has a significant potential for prejudice. The
danger is that the jury is likely to assign much more
weight to the defendant's previous silence than is war-
ranted. And permitting the defendant to explain the rea-
sons for his silence is unlikely to overcome the strong
negative inference that the jury is likely to draw from the
fact that the defendant remained silent at the time of his
arrest.
75
It should first be noted that the Court has not generally en-
dorsed Hale's sweeping dictum that in most circumstances "si-
lence is so ambiguous that it is of little probative force." Much
depends on how the issue of exclusion or admission ultimately
comes out and on which Justice happens to be writing the
Court's opinion. In the following year, for example, in Baxter v.
Palmigiano,27 6 the Court upheld using a prisoner's silence
against him in a disciplinary proceeding, and was quite positive
about the probative value of silence in that decision, including
an endorsement of the assertion that "[slilence is often evidence
of the most persuasive character.
'2 77
Beyond the questionable nature of the general attitude toward
the evidentiary use of silence that appears to underlie the opin-
ion in Hale, questions must also be raised about its methodology
of listing possible innocent reasons for silence as grounds for
concealing it from the trier. Virtually any sort of suspicious cir-
cumstance or evidence may prove to be innocent when the facts
of the case are fully set out. This generally does not result in its
being barred in limine, so long as the normal requirement of rel-
evance is satisfied. These points are entirely elementary, and re-
quire discussion only because they are frequently overlooked in
arguments against disclosure of the defendant's silence.
275. 422 U.S. at 176-77, 180.
276. 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
277. Id. at 319. The quote was from Justice Brandeis' opinion for the Court in
Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1923), relating to the use of a person's silence
against him a deportation proceeding.
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For example, suppose that a defendant's identity as the perpe-
trator of a robbery at a store is at issue in a case, and the police
find the defendant's fingerprints on a counter that the robber
touched. In itself, this does not show that he is guilty. Perhaps
he left prints there on some other occasion, when he came in to
make a purchase, or to socialize with a cashier. Nevertheless,
this fingerprint evidence is relevant and admissible because the
presence of the defendant's prints on the counter makes his guilt
more probable than it would be if his prints had not been found
there. If an innocent explanation for this evidence is possible,
the defense is free to offer it at trial, and the trier would be
responsible for assessing its significance in light of the proffered
explanation and the other evidence in the case.
Turning to the actual facts in Hale, Hale's failure to talk to
the police was not the only arguably suspicious aspect of his con-
duct that was disclosed at trial. He also fled when the victim of
the robbery identified him and the police approached him. Hale
offered an explanation for his flight in his trial testimony,"" and
the jury presumably took that into account in assessing its im-
port. Nevertheless, the fact of his flight was relevant and admis-
sible because it made his guilt more probable than it would be if
he had not fled.
Returning to the issue of disclosing pretrial silence in the type
of situation presented in Hale, very similar considerations apply.
If the defendant had told the police when arrested the same ex-
culpatory story he later told at trial, that fact would increase the
credibility of his story and foreclose the possibility that it was
concocted at a later date after the defendant had had an oppor-
tunity to think about the evidence against him, coordinate with
sympathetic witnesses, and obtain the advice of counsel. Con-
versely, if the defendant's trial defense was not heard before
trial, its credibility is not enhanced by prior consistent state-
ments, and its novelty raises the possibility that it was a later
fabrication. Silence in his context is rationally relevant to the
determination of guilt or innocence because it makes the trial
defense less credible than it would be if the defendant had told
the same story in his initial encounters with the authorities.
Moreover, the force of this point is not limited to situations in
which the defendant personally testifies and the question
presented is the use of his pretrial silence to impeach his testi-
mony. The defendant's silence can be equally relevant in assess-
ing the credibility of defenses presented through other wit-
278. 422 U.S. at 174.
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nesses. For example, suppose that the defendant is apprehended
shortly after the commission of the offense, says nothing to the
police, but later presents an alibi defense through the testimony
of other witnesses at trial. Here as well, the late assertion of the
defense presents a greater probability of fabrication following
coordination with the witnesses supporting the defense.
Finally, while the possible motives for not talking noted in
Hale could apply to both the guilty and the innocent, the guilty
suspect generally has a reason for remaining silent that the inno-
cent suspect does not-his inability to tell a truthful exculpatory
story. Conversely, the innocent defendant generally has a motive
for protesting his innocence and making explanations and deni-
als that the guilty defendant does not-his indignation at being
falsely accused of a crime he did not commit. Thus, silence in
this context has a general relevance as evidence of an inability to
state a truthful defense and as evidence of consciousness of
guilt.
These common sense points are ignored rather than answered
in the general argument in Hale. Perhaps an implicit response is
suggested in the Court's assertion near the end of the opinion
that any probative value of silence is outweighed by the likeli-
hood that the jury will "assign much more weight to the defen-
dant's previous silence than is warranted"-a risk of prejudice
that is unlikely to be overcome by the defendant's explanation
of his reasons for not talking. " However, the Court in Hale of-
fered nothing at all in support of this assertion.28 °
In testing the plausibility of this bare stipulation, it is useful
to consider how well it plays in other contexts. Hale did have an
opportunity at trial to explain why he did not tell his story to
the police. All he said was that he did not think that it was nec-
essary at that time.2 81 Suppose the disputed evidence was not
the defendant's silence but, for example, the fact that he unex-
pectedly left town after the offense. Suppose further that all he
offered in explanation at trial was that he did not feel that it
was necessary to stay in town at that time. One could then imag-
ine a Hale-minded court arguing as follows:
In most circumstances apparent flight is so ambiguous
that it is of little probative force. . . . A suspect is under
no duty to stay in town. . ..
279. Id. at 180.
280. See generally supra text accompanying note 272.
281. 422 U.S. at 174.
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Faced with possible suspicion of criminality, innocent
and guilty alike-perhaps particularly the inno-
cent-may find the situation so intimidating that they
may choose to flee. In general, a variety of reasons may
influence the decision to go traveling. A suspect may
leave out of fear or to avoid being required to incriminate
another. Or a person may appear to flee when he is actu-
ally called out of town for a family emergency, or would
have been leaving on a trip at that time anyway, or sim-
ply got tired of the daily grind and decided to take an
unscheduled vacation. In sum, the multiplicity of motives
for leaving one place and going to another compounds
the difficulty of identifying the reason for apparent flight.
In light of the many alternative explanations for the
defendant's departure, we do not think it sufficiently pro-
bative of an inconsistency with his innocence to warrant
admission of evidence thereof.
Not only is evidence of apparent flight generally not
very probative of a defendant's guilt, but it also has a
significant potential for prejudice. The danger is that the
jury is likely to assign much more weight to the defen-
dant's movements than is warranted. And permitting the
defendant to explain the reasons for his actions is un-
likely to overcome the strong negative inference that the
jury is likely to draw from the fact that the defendant
left town following the offense.
Or again, suppose the defendant destroyed or disposed of evi-
dence that might have incriminated him, and at trial limited his
explanation to saying that he did not think that it was necessary
to preserve it. Turning again to Hale, the argument for conceal-
ing this fact from the trier is apparent:
In most circumstances the destruction of evidence is so
ambiguous that it is of little probative force. . . . The
defendant was under no duty to preserve evidence that
might be used against him. ...
Faced with apparently incriminating evidence, inno-
cent and guilty alike-perhaps particularly the inno-
cent-may find the situation so intimidating that they
may choose to dispose of it. In these emotional and try-
ing circumstances, a person may not have thought clearly
about the risk of bringing suspicion on himself by de-
stroying material that puts a false light on his actions, or
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may have felt that there was no need to keep such mate-
rial. He may have acted out of fear or a desire to protect
another whom the material would incriminate. Or it may
be that he would have disposed of the material anyway,
and was not aware of its possibly incriminating character
and of the suspicious nature his actions would take on
with the benefit of hindsight. In sum, the many innocent
reasons for destroying possibly incriminating evidence
compound the difficulty of identifying the reason the de-
fendant did so.
In light of the many alternative explanations for the
defendant's actions, we do not think it sufficiently proba-
tive of an inconsistency with his innocence to warrant ad-
mission of evidence thereof.
Not only is destruction of evidence generally not very
probative of a defendant's guilt, but it also has a signifi-
cant potential for prejudice. The danger is that the jury
is likely to assign much more weight to the defendant's
destruction of evidence than is warranted. And permit-
ting the defendant to explain the reasons for his actions
is unlikely to overcome the strong negative inference that
the jury is likely to draw from the fact that the defendant
disposed of an item that might have incriminated him.
Examples could readily be multiplied. Almost any sort of evi-
dence, considered in the abstract, will admit alternative inno-
cent explanations. This is surely no reason for not admitting it,
subject to the defendant's right to respond and the trier's re-
sponsibility for assessing its import in light of all the facts dis-
closed in the case. Neither Hale's laundry list of possible inno-
cent reasons for silence, nor Hale's unexplained and undefended
assertion concerning a mysteriously irremediable prejudice re-
sulting from the disclosure of this aspect of the defendant's con-
duct, suffice to distinguish pretrial silence from other types of
evidence.' 82 We will consider next whether the Miranda warn-
ings provide such a distinction.
2. The Argument in Doyle v. Ohio
Under current procedures, a defendant's statements obtained
in custodial questioning are generally inadmissible unless he is
282. See generally REPORT No. 1, supra note 16, Part IV.D.4.
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first advised that he has a right to remain silent, that anything
he says can be used against him, that he has a right to consult
with a lawyer before questioning and to have a lawyer with him
during questioning, and that he has a right to free counsel for
that purpose if he cannot retain counsel. This warning require-
ment is part of a broader system of procedural restrictions on
police questioning that the Supreme Court created in 1966 in
Miranda v. Arizona.2 8 The warnings requirement and the other
Miranda restrictions are not constitutional requirements, but
non-constitutional "prophylactic" measures whose purpose is to
reduce the likelihood that compulsion in violation of the fifth
amendment will occur in custodial questioning." 4
In Doyle v. Ohio28' the Court held that the Miranda warnings
entailed a general exclusionary rule with respect to a defendant's
silence in police custody following the receipt of such warnings.
The use of such silence was to be barred even for purposes of
impeaching the credibility of trial testimony by a defendant
which presents an exculpatory story that he had not told to the
police. The Court acknowledged that the Miranda warnings did
not contain an express assurance that such adverse use of silence
would not occur, but believed that "such assurance is implicit to
any person who receives the warnings." In such circumstances,
said the Court, the defendant's silence is "insolubly ambiguous,"
and it would be "fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due
process" to allow its use for impeachment.
26
Justice Stevens, joined in dissent by Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Blackmun, sensibly pointed out that there is nothing
"insoluble" about any ambiguity in a defendant's silence in this
situation, since the defendant is free to explain the actual rea-
sons why he did not talk. In Doyle, the dissent noted, the de-
fendants had not in fact asserted that they remained silent in
reliance on a representation they discerned in the Miranda
warnings, but gave entirely different reasons for not talking:287
I
[If] the Miranda warning. were the true explanation,
I should think that they would have responded to the
questions on cross-examination about why they had re-
283. 384 U.S. 436.
284. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-46 (1974); New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649, 654-58 (1984); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304-09 (1985); Connecticut v.
Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987).
285. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
286. Id. at 617-18.
287. Id. at 621-26
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mained silent by stating that they relied on their under-
standing of the advice given by the arresting officers. In-
stead, however, they gave quite a different jumble of
responses. Those responses negate the Court's presump-
tion that their silence was induced by reliance on decep-
tive advice.
Since the record requires us to put to one side the
Court's presumption that the defendants' silence was the
product of reliance on the Miranda warning, the Court's
due process rationale collapses. For without reliance on
the [warning], the case is no different than if no warning
had been given ...
Indeed, as a general proposition, . . . I should think
that the warning would have a tendency to salvage the
defendant's credibility as a witness. If the defendant is a
truthful witness, and if his silence is the consequence of
his understanding of the Miranda warning, he may ex-
plain that fact when he is on the stand. Even if he is un-
truthful, the availability of that explanation puts him in
a better position than if he had received no warning. In
my judgment, the risk that a truthful defendant will be
deceived by the Miranda warning and also will be unable
to explain his honest misunderstanding is so much less
than the risk that exclusion of the evidence will merely
provide a shield for perjury that I cannot accept the
Court's due process rationale.
There is not much to add to Justice Stevens' discussion of this
issue. The Miranda warnings advise the suspect that he has the
option of remaining silent, but do not tell him that he has to do
so. If he comes forward at trial with some innocent explanation
for the circumstances leading to his arrest, it remains a legiti-
mate question why he did not offer that explanation at an ear-
lier time. If he has an answer to this question, he is free to state
it in his trial testimony.
It also bears emphasizing that the result in Doyle depended
entirely on the Court's view that the Miranda warnings result in
fundamental unfairness when taken in conjunction with inher-
ently unobjectionable2 88 state rules permitting impeachment of
the defendant's trial testimony by his pretrial silence. Thus, the
Miranda warnings represent an intrinsically unrelated proce-
288. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980); Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603
(1982).
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dural impediment to the evidentiary use of pretrial silence,
which might be compared to the effect of the rule relating to
impeachment by prior convictions on the evidentiary use of si-
lence at trial. In each case, it is argued that an intrinsically unre-
lated procedural or evidentiary rule clouds the significance of
the defendant's silence and makes its use unfair. In each case,
modification or elimination of the unrelated rule could make the
argument wholly inapplicable. One means of doing so is sug-
gested by Justice White's separate opinion in Hale v. United
States, 8 9 which was quoted approvingly by the Court in Doyle:
"[W]hen a person under arrest is informed, as Miranda
requires, that he may remain silent, that anything he
says may be used against him, and that he may have an
attorney if he wishes, it seems to me that it does not
comport with due process to permit the prosecution dur-
ing the trial to call attention to his silence at the time of
arrest and to insist that because he did not speak about
the facts of the case at that time, as he was told he need
not do, an unfavorable inference might be drawn as to
the truth of his trial testimony. . . . Surely Hale was not
informed here that his silence, as well as his words,
could be used against him at trial. Indeed, anyone would
reasonably conclude from Miranda warnings that this
would not be the case.
'290
The obvious implication is that Doyle's rationale would not
apply if the warnings were modified so as to make it clear to the
defendant that his refusal to talk could be used against him in
subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the Supreme Court was
presented with this type of admonition in Baxter v. Palmigi-
ano,29 1 in which a prisoner facing a disciplinary proceeding was
told that "he had a right to remain silent during the hearing but
that if he remained silent his silence would be held against him."
The Court found nothing objectionable in this type of advice,
and upheld the evidentiary consideration of the defendant's si-
lence in the proceeding.
While making it clear to the defendant that his silence could
be held against him would dispel the specific concern underlying
Doyle, the question would remain whether this type of notice
would raise a fifth amendment (compelled self-incrimination)
289. 422 U.S. at 182-83.
290. 426 U.S. at 619 (emphasis added).
291. 425 U.S. 308, 312, 316-20 (1976).
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problem in a criminal prosecution. The decision in Baxter does
not resolve this question, since it only addressed the use of si-
lence as evidence in a civil proceeding, and indicated that the
Griffin rule would continue to apply in criminal trials. This issue
will be discussed in the recommendations part of this Report.2 9
III. THE LAW OF FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS
Many foreign democracies permit adverse inferences from the
silence of a suspect or defendant on a broader basis than the
contemporary rules in the United States. The first Report in this
series examined the law relating to the questioning of the ac-
cused in several other countries, and concluded that
most of the jurisdictions surveyed clearly share the per-
ception that society's choice not to compel a person to
answer incriminating questions does not require that it
also permit him to remain silent at no risk to himself,
thereby-in effect-obstructing the investigation. Rather,
the common view is that the trier should be allowed to
draw adverse inferences from a defendant's failure to tell
what he knows at some stage in the process.2"'
The rules and practices of three jurisdictions that illustrate this
point-England, France, and India-will be examined in this
part.
A. England
In England, the judge, but not the prosecutor, is permitted to
comment on the defendant's failure to testify at trial. As in the
United States, the formulation of the basic rule in this area was
part of the legislative reforms in the late nineteenth century that
abrogated the defendant's testimonial incapacity:
[I]n the United States . . . when the federal statute of
1878 allowed an accused person to give evidence on his
own behalf, it was provided that his failure to do so
292. See infra notes 313-19 and accompanying text.
293. REPoRT No. 1, supra note 16, Part III.G; see W. SCHAEFER, supra note 50, at 70-
71 (1967) ("Most nations... require that the silence of an accused be noted for consid-
eration in the ultimate determination of guilt or innocence.").
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should not create a presumption against him. . .. In
England, those who wished to show this extreme solici-
tude for the acquittal of the guilty did not wholly get
their way. The Act of 1898 was a compromise; it forbade
counsel for the prosecution to make the damning com-
ment upon the accused's failure to testify but permitted
the judge to do so; under this compromise we live
today. 
2
Pursuant to this authority, judges in England have been able
to comment on the defendant's failure to testify for as long as he
has been allowed to testify. A striking illustration is provided by
the judge's charge in a well-known child abduction case from the
1930s:
Members of the jury, there is one person in this court
who could tell you a great deal about the disappearance
of this little child. A great deal! For it is admitted that he
was with her on the evening and during the afternoon of
the day .on which she was last seen.
He could tell you much, and, members of the jury, he
sits before you in the dock. But he has never been there
[pointing to the witness-box]. Would you not think that
he would be willing-nay, eager to go into the box, and
on his oath tell you all he knows? But he stays where he
is.
Nobody has ever seen that little girl since twelve
o'clock on January 6th. Nobody knows what has become
of her. ..
There is one person in this court who knows, and he is
silent. He says nothing to you at all.
The witness-box is there open and free. Why did he
not come and tell you something of that strange journey
beginning in the Guildhall Street, Newark, when she in-
quired: "How is Auntie? I should like to see Peter?"
There is one person in this world who could have made
it all plain to you. There is one man in the world who
knows the whole story, and when you are trying to elicit
that which is true he sits there and never tells you a
word.
294. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 17, at 58.
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When [counsel for the defendant] says there is no evi-
dence of what happened on January 5th and 6th I ven-
ture to ask: "Whose fault is that?"
You are not to speculate, but you are entitled to ask
yourselves: "Why does he give us no information? Why is
he silent when we are wondering and considering what
has happened to that little girl?"'"9
Under more recent English practice, the nature of the com-
ment to be made remains largely in the discretion of the trial
judge, taking account of the strength of the government's evi-
dence and the significance of the defendant's failure to respond
to it under the facts of the case.'"
In relation to pretrial silence, a distinction is drawn between
pre-warning and post-warning silence. The police are generally
required to inform a suspect before questioning that he does not
have to talk, and that his statements may be used as evidence."
7
"If, prior to the warning a suspect and police officer are speaking
on even terms, and the officer makes an accusation against the
suspect which an innocent person would be expected to deny,
the suspect's silence may be used as an acknowledgement that
the accusation is true." In the ordinary situation, in which the
suspect is not on an equal footing with the police, such an infer-
ence is not thought to be warranted, but evidence of the sus-
pect's silence remains "part of the circumstances which the
court has to take into account when assessing the evidence."' 8
Adverse comment on the defendant's silence after he has re-
ceived the standard warning is not permitted. However, the fact
that the defendant did not talk before trial is not concealed
from the jury, and it is widely assumed that that fact will be
considered against him is a practical matter:
Once a suspect has been cautioned, courts hold that it is
"unsafe to use his silence against him for any purpose
whatever." Consequently . . . English courts hold that
the judge should not, by adverse comment or otherwise,
invite the jury to draw inferences from an accused's exer-
cise of his right to silence. In fact, the judge should in-
295. Quoted in G. WILLIAMS, supra note 17, at 59-60. See generally id. at 57-63.
296. See generally R. v. Sparrow, [1973] 2 All E.R. 129; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 17,
at 58-63; Greenawalt, Perspectives on the Right to Silence, in CRIM CRIMINOLOGY AND
PUBLIC POLICY 235, 240-41 (Hood, ed. 1974).
297. Van Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A Comparison
of the English and American Approaches, 38 HASTINGS L J. 1, 39 (1986).
298. Id. at 11-12.
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struct the jury that they must not draw an inference of
guilt from such silence. Unlike American practice, how-
ever, English courts restrict only comments about the ev-
idence of silence; they do not exclude the evidence itself.
As a consequence, the jury is fully aware that the defend-
ant refused to answer questions when cautioned and in-
terrogated by the police ....
In summary, because the English rule against drawing
adverse inferences from a defendant's post-warning si-
lence does not affect the admissibility Of evidence, but
only controls what the judge and prosecutor may say to
the jury, it is considered wise for English suspects to
make statements when cautioned and questioned by po-
lice. In contrast, in the United States, the pressures on
suspects in this context are considerably diminished by
the knowledge that ordinarily the jury will remain igno-
rant of a refusal to talk to the police.2"
B. France
French law provides multiple opportunities for questioning
the defendant, and freely permits adverse inferences to be
drawn from a refusal to respond. Suspects may be detained for
questioning by the police. Subsequent questioning by a magis-
trate may also occur. The magistrate is required to advise the
defendant of the charges and to inform him that he is not re-
quired to talk. The defendant is also provided with counsel at
this stage. The magistrate is free to question him, however, and
he may not confer with his attorney prior to answering particu-
lar questions. A refusal by the defendant to answer would result
in adverse inferences being drawn by the magistrate, and later
by the court at trial.
French criminal cases are tried before judges alone, or in more
serious cases before a mixed tribunal comprising three judges
and a lay "jury." The judges have at their disposal a dossier con-
taining the results of earlier investigative efforts, including the
pretrial interrogation of the defendant. The trial opens with the
questioning of the defendant by the presiding judge. The de-
fendant may refuse to answer, but that option would involve re-
maining silent in the face of direct questioning in the presence
299. Id. at 13-15.
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of the trier, and it is rarely exercised. If the defendant does fail
to respond, the "French judge is free to . ..comment to the
jury upon [his] reticence and evasiveness," and his silence "ex-
poses [him] to whatever inferences the court chooses to draw."'0
C. India
In India, the trial provides the primary opportunity for elicit-
ing testimonial evidence from the defendant.301 Trials are usu-
ally conducted by a judge alone, but juries are used in some re-
stricted geographic areas. The defendant is free to refrain from
taking the stand and testifying under oath, and comment is not
allowed on his failure to do so. However, the judge is allowed to
question the unsworn defendant at any time during the trial,
and is required to do so-at least if the defendant is not repre-
sented by counsel-at the end of the presentation of the prose-
cution's case. This procedure serves to enable the accused "to
explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against
him," and the judge, to this end, is required to question the de-
fendant "separately about each material circumstance which is
intended to be used against him." Questioning by the judge op-
erates to the detriment of guilty defendants-as well as serving
as a shield to the innocent-since the code of criminal procedure
specifies that the court or jury may draw any inference they con-
sider just from a refusal to answer or from a false answer.302
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
The import of the study and discussion in the earlier portions
of this Report may be summarized as follows: The existing rules
300. See Mendelson, Self-Incrimination in American and French Law, 19 Cram. L
BuLL. 34, 43-47 (1983); Tomlinson, Nonadversarial Justice: The French Experience, 42
MD. L. REV. 131, 156-57, 158-59, 161, 167-68, 170-78 (1983); Hrones, Interrogation
Abuses by the Police in France-A Comparative Solution, 12 CraM. L. Q. 68, 78 (1969);
Developments in the Law-Confessions, supra note 47, at 1115-19.
301. The defendant's pretrial admissions to the police are generally inadmissible.
However, if a confession leads to corroborating evidence, the evidence, along with the
portion of the defendant's statement relating to it, is admissible. See Developments in
the Law-Confessions, supra note 47, at 1106, 1108.
302. See INDIA CODE OF CrM. PROC. § 342; Developments in the Law-Confessions,
supra note 47, at 1111-12; Sharma, "Law and Order" and Protection of the Rights of the
Accused in the United States and in India: A General Framework for Comparison, 21
BUFFALO L. REv. 361, 398 (1972).
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that bar or limit the evidentiary consideration of a defendant's
silence in criminal cases are not required by the Constitution
and are not warranted as a matter of policy. These rules impede
the conviction of the guilty. There is no reason to believe that
they have any countervailing value in protecting the innocent
from unjust conviction; they may well have the opposite effect.
The practice of other democracies does not support the view
that such rules are necessary to a fair or civilized system of jus-
tice. In short, they are unjustified impediments to the search for
truth.
We accordingly recommend that the Department of Justice
seek to change these rules. Optimally, the trier should be free to
consider the defendant's silence on the same footing as other as-
pects of his conduct which have a bearing on the probability of
guilt or innocence. Given the dominant policy-making role that
the Supreme Court has assumed in this area, the main implica-
tions are for the Department's litigation program.
First, the Department should seek to persuade the Supreme
Court to limit or overrule Griffin v. California.303 The desirable
initial position in litigation would be to argue that adverse com-
ment on the defendant's failure to testify should be allowed in
cases in which testimony by the defendant would not expose
him to impeachment by prior convictions.
Second, the Department should seek to persuade the Court to
authorize broader disclosure at trial of the defendant's pretrial
silence to impeach his trial testimony. The most promising ap-
proach would be to argue that the restriction of Doyle v. Ohio3 04
does not apply if the defendant had been put on notice that his
failure to talk could be used against him.
Third, the Department should seek to persuade the Court to
authorize the use of the defendant's pretrial silence at trial for
purposes other than impeachment of his trial testimony. It could
be argued that silence should be admissible as evidence in the
government's case in chief in a clear "adoptive admissions" situ-
ation, or should be admissible in a situation in which it has a
specific bearing on the credibility of a defense presented through
other witnesses.
The basis for these specific recommendations and the practi-
cal considerations bearing on the selection of test cases are dis-
cussed in the remainder of this part.
303. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
304. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
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A. Limiting Or Overruling Griffin v. California
Section 3481 of Title 18 of the United States Code makes the
defendant a competent witness but provides that his failure to
testify "shall not create any presumption against him." This
limits the possibility of finding a suitable test case for limiting or
overruling Griffin in federal proceedings. If a federal judge or
prosecutor commented on the defendant's failure to testify, the
Court could find that to be in violation of the statute, obviating
the need to address the constitutional issue. The more likely av-
enue for raising the issue before the Court would be amicus par-
ticipation in a state case in which adverse comment had oc-
curred, but the state courts had not ruled that the comment was
in conflict with any provision of state law.
The most important constraint on such a test case is that it
should be a case in which it is clear that the defendant could not
have been motivated to stay off the stand by a desire to avoid
disclosure of his prior convictions. This condition would be satis-
fied in any case from a state that generally bars disclosure of the
defendant's criminal record for impeachment. It would also be
satisfied in any case in which the record of the trial or related
sentencing proceedings showed that (1) the defendant did not
have any criminal record, or (2) the defendant's convictions did
not fall within the general class of offenses admissible under the
state's impeachment rule, or (3) the trial judge had ruled that
the defendant's prior convictions would not be admissible if he
testified, or (4) the defendant's record would have been disclosed
to the trier prior to a verdict even if he did not testify.' 5 The
position that should be taken in such a case is that Griffin
should be held inapplicable in cases in which the concern over
impeachment by prior convictions does not exist. This approach
serves several purposes:
First, in the historical debate over comment on silence, the
point that has been most strongly and frequently urged against
the fairness of such a procedure is that it would prejudice the
defendant where he actually stayed off the stand to avoid dis-
closure of past convictions, but the jury might assume that his
silence resulted from an inability to respond to the evidence." °
Framing an initial challenge to Griffin as suggested would avoid
this complicating factor.
305. See generally supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
306. See generally supra notes 227-31 and accompanying text.
Adverse Inferences 1113
Journal of Law Reform
Second, in addressing procedural or evidentiary rules that cir-
cumscribe or discourage the defendant's choice of silence, the
Court has been disposed to uphold them against fifth amend-
ment challenges if they appeared to serve some legitimate truth-
promoting function. Such rules have generally not been regarded
as "penalties" or "impermissible burdens" on the choice of si-
lence. However, it has been argued that inferring an increased
likelihood of guilt from silence is not legitimate or reasonable
where the defendant may have been motivated by fear of expo-
sure of his criminal record, and that permitting such an infer-
ence is accordingly not a valid truth-promoting mechanism.
Limiting an initial challenge to Griffin to cases in which im-
peachment by prior convictions is not an issue would make this
argument inapplicable and permit the maximum utilization of
other precedents in which the Court has upheld truth-promoting
rules that generate informal pressures to testify.' 7
Third, exclusion of the problem of impeachment by prior con-
victions would provide a specific distinction from both Carter v.
Kentucky808 and Griffin v. California.309 In Griffin, the defen-
dant did have serious prior convictions and would have been ex-
posed to impeachment if he had testified.3 10 The Court's opinion
in that case pointed to the possibility of impeachment by prior
convictions as part of its rebuttal to the argument that adverse
inferences from the defendant's silence concerning matters pecu-
liarly within his knowledge are "natural and irresistible," as op-
posed to being an unconstitutional penalty. " ' In Carter, the
Court discussed and quoted specific material from the trial rec-
ord which showed that the defendant had a lengthy criminal
record and suggested that concern over its disclosure influenced
his decision not to testify."" Neither case actually presented the
question whether adverse comment would be constitutional in
the absence of this complicating factor. Excluding this factor
would accordingly make it possible to argue for a distinction or
limitation of these decisions, as opposed to carrying the heavier
burden of arguing that they should simply be overruled.
While the ostensibly "constitutional" nature of the Griffin
rule makes litigation the only feasible means of changing it,
there is a legislative reform that would be a useful adjunct to
307. See generally supra notes 216-26 and accompanying text.
308. 450 U.S. 288 (1981).
309. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
310. See Brief for Petitioner at 1-3, 10-11, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
311. See 380 U.S. at 614-16.
312. See 450 U.S. at 292-94 & n.4; see also id. at 300 n.15.
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such an effort-repealing the final sentence of 18 U.S.C. § 3481,
which bars an adverse presumption from the defendant's failure
to testify. Changing the statute would not have any immediate
practical effect in light of Griffin. However, since such a change
would remove the statutory basis for excluding comment and in-
ferences concerning the defendant's failure to testify, it would
make it more feasible to draw on federal prosecutions for test
cases in which the constitutional issue could be raised and de-
cided. Moreover, the decisions in Griffin and Carter pointed to
earlier decisions applying the statutory no-presumption rule of
section 3481 as supporting the creation of those decisions' "con-
stitutional" rules. The withdrawal of legislative support for the
no-presumption rule could have the converse effect of strength-
ening the case for reconsidering the constitutional issue. An
amendment of this sort to section 3481 might be proposed as
part of a broader package of criminal justice reforms.
B. Broader Use Of Pretrial Silence For Impeachment
The decision in Doyle v. Ohio3s 3 is the main impediment
under current law to the use of a defendant's pretrial silence to
impeach his testimony at trial. In that case, the Court held that
disclosure of pretrial silence by a defendant following his receipt
of Miranda warnings would be fundamentally unfair and a de-
nial of due process, based on the Court's view that the warnings
carry an implicit representation that no such use of silence will
occur. In the absence of Miranda warnings, however, the Court
has made it clear that it sees no constitutional problem in using
either pre-arrest or post-arrest silence for impeachment. " "
Thus, there would be no due process problem in using a de-
fendant's pretrial silence as evidence at trial, even if he were
given some type of warnings, so long as it were made clear to
him that his failure to talk could be put to such use. This point
is implicit in the rationales of the foregoing decisions. It also
draws support from language in the Doyle opinion, and from the
Court's holding in Baxter v. Palmigiano1 5 that there was noth-
313. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
314. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980); Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603
(1982). In light of these decisions, dicta in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37
(1966), and Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 317 (1976), stating that the Griffin rule
would apply to pretrial silence, could at most be understood as relating only to the use of
such silence for purposes other than impeachment.
315. 425 U.S. 308, 312, 316-20 (1976).
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ing wrong with telling a prisoner facing disciplinary proceedings
that "he had a right to remain silent during the hearing but that
if he remained silent his silence would be held against him." '
Comparable situations involving suspects facing criminal charges
might arise through deliberate changes in the warnings given in
that context, as recommended in the first Report in this se-
ries.3 17 Situations of this type might also arise less formally
where an officer gives the standard Miranda warnings, but also
makes other remarks which effectively tell the suspect that his
silence will be held against him, or where the standard warnings
have been given, but the suspect himself makes statements
which demonstrate that he expects that his silence will be used
against him."'8
The question would remain whether there would be a problem
in such cases in light of the fifth amendment's prohibition of
compelled self-incrimination. In Jenkins v. Anderson,31 9 how-
ever, the Court explicitly considered and rejected the argument
that pretrial silence should be inadmissible for impeachment be-
cause "a person facing arrest will not remain silent if his failure
to speak later can be used to impeach him." In other words, the
Court rejected the notion that any psychological pressure which
might be generated by the prospect of having one's silence used
for impeachment constitutes compelled self-incrimination in the
sense of the fifth amendment. Since advising a suspect that his
silence may impair the credibility of a story told later on only
makes this prospect explicit, Jenkins provides a strong response
to objections to such an admonition on fifth amendment
grounds.
C. Use Of Pretrial Silence For Other Purposes
There have been some dicta in the Court's post-Griffin deci-
sions bearing on the applicability of the Griffin rule to the use of
316. See supra notes 288-92 and accompanying text.
317. See REPowr No. 1, supra note 16, Part IV.D.1 (suggesting that Doyle problem be
avoided by revising warnings to advise suspect that his failure to talk would make a story
or explanation offered later on less credible); see also Criminal Law Revision Committee,
Eleventh Report-Evidence (General), 1972, Cmnd. No. 4991, at 25-26 (comparable ad-
monition in English law reform proposal).
318. The Department has already noted in a brief before the Supreme Court that
using the defendant's pretrial silence would be consistent with Doyle "if the defendant
were told that his silence at the time of arrest could be used against him at trial." Brief
for Petitioner at 26-27 n.15, United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25 (1988).
319. 447 U.S. at 236-38.
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pretrial silence for purposes other than impeachment of the de-
fendant's trial testimony, but no holdings on this general ques-
tion. The decisions sanctioning the use of pretrial silence for im-
peachment are not directly on point, since they rest in part on
the rationale that the government can validly make the defen-
dant's "waiver" of the fifth amendment right when he decides to
testify an all-or-nothing proposition, including exposure to im-
peachment by earlier silence. They do not determine what the
rule should be when the defendant has decided not to testify,
and admission of his pretrial silence is sought for some other
bearing it has on the probability of guilt or innocence.
The precedents that would be most strongly urged against the
admissibility of silence in such a case are Griffin v. California
and Carter v. Kentucky. However, even assuming that these de-
cisions remain in effect, comment or inferences concerning si-
lence at trial and disclosure of pretrial silence are distin-
guishable in several respects:
First, there is a distinction in terms of historical support for
the respective practices. While the rules barring comment on the
defendant's silence at trial were frequently criticized, relatively
few states actually adopted a contrary rule. In contrast, consid-
eration of pretrial silence was widely allowed, and was not lim-
ited to disclosure of such silence to impeach the defendant's trial
testimony. The disclosure of pretrial silence pursuant to the
common law preliminary examination procedure pre-dated the
authorization of testimony at trial by the defendant. The later
admission of pretrial silence pursuant to the adoptive admis-
sions doctrine was also not limited to the use of silence for
impeachment.
820
Second, the Court has generally been willing to uphold rules
discouraging or circumscribing the choice of silence if they were
perceived as serving some legitimate truth-promoting func-
tion.3 2 ' Griffin and Carter represent a departure from the gen-
eral course of decisions in this area, and might be understood as
reflecting a view that permitting adverse comment on the de-
fendant's silence at trial is not a legitimate truth-promoting
measure, but carries substantial risks of prejudice and misappre-
hension. The most strongly and frequently urged possibility is
that the defendant may actually stay off the stand to avoid dis-
closure of his criminal record pursuant to the impeachment rule,
but the jury in such a case may misapprehend that his silence
320. See generally supra notes 27-31, 45-47 and accompanying text.
321. See generally supra notes 216-26 and accompanying text.
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reflects an inability to respond to the evidence. This concern
does not apply in relation to pretrial silence, since talking before
trial does not result in disclosure of the defendant's criminal re-
cord at trial, and apprehension about such a disclosure accord-
ingly cannot be the motive for pretrial silence. More generally,
the risk of misapprehension of the reason for pretrial silence is
minimized by the fact that the defendant is free to take the
stand at trial and explain the reason for his silence at an earlier
point. "'
Third, the decision whether to take the stand at trial may be
considered a particularly sensitive choice in relation to fifth
amendment values, since it entails an exposure to compulsion at
the stage of cross-examination. The testifying defendant is not
free to limit his disclosure, but must answer the prosecutor's
questions. In contrast, a defendant or potential defendant who
talks in an informal setting before trial-for example, in ques-
tioning by the police either before or after arrest-can say as
much or as little as he likes, and is not subject to compulsion to
respond.
Finally, there is a strong policy argument for admitting pre-
trial silence for other purposes, as well as for impeachment,
since a contrary rule would create a disincentive to testimony by
the defendant. The first Report in this series observed:
[A] rule admitting pretrial silence when the defendant
takes the stand but not otherwise would create a perverse
incentive to refrain from testifying. Since the defen-
dant-whether innocent or guilty-is normally the per-
son who knows the most about the truth of the charges
against him, it is desirable to have him available for ex-
amination at trial, and detrimental to the discovery of
truth if evidentiary rules are so devised as to discourage
him from taking the stand.2 3
Turning to practical considerations relating to the selection of
test cases, an obvious constraint is that any case selected should
not be one in which the defendant has received Miranda warn-
ings prior to the relevant period of silence. The warnings would
bring into play the rule of Doyle v. Ohio, which applies to bar
the use of pretrial silence as evidence in the government's case
in chief,3 24 as well as for impeachment.
322. See generally supra notes 271-82 and accompanying text.
323. REPORT No. 1, supra note 16, Part IV.D.4.
324. See Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 292 (1986).
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In general, a defendant's silence before trial may be relevant
as evidence of an inability to tell a truthful exculpatory story
and as evidence of consciousness of guilt.3 28 The issue would be
presented most favorably, however, if the defendant's silence
also had some more specific probative force. Two possibilities
may be noted:
First, a classic "adoptive admissions" situation would present
a favorable type of test case-for example, a case in which the
defendant is directly confronted by a victim or witness who
identifies him as the perpetrator, or a case in which the defend-
ant's accomplice makes a confession in his presence which impli-
cates the defendant, but the defendant makes no denial. The
probative value of silence in such circumstances is particularly
great, and excluding it would require a partial invalidation of an
ancient evidentiary doctrine that the Court has applied in the
past, and whose general validity the Court has continued to
endorse.2 6
Second, silence in some cases has a specific bearing on the
credibility of a defense presented through other witnesses. Re-
turning to an example suggested earlier, 27 suppose that a de-
fendant is arrested shortly after the occurrence of an offense and
says nothing at the time of arrest, but later presents an alibi
defense at trial through other witnesses. The defendant's pre-
trial silence in such a case raises the possibility that the alibi
defense was concocted at a later point, after the defendant had
had an opportunity to line up the witnesses. In this type of case
as well, the failure of the defendant to make a statement at an
early point has a specific relevance to the issues in the case, in
addition to its general relevance as evidence of consciousness of
guilt or an inability to respond truthfully to the charges.
CONCLUSION
Few would deny that there cannot be justice without the relia-
ble discovery of the truth on a regular basis, but many features
of current criminal procedure reflect a willingness to subordinate
the search for truth to other ends. Any constraints on the dis-
325. See generally supra text accompanying notes 278-80.
326. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976) (endorsing adoptive admis-
sions doctrine and other evidentiary consideration of silence); Sparf and Hansen v.
United States, 156 U.S. 51, 56 (1895) (admitting accomplice's confession under adoptive
admissions doctrine).
327. See supra text accompanying notes 278-80.
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covery or use of evidence that the Constitution actually
prescribes must, of course, be scrupulously observed. It is a very
different matter, however, to create new "rights," based on mis-
interpretations of the Constitution, which limit legislative dis-
cretion in seeking to improve the processes of justice for the
benefit of the whole public, and impede government in discharg-
ing its primary mission of ensuring the security of its people in
their lives and liberty:
Truth here is the aim .... When the guilty go unde-
tected, or, if detected, are nonetheless set free because
plain evidence of guilt is suppressed, the price is exacted
from what must be the first right of the individual, the
right to be protected from criminal attack in his home, in
his work, and in the streets. Government is constituted to
provide law and order. The Bill of Rights must be under-
stood in the light of that mission.
There is no right to escape detection. There is no right
to commit a perfect crime or to an equal opportunity to
that end. The Constitution is not at all offended when a
guilty man stubs his toe. On the contrary, it is decent to
hope that he will. . . . Thus the Fifth Amendment does
not say that a man shall not be permitted to incriminate
himself, or that he shall not be persuaded to do so. It
says no more than that a man shall not be "compelled"
to give evidence against himself.
2 8
In particular, the fifth amendment does not state or fairly im-
ply that rules must be adopted to protect the defendant from
the inferences which are normally drawn from silence in the face
of incriminating circumstances. The rules which have been
adopted to that end can accurately be described as self-inflicted
wounds of the contemporary criminal justice process.
As Ernest van den Haag has observed, conducting a criminal
trial without the testimony of the defendant is like playing
Hamlet without the prince. Yet the existing rules are designed
to facilitate the reduction of the principal actor in the courtroom
drama to a mute presence. Under Griffin v. California, adverse
comment on the defendant's failure to testify is barred. Carter v.
Kentucky goes further and entitles the defendant to an affirma-
tive instruction to the jury that no inference is to be drawn from
his failure to say what he knows-an effort to enlist the jurors in
328. State v. McKnight, 243 A.2d 240, 250 (N.J. 1968).
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the "process of nullifying [their] own reasoning powers. ' '1 29
There are comparable constraints on the consideration of pre-
trial silence. Under the Miranda procedures, a suspect in cus-
tody cannot be asked questions unless he consents to question-
ing, and under Doyle v. Ohio, silence subsequent to the warnings
must be concealed from the trier. The general principle is that
the defendant is not to be questioned in the most important in-
vestigative and adjudicative contexts unless he deems it in his
interest to be questioned, and that his failure to speak in these
contexts cannot be considered against him.
"If all the criminals of every class had assembled, and framed
a system after their own wishes, is not this rule the very first
which they would have established for their security?"33 10 There
is no impediment in constitutional principle or sound policy to
rectifying the situation by allowing the normal incentives to re-
spond to charges of serious misconduct to operate, and by per-
mitting natural inferences to be drawn if no response is forth-
coming. The current system, however, does its best to eliminate
both the inferences and the incentives. Correcting this anomaly
would produce a more rational and just criminal justice system.
It would deprive "[t]he innocent defendant. . . of no essential
protection and the guilty accused . . . only of a shelter to which
he is in no way entitled." 31
329. 8 WIGMORE'S EVIDENCE § 2272, at 436 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
330. J. BENTHAM, A TREAT SE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, supra note 36, at 241.
331. Dunmore, supra note 248, at 470.
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